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INTRODUCTION
S in ce  the p a th -b re a k in g  w o rk  on the eco n o m ics  o f c r im e  developed
by G a ry  B e c k e r 1 , m any eco n o m is ts  have focused on the p ro b le m  o f
c r im e  and c r im e  c o n tro l.^  T h ese  a n a ly s es  use a  m odel w h ich  tre a ts
c r im in a l a c t iv ity  d ec is io n s  as la b o r  supply d e c is io n s . An in d iv id u a l
ra t io n a lly  d ec id es  w h e th e r o r  not to c o m m it c r im e s  depending on h is
expected  g a ins  fro m  c o m m ittin g  c r im e ,  h is  expected  costs  and h is
o p p o rtu n ity  co st re s u ltin g  fro m  not w o rk in g  in the le g a l s e c to r . C o sts
a re  in c u rre d  because the o ffe n d e r m ay be apprehended  and im p ris o n e d .
It  is expected  that an in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f p ris o n  o r  the len g th
o f p ris o n  sentence im posed w il l  d e te r  c r im e  because the expected  gains
fro m  c o m m ittin g  c r im e s  a re  red u ced .
T h e  p re s e n t a n a ly s is  uses the sam e b as ic  m odel o f the in d iv id u a l's
c r im in a l b e h a v io r d ec is io n s  as the one developed  by B e c k e r  and re fin e d
and ap p lied  by Isa a c  E h r l ic h .^  H o w e v e r , the B e c k e r /E h r l ic h  m odel is
expanded in two w a y s . F i r s t ,  som e of the b a s ic  assu m p tio n s  o f th e ir
m odel a re  changed . In th e ir  m o d e l, the p ro b a b ility  o f app reh en s io n
4
is assum ed  to be independent o f the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d .
A ls o , they assum e that the sentence im posed is a function  o f the n u m b e r  
o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d . H e re , these assu m p tio n s  a re  re v e rs e d . The
2
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is assum ed to v a ry  w ith  the n u m b er o f c r im e s  
c o m m itte d  and the c o s t is assum ed to be independent o f the n u m b e r o f 
c r im e s  c o m m itte d  in the c u r re n t  p e r io d . T h u s , th is  a n a ly s is  e x a m in e s  
the e x te n t to w h ich  the conclus ions  o f the m odel o f c r im e  c o n tro l 
c u r re n t ly  used by a n u m b e r o f e co n o m is ts  a re  changed when the assu m p ­
tions  a re  changed.
T h e  second w ay in w h ich  th is  a n a ly s is  expands the b as ic  m odel is  
by a llo w in g  a n u m b e r o f u n d e s ira b le  outcom es to a ffe c t the d e c is io n ­
m akin g  o f the p o te n tia l o ffe n d e r . In the B e c k e r /E h r l ic h  a n a ly s is , th e re
is one d e s ira b le  outcom e: no a r r e s t  and th e re  is one u n d e s ira b le  outcom e
5
a r r e s t ,  c o n v ic tio n  and im p ris o n m e n t. H e r e ,  the u n d e s ira b le  ou tcom es
inc lude: a r r e s t  but no co n v ic tio n ; a r r e s t  and co n v ic tio n  but no in c a r c e -
6
ra tio n ; a r r e s t ,  co n v ic tio n  and a ja i l  sentence; and a r r e s t ,  co n v ic tio n  
and a p r is o n  sen ten ce .
An a g g reg a te  c r im e  supply  function  is d e r iv e d  fro m  the m odel o f 
in d iv id u a l c r im in a l  b e h a v io r . T h e  in d iv id u a l's  supply o f c r im e  is  a 
function  o f h is  g a ins  fro m  c o m m ittin g  o ffen ses  h is  o p p o rtu n ity  costs  o f 
not engaging in le g a l w o r k , and h is  p re fe re n c e  to w ard  r is k .  In the 
a g g re g a te , c r im e  is  a function  o f the p ro b a b ilit ie s  and co sts  o f a r r e s t ,  
c o n v ic tio n  and in c a r c e r a t io n , as  w e ll as o th e r  v a r ia b le s  not d ire c t ly  
re la te d  to the c r im in a l  ju s tic e  s y s te m .
T h e  a g g reg a te  function  is te s te d , us ing  1970 data  fo r  the 62 co unties  
in N ew  Y o r k  S ta te . T h e  county le v e l is the s m a lle s t u n it in w h ich  th e re
3
Is  s e p a ra te  a d m in is tra tio n  o f  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t a g en c ie s . T h e  county is  
thus the s m a lle s t  u n it o f o b s erv a tio n  in w h ich  th e re  is s e p a ra te  d e c is io n ­
m aking  about the la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s . /Most o th e r  s tu d ies  have  
tes ted  the d e te rre n c e  m odel a t the S ta te w id e  le v e l ,  o r  fo r  m u n ic ip a li­
t ie s  o r  s m a lle r  d iv is io n s .
C h a p te r  1 p re s e n ts  a d e s c rip tio n  o f the th e o re tic a l m odel o f c r im e  
and the in d iv id u a l. In C h a p te r  2 ,  a d e s c rip tio n  o f the in d iv id u a l and 
a g g reg a te  s u p p ly -o f-o ffe n s e s  functions a re  p re s e n te d , as w e ll as  the  
hypotheses to be te s te d . In C h a p te r  3 ,  th e re  is  a d e s c rip tio n  o f the 
c r im in a l ju s tic e  s ys te m  in N ew  Y o r k  S ta te  and o f the d ata  used to tes t 
the h yp o th eses . C h a p te r  4 p re s e n ts  the e c o n o m e tr ic  s e p c ific a tio n  o f 
the m o d e l, and re g re s s io n  re s u lts . In C h a p te r  5 ,  the co n c lu s io n s  to 
the a n a ly s is  a re  p re s e n te d .
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F O O T N O T E S
1 G a ry  S .  B e c k e r , " C r im e  and P u n ish m en t: A n E co n o m ic  A p p ro a c h ,"  
in G a ry  B e c k e r  and W il l ia m  L a n d e s , ( e d s .) ,  E ss a ys  in the E co n o m ics  o f  
C r im e  and P u n ish m e n t (N ew  Y o rk : C o lu m b ia  U n iv e rs ity  P re s s  1974 ).
(T h e  a r t ic le  w as  o r ig n ia l ly  pub lished  in 1968 in the M a r c h /A p r i l  issue  
of T h e  J o u rn a l o f P o lit ic a l  Econom y 7 8 . )
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S e e , fo r  e x a m p le , D av id  L .  S jo q u is t, " P r o p e r ty  C r im e  and 
E co n o m ic  B e h a v io r: S o m e E m p ir ic a l  R e s u lts ,"  A m e r ic a n  E co n o m ic  
R e v ie w  83 (June 1973); R . A .  C a r r - H i l l  and N . H .  S te r n ,  "A n E c o n o m e tr ic  
M odel o f the S upp ly  and C o n tro l o f R eco rd ed  O ffe n s es  in England and W a le s ,"  
J o u rn a l o f P u b lic  E co n o m ics  2 (N o v e m b e r 1973); Eugene S w im m e r ,  
" M e a s u re m e n t o f the E ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f U rban  L a w  E n fo rc e m e n t-A  S im u lta ­
neous A p p ro a c h ,"  S o u th ern  E con om ic  J o u rn a l 40  (A p r i l  1974); L la d  P h ill ip s  
and H a ro ld  V o te y , J r .  , "A n E con om ic  A n a ly s is  o f the D e fe r r e n t  E ffe c t o f 
L aw  E n fo rc e m e n t on C r im in a l A c t iv i t ie s ,"  J o u rn a l o f C r im in a l L a w , 
C r im in o lo g y , and P o lic y  S c ien ce  63 (S e p te m b e r  1972); Isaac  E h r l ic h ,  
" P a r t ic ip a t io n  in I l le g it im a te  A c t iv it ie s :  A n E co n o m ic  A n a ly s is ,"  in G a ry  
B e c k e r  and W il l ia m  Lan d es  (e d s .) ,  E ssays  in the E co n o m ics  of C r im e  and 
P u n ish m e n t, (N ew  Y o rk :  C o lu m b ia  U n iv e rs ity  P re s s  1974) (A r t ic le  w as  
o r ig in a lly  pub lished  in 1973 in the M a y /J u n e  issue o f T h e  J o u rn a l o f 
P o lit ic a l  E conom y 81); D onald  M a th ieso n  and P e te r  P a s s e l l ,  "H o m ic id e  and 
R o b b ery  in N ew  Y o r k  C ity : An E co n o m ic  M o d e l, "  J o u rn a l o f L eg a l S tu d ie s  
5 (J a n u a ry , 1976.)
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E h r l ic h ,  " P a r t ic ip a t io n  in I l le g it im a te  A c t iv i t ie s ."
4
T h is  assu m p tio n  is  re la x e d  in the appen d ix  to E h r l ic h 's  a n a ly s is .  
H o w e v e r , E h r lic h  o n ly  a n a ly ze s  one s p ec ia l case: W h e re  an exogenous  
s h ift  in the a v e ra g e  p ro b a b ility  causes the m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  to r is e  
by the sam e p erce n ta g e  as  the change in the a v e ra g e  p ro b a b ility .
5
A lthough these a u th o rs  do a llo w , th e o r e t ic a l ly ,  fo r  m any s ta te s  o f  
the w o r ld ,  they  do not s p e c if ic a lly  e xam in e  m o re  than one u n fa v o rab le  
outcom e fo r  the c r im in a l .
T o  be s p e c if ic , j a i l  r e fe rs  to in c a rc e ra tio n  in a lo c a l (m u n ic ip a l 
o r  cou n ty ) fa c i l i ty  w ith  a m a x im u m  sentence o f up to one y e a r .  P r is o n  
r e fe r s  to in c a rc e ra tio n  o f one y e a r  o r  m o re  in a s ta te  c o rre c tio n a l  
f a c i l i t y .  In c a rc e ra tio n  r e fe r s  to a j a i l  o r  a  p r is o n  s en ten ce .
5
C H A P T E R  I
C R IM E  A N D  T H E  IN D IV ID U A L
T h e  m odel used to d e r iv e  the supply o f o ffen ses  function  is one o f
expected  u t i l i ty  m a x im iz a t io n . In d iv id u a ls  w i l l  m a x im iz e  the expected
u t i l i ty  g iven  by the fo llo w in g  function:
s
( 1 .1 )  E U (C s , t c s ) =  ^  TTs U (C s , t c s ) .
3= 1
U ti l i ty  is a function  o f the am ount o f m o n e y  a v a ila b le  to spend on 
consum ption goods (C ) as w e ll as the t im e  a v a ila b le  fo r  consum ption  
( tc ) .  E xpected  u t i l i ty  is the sum  o f the u t i l i ty  in each p o ssib le  s ta te  o f 
the w o rld  ( i . e .  , o u tco m e) w eig h ted  by the p ro b a b ility  o f th a t o u tco m e. 
TheTT v a r ia b le  re p re s e n ts  the p ro b a b ility  o f s ta te  s . (T h e  sum  o f the 
TTs ' s  m u st equal o n e .)  In d iv id u a ls  w i l l  a llo c a te  th e ir  t im e  to leg a l 
a c t iv i t ie s ,  il le g a l a c t iv it ie s  and consum ption  a c t iv it ie s  in a  m a n n er  
w h ich  w il l  re s u lt  in m a x im u m  p o ss ib le  expected  u t i l i ty .
T h re e  S ta te s  o f the W o rld  
A su m e that th e re  a re  th re e  p o ss ib le  outcom es re s u ltin g  fro m  
c o m m is s io n  o f an offense: no a r r e s t ,  a r r e s t  but no co nvic tion ; and 
a r r e s t ,  co n v ic tio n  and p u n ish m en t.
A s  ind icated  in T a b le  1 , each s ta te  o f the w o rld  has a c e r ta in  p ro o a b U ity  
attached  to i t .  T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f s ta te  o n e , w h e re  th e re  a re  no a r r e s ts ,  
is ( 1 - P ) .  P re p re s e n ts  the p ro b a b ility  o f a t le a s t one a r r e s t  fo r  c o m ­
m itt in g  N n u m b e r o f o ffenses in a g iven tim e  span. T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f 
co n v ic tio n  and p u n ish m en t given a r r e s t  is Q . T h u s , the p ro b a b ility  o f 
s ta te  tw o , w h e re  th e re  is a r r e s t  but no c o n v ic tio n , is P ( 1 - Q ) .  The  
p ro b a b ility  o f the m o s t u n fa v o rao le  o u tco m e , s ta te  th re e , is P Q .
and P u n ish m en t
T h e  consum ption  p ro s p ec t in s ta te  one is equal to the to ta l incom e: 
f ix e d  incom e (W ’ ) p lu s  ille g a l incom e plus le g a l e a rn in g s . W . is  the 
(c o n s tan t) w age fro m  c o m m ittin g  an offense and N is  the n u m b e r o f  
o ffen ses  c o m m itte d . It  is a ss u m e d , fo r  s im p lic ity ,  th a t one o ffense  is  
c o m m itte d  p e r  h o u r. T h u s , t im e s  N is the ille g a l in c o m e. T h e  
(c o n s tan t) h o u rly  w age in the le g a l s e c to r is re p re s e n te d  by W i_and ti_ 
re p re s e n ts  the am o u n t o f tim e  a llo c a te d  to g en era tin g  leg a l e a rn in g s .  
L e g a l e a rn in g s  is tim e s  t .
T A B L E  1
C O N S U M P T IO N  P R O S P E C T S  A N D  P R O B A B IL IT IE S :  
T H R E E  S T A T E S  O F  T H E  W O R L D
S ta te  o f the W o rld P ro b a b ility C onsum ption  P ro s p e c t
1 . No a r r e s t ( 1 - P ) C 1 =W  1 +W j(N}fW jt u
2 . A r r e s t  but no 
C o n v ic tio n
P(1 -Q )
3 .  A r r e s t ,  C o n v ic tio n P Q C 3 =W  ' + W ;^ fW fe't  j - F a - F b
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The consum ption  in s ta te  two is equal to incom e in s ta te  one m inus  
the costs  (d ir e c t ,  in d ire c t  and p sych ic ) asso c ia ted  w ith  a p p re h e n s io n ,
F  . D ir e c t  costs  include le g a l fe e s , the costs  o f a b a il bond, e tc .
cl
In d ire c t  costs  include the va lu e  o f the t im e  no lo n g e r a v a ila b le  fo r  
g e n era tin g  incom e (o r  fo r  c o n su m p tio n ). A ls o , the s tig m a  of a r r e s t  
m ig h t reduce  the fu tu re  incom e s tre a m  o f the in d iv id u a l. w ould  
then include the p re s e n t va lu e  o f the fu tu re  incom e s tre a m  w h ich  is  lo s t .  
A n d , th e re  m ig h t a lso  be p sych ic  costs  asso c ia ted  w ith  a r r e s t .
T h e  consum ption  p ro s p e c t in s ta te  th re e  is equal to the incom e in 
s ta te  one m inus the c o s t o f a p p re h e n s io n , F  , and m inus the co st o fCl
co n v ic tio n  and p u n is h m en t, F ^ . T h e  o ffe n d e r in c u rs  a ll  o f the costs
included in F  p lus  the a d d itio n a l d ir e c t ,  in d ire c t and p sych ic  costs  
a
o f co n v ic tio n  and p u n ish m en t. F o r  e x a m p le , w ith  c o n v ic tio n , the 
o ffe n d e r o b ta in s  o r  len gthens h is  c r im in a l re c o rd . T h is  m ig h t a ffe c t  
p re s e n t and fu tu re  in c o m e. And the p u n is h m en t, w h ich  w ould include  
e ith e r  p ro b a tio n a ry  s u p e rv is io n  o r  in c a rc e ra t io n , w ould  s u re ly  reduce  
p re s e n t w e a lth , and p o s s ib ly  w ould  reduce  fu tu re  w e a lth , a ls o .
I t  is assum ed that:
( 1 .2 )  Fa> O; F b> O
and th e re fo re
( 1  .3 )  ^  1^ C 3 .
E quation  ( 2 .1 )  can now be re w r it te n  as:
O ' - 4 )  E U ( C s , t c s ) < 1 - P ) U ( C - ,  ,  t  c  1 ) + P  (1 - Q )  U  (C g .tc  2  ) + P Q U  ( c 3 , t  c 3 ) .
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T h e  p ro b le m  is to m a x im iz e  equation  ( i .4 )  su b jec t to consum ption  
c o n s tra in ts  o f through C g , and the t im e  c o n s tra in t g iven by:
.5 )  t= t i+ tc + N .
S in ce  th is  a n a ly s is  does not in v es tig a te  the issue o f t im e  a llo c a tio n  
betw een w o rk  and co n su m p tio n , i t  is assum ed th a t d ec is io n s  o f w h e th e r  
to w o rk  o r  use tim e  fo r  le is u re  a re  m ade independently  o f d ec is io n s  
co n cern in g  a llo c a tin g  t im e  betw een  leg a l and i l le g a l w o rk . T h u s , fo r  
o u r p u rp o s e s , equation  (1 .5 )  is  reduced  to :
( 1 .6 )  t = t i+ N = t - t c .
and
( ■ • 7) tc 1 = tc 2 stc3=tc-
A ls o , the expected  u t i l i ty  function  can be e xp re s se d  in te rm s  o f 
C-) and the F^ 's  r a th e r  than the C ^ 's . E quation  (1 .4 )  is now re w r it te n  a s .
0  -3 )  E U (C s<t c )= (1 -P )U (C -i , t c)+P(1 -Q )U (C - i -  F a , t c)+ P Q U (C - i-F a
- F b , t c)
E quation  (1 . 8 ) w i l l  be m a x im iz e d  when t im e  is  o p t im a lly  d is tr ib u te d  b e t­
w een  c r im e  and le g a l w o rk .
B e fo re  p re s e n tin g  the f i r s t - o r d e r  co n d itio n s  fo r  expected  u t i l i ty  
m a x im iz a t io n , som e assu m p tio n s  need to be m ade about the re la tio n s h ip s  
betw een  the p ro b a b ilit ie s  and costs  o f u n d e s ira b le  ou tcom es and the 
n u m b e r o f  o ffen ses  c o m m itte d . It  is assu m ed , fo r  s im p lic ity ,  that the  
n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d  in the c u r re n t  t im e  p e rio d  w i l l  not a ffe c t  
the co sts  o f a p p re h e n s io n , co n vic tio n  and p u n ish m en t. S in ce  the  
o p e ra tio n a l t im e  span used in th is  a n a ly s is  is one y e a r ,  th is  assum ption
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m eans th a t the n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  p re v io u s ly  c o m m itte d  d u rin g  the c u r re n t  
y e a r  do not a ffe c t the F . 's .  Such an a s s u m p tio n , a lthough it is a depai—  
tu re  fro m  m ost o th e r  a n a ly s e s , is not u n re as o n a b le .
The  ra tio n a le  fo r  the F^ 's  to be independent o f N is  th a t past 
c r im in a l  re c o rd  is  assum ed to be a d e te rm in a n t in the h a rsh n ess  o f  
tre a tm e n t the o ffe n d e r re c e iv e s  d u rin g  the p ro c es s  o f re s o lv in g  the 
a r r e s t  in the c r im in a l ju s tic e  s y s te m . And h a rs h e r  tre a tm e n t is  l ik e ly  
to ra is e  the F ^ 's . B u t, o ffen ses  c o m m itte d  d u rin g  the c u r r e n t  y e a r  
p ro b a b ly  do not co n stitu te  the m a jo r  p a r t  o f the c r im in a l 's  re c o rd  
because: ( 1 ) the c u r re n t  y e a r  is  on ly  p a r t  o f the o ffe n d e r 's  c r im in a l  
" c a r e e r "  and ( 2 ) m o s t c r im e s  c o m m itte d  d u rin g  th is  y e a r  have p ro b a b ly  
not been d e te c te d , and a re  even le s s  l ik e ly  to have a lre a d y  re s u lte d  in a 
c o n v ic tio n . T h u s , c r im e s  c o m m itte d  in o th e r  y e a rs  a re  assum ed  to be 
the m a jo r  p a r t  o f the c r im in a l  r e c o r d , and on ly  c r im e s  c o m m itte d  in 
p ast y e a rs  a re  assum ed  to a ffe c t the F ^ 's .
T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  in one y e a r ,  P ,  is thought to be a p o s itive  
function  o f the n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d  that y e a r .  T h is  assum ption  
is ,  a g a in , a d e p a rtu re  fro m  p r io r  a n a ly s e s . 1 B u t, i t  s eem s  m o re  
re as o n a b le  to assu m e th a t the m o re  c r im e s  an in d iv id u a l c o m m its , the 
g r e a te r  h is  chances o f being caugh t. The  s p e c ific  fu n c tio n a l fo rm  o f th is  
p ro b a b ility  d is tr ib u tio n  is d iscussed  m o re  fu lly  la t e r  in the a n a ly s is .
T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f co n vic tio n  and p u n ish m en t is assum ed to be in d e -
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pendent o f the n u m b e r o f o ffenses c o m m itte d . T h is  assu m p tio n  is  
c o n s is te n t w ith  p ro p e r  t r ia l  p ra c t ic e s  w h ich  d ic ta te  tha t the accused is  
o n ly  on t r ia l  fo r  the p a r t ic u la r  o ffense fo r  w h ich  he w as  a r re s te d .
P a s t re c o rd  is not supposed to e n te r  into the d e te rm in a tio n  o f g u ilt  o r  
in n o cen ce .
The re la tio n s h ip s  betw een the n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  and the p ro b a b i­
l i t ie s  and costs  can be s u m m a riz e d  by the fo llo w in g  equations:
( 1  .9 )  F a  = G; o  Fb  = O
S n
(1 .1 0 )  6  P = P N > O
<S N
(1 .1 1 )  <5Q = O
S N
T h e  f i r s t - o r d e r  co n d itio n  fo r  c o n s tra in e d  u t i l i ty  m a x im iz a t io n  is 
now found by d if fe re n t ia t in g  equation  (1 .3 )  w ith  re s p e c t to N , the n u m b er  
o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d . T h e  r e s u lt  is:
(1.12)  ^SU = (1 -P )d U '1+P(1-Q)dU2+PQciU'3+f=Nj:i-Q )U2+QU3-
u p  = O
w h e re :
(1 .1 3 )  U-| = U (C 1 , tc ) > O
sc1
u2= U (C 2 , t c )  U '2 = 5 u _ >  o
$c2
U 3 = U (C 3 >tc ) U 43= | U  > O
and
T h e  f i r s t  th re e  te rm s  o f  equation  (1 .1 2 )  a re  a w eigh ted  sum  o f the 
m a rg in a l u t i l i t ie s  o f incom e in each s ta te , m u ltip lie d  by d , the 
m a rg in a l re tu rn  f ro m  a llo c a tin g  an a d d itio n a l hour to c r im e  ra th e r  than  
le g a l w o rk . T h e  la s t  te r m  is tim e s  a w eigh ted  a v e ra g e  o f U 2  and U 3 , 
m inus  U-) . S in ce  is assum ed to be p o s itiv e  and U-)> U 2  ^U g , the la s t  
te rm  w i l l  be n e g a tiv e . In o r d e r  to fu l f i l l  the f i r s t - o r d e r  c o n d itio n , d 
m u st be p o s it iv e . T h a t  is ,  the w age in ille g a l w o rk  m ust exceed the  
le g a l w ag e .
The f i r s t - o r d e r  co n d itio n  can be re w r it te n  as:
(1 .1 5 )  P N = d ( ( 1 - P ) U , 1 + P (1 -Q )U 12 + P Q U ,q)
U t - ( 1 - Q ) U 2 -Q U 3
T h e  le f t  s ide o f th is  equation  could be in te rp re te d  as the m a rg in a l c o s t, 
to the o ffe n d e r , o f c o m m ittin g  an a d d itio n a l o ffe n s e . T h e  r ig h t s ide  
could be in te rp re te d  as the o ffe n d e r 's  m a rg in a l re v e n u e . S in ce  the  
o ffe n d e r is  a  m o n o p o lis t in supplying  h is  own la b o r  (to < ;r im e ), he w il l  
be in e q u ilib r iu m  w h e re  h is  m a rg in a l reven u e  equals  m a rg in a l c o s t.
F ig u re  1 i l lu s tra te s  tw o p o s s ib ilit ie s  fo r  s tab le  e q u ilib r iu m . I f  
both the m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  and m a rg in a l reven u e  c u rv e s  fa ll  
as  N in c re a s e s  the M C  c u rv e  w i l l  be le s s  s te ep ly  sloped than the M R  
c u rv e . I f  both fu n c tio n s  a re  in c re a s in g  w ith  N , the M C  c u rv e  w i l l  be 
m o re  s te ep ly  s loped then M R . M a th e m a tic a lly , the s tab le  e q u ilib r iu m  
o c c u rs  w h e re :
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( 1  . 16) & M C  N j>M R  
S N  y «5N
M C = F n ;M R =  eJ ((1 -P )U , 1 + P (1 -Q )U '2 ^ Q U ,3
u r ( i - Q )  u 2 - Q u 3
O r ,  su b stitu tin g  equation (1 .1 5 )  into (1 . 16) w e obta in :
(1 .1 7 )  P N ^  d2 ( ( 1 - P ) U " 1 + P (1 -Q )U " 2 + P Q U " 3 )+ (d M R -K iP n )
__________________________________ ((1 - Q ) U ,q+ Q U ,3 - U >i  )
U -|- (1 -Q )U 2 -Q U 3
-lAfc






(A ) (B )
iAC
N
M a rg in a l R evenue and M a rg in a l C o st C u rv e s
(A ) R e p re s e n ts  case w h e re  both M C  and M R  a re  fa llin g
(B ) R e p re s e n ts  case w h e re  both M C  and M R  a re  r is in g
T h e  sam e re s u lt  is ach ieved  by assum ing  the expected  u t i l i ty
function  is convex to the o r ig in .  E xp ressed  th is  way:
, 2
(1 .1 3 ) ■ U e u  
\ * N  ,
-5 N
d‘'(P (1 -Q )U " 2 -H=QU"3 + ( 1 - P ) U " 1) +  
= 4 =  2 P N (d X (1 -Q )U ,2+Q U ,3 - U '1) +
P n n  C (1-Q )U 2 +Q U 3 - U i )  q. o  .
No conclusion  about U" can be m ade by e xa m in in g  the s e c o n d -o rd e r  
cond ition  exp re s se d  in equation  (1 .1 8 ) .  I f  the in d iv id u a l is r is k  a v e rs e  
and th e re fo re  'J" is  le s s  than z e r o ,  the f i r s t  te rm  w i l l  be neg ative  but 
the second te rm  w i l l  be p o s it iv e , s in ce  U-)' is  les s  than U2 ' and U3 ’ .
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i f  the in d iv id u a l is r is k  n e u tra l,  and th e re fo re  U " equals  z e r o ,  then  
m u st be p o s itiv e  to fu l f i l l  equation ( 1  .1 8 ) .
T h e  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  w h ich  e n te r  into the co n d itio n  d es­
c r ib in g  the o p tim a l n u m b e r o f o ffenses  a re : P ,  the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t ;
Q , the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  and pu n ish m en t g iven  a r r e s t ;  F a , the co st 
o f ap p reh en s io n ; and F ^ , the co s t o f co n v ic tio n  and sentence g iven  
a p p re h e n s io n . A ls o , the w ages in the le g a l and il le g a l s e c to rs  a ffe c t  
t im e  a llo c a tio n  to c r im e .  W h a t w i l l  be the e ffe c t on c r im e  o f an in c re a s e  
in each  o f these v a r ia b le s ?
A .  A  C H A N G E  IN T H E  P R O B A B IL IT Y  O F  A R R E S T
A s  s ta ted  e a r l i e r ,  the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is assum ed to b e , in 
p a r t ,  a  function  o f the n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d . T h e  p ro b a b ility  of 
a r r e s t  is  a lso  a function  o f an exogenous v a r ia b le ,  x .  T h e  g e n e ra l fo rm  
o f th is  p ro b a b ility  function  is:
( 1 .1 9 )  P  = P ( N ,x )
A n exogenous s h ift  in P is caused by a change in the exogenous  
v a r ia b le  in the P  fu n c tio n , x .  B y d iffe re n tia t in g  equation  ( 1  .1 2 )  w ith  
re s p e c t to N , the e ffe c t on the o p tim a l n u m b e r o f o ffe n s e s , N * ,  o f an 
in c re a s e  in x can be shown as fo llo w s:
( 1 .2 0 )  d N * =_1 (d P x ( U ' 1 - ( 1 - Q ) U ^ - Q U ,3 )+ P nx( U 1 - ( 1 - Q ) U 2 -Q U 3 )  
dx A
w h e re :
( 1 . 2 1 )  ; p nx = j P n
S *  S *
T h e  sign o f th is  function  is  not d e te rm in e d  w ith o u t fu r th e r  assu m p tio n s
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about the P  fu n c tio n . I f  it  is  assum ed th a t both P  and Pf\j r is e  by the sam e  
p erce n ta g e  w ith  a change in x ,  then it  can be shown th a t the e ffe c t o f  x 
on the n u m b e r o f o p tim a l o ffen s e s  c o m m itte d  w i l l  be n eg ative  re g a rd le s s  
o f the r is k  p re fe re n c e  o f the in d iv id u a l
T h e  above conclus ion  w i l l  not hold when one m a ke s  o th e r  a ss u m p ­
tio n s  about the b e h a v io r  o f the P fu n c tio n . F o r  e x a m p le , take  the case  
w h e re  x is  re p re s e n te d  by (J) , the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffe n s e , 
and P  re p re s e n ts  the p ro b a b ility  o f a t le a s t one a r r e s t  fo r  N o ffe n s e s .
I f  it  assum ed th a t the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one offense is  independent
o f the to ta l n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d , then one can use the b in o m ia l 
d is tr ib u tio n  to find  P as fo llo w s :
(1 .2 2 )  P  = 1 - ( 1 -(J))N
F o r  s m a ll v a lu e s  o f Cj), the above fo rm u la  can be ap p ro xim aced  us ing  the  
3
fo llo w in g :
(1 .2 3 )  P = 1 - ( e ^ N )
F irs t -a n d  S e c o n d - p a r t ia l d e r iv i t iv e s  o f th is  function  w ith  re s p e c t to (p 
and N a r e  e xp re s se d  below :
( 1 .2 4 )  P N =(t)e ~ ^ N > °
(1 .2 5 ) PX=P<|)=Ne-N<^> ̂  O
( 1 .2 6 )  P n x  = (1-<pN) ^ O a s < ( ) N f l
(1 .2 7 ) P NN = -4>2 e - (t)N < O
I t  is  obvious th a t the assu m p tio n  o f an equal p e rce n ta g e  change in P  
and P]^ when x ((j)) changes is  u n re a s o n a b le , using  the above p ro b a b ility  
d is tr ib u t io n . A ls o , the sign  o f P[\jx  '■s am b ig u o u s . T h e  m a rg in a l
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p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  w i l l  in c re a s e  o n ly  fo r  o ffenses  le s s  than 1 /cj>. F o r  
a la rg e  n u m b e r o f o ffe n s e s , che m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  w i l l  f a l l .  
F ig u re  2 i l lu s tra te s  the s h ift  in the P N (m a rg in a l c o s t) function  w ith  a  
s h ift  in the exogenous v a r ia b le ,  h e re  re p re s e n te d  by the p ro b a b ility  o f 
a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffe n s e . It  is  assum ed th a t the M C  c u rv e  is  n e g a tiv e ly  
s lo p ed . T h e  m a rg in a l reven u e  is  held  co n stan t.
I f  the o p tim a l n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  is  le s s  than 1/<|3, a  s h ift in P ^ ,  
caused by an exogenous in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o f­
fe n s e , w i l l  r e s u lt  in a  new e q u ilib r iu m  to the le f t  o f the o r ig in a l e q u ili­
b r iu m . Such a s h ift  in the m a rg in a l co s t function  is  i l lu s tra te d  in F ig u re  
2 ,  panel A .  I f  N *  (th e  o p tim a l n u m b e r o f  o ffen s e s ) is  g r e a te r  than 1 /4 ) ,  a  
s h ift  in the M C  c u rv e  caused by an in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f  a r r e s t  
fo r  one o ffen se  w i l l  re s u lt  in a new  e q u ilib r iu m  po in t w h e re  m o re  o ffen ses
a r e  c o m m itte d . T h is  s h ift  is  in d ica ted  in panel B o f F ig u re  2 .
F ig  2 e ffe c t o f a  change in ($ on m a rg in a l cost
(A )  N *  <  1/(t>
(B )  N *  > 1/<t>
M C  is m a rg in a l co st c u rv e  b e fo re  the s h ift  
M C ' is  m a rg in a l cost c u rv e  a f te r  the s h ift
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It  is not s u rp r is in g  than an in c re a s e  in the m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  o f 
a p p reh e n s io n , m a rg in a l revenue  held co n s tan t, w i l l  re s u lt  in fe w e r  
offenses; and a fa l l  in the m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one offense  
(and th e re fo re  fo r  N o ffen s e s) w il l  re s u lt  in m o re  o ffen s e s . W h at is  
s u rp r is in g  is th a t an in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one offense  
and th e re fo re  fo r  N o ffen ses  w il l  lo w e r  the m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t ,  
P N , in som e c a s e s . In the sam p le  d a ta , d e s c rib e d  la t e r ,  the a v e ra g e  
va lu e  fo r  the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffense  is found to be betw een  
.1 5  and .2 0 .  T h u s , fo r  fe w e r  than fiv e  to seven o ffenses c o m m itte d  
a n n u a lly , a r is e  in the in d iv id u a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  w ould be expected  
to in c re a s e  the m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  and d e te r  c r im e .  F o r  
fre q u e n t o ffe n s e rs , an in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  an 
in d iv id u a l o ffe n s e , hold ing M R  co n s tan t, is  expected  to encou rage c r im e  
by lo w e r in g  the m a rg in a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t .
So f a r ,  the m a rg in a l reven u e  o f c o m m ittin g  an o ffense  has been  
held  co n stan t. One can e xam in e  the to ta l e ffe c t o f a change in (p on N 
by tak in g  the d if fe re n t ia l  o f equation  (1 .1 5 ) .  H e re  <4 ) one o f the enogeuous  
v a r ia b le s  is  a llo w e d  to v a ry  as w e ll as N , the endogenous v a r ia b le :
( 1  .2 3 ) PN<{> d(t)+PN N dN =M R <|)d ^+M R NdN
whe r e :
(1 .2 9 )
P NN  ~ ^ PN MRryj — & M R  
5 N< N
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T h e  to ta l e ffe c t o f a change in (J) on N is  found by n e a rra n g in g  the
te rm s  in equation  ( 1  .2 8 ):
(1 .3 0 )  dN = P N(p -  M R ^
d(J) M R n  -P ,\j n
a cc o rd in g  to equation  (1 .1 6 ) ,  M R N ^ P n n * T h e r e fo r e ,  the d e n o m in a to r
on the r ig h t  s ide o f equation  ( 1  .3 0 )  m u st be n e g a tiv e . Thus:
2 .
( 1  . 3 1 ) dN ^  O as P[\|(p -  MR<j) " y  O
d<t>
T h u s , holding M R  f ix e d ,
(1 .3 2 )  dN >  C as P n a  4 *  C .
dCf) r
T h is  e ffe c t ,  o f $  on the M C  c u rv e , has a lre a d y  been il lu s tra te d  in F i g . 2 .
H ow , hold ing M C  fix e d , and tak in g  the p a r t ia l  d e r iv i t iv e  o f the r ig h t
s ide o f equation (1 .1 5 )  w ith  re s p e c t to (p:
(1 .3 3 )  d N ^ _ 0  as MR<|)= d(P<|)(1 -Q )U 'o -iP (|)Q U '3 - P ( | ) U ' i ) ^  O
d(j> U 1 - ( 1 - Q ) U 2 -Q U 3
S in ce  U i>  U 2 > U g , the d e n o m in a to r m ust be p o s it iv e . E quation  (1 .3 3 )
i l lu s tra te s  that i f  the in d iv id u a l is a r is k  p r e f e r e r ,  m a rg in a l revenue
w il l  fa l l  w ith  an in c re a s e  in the in d iv id u a l p ro b a b ility  o f a r re s t,(J ) .
C o n v e rs e ly , i f  the in d iv id u a l is  a r is k  a v o id e r , the m a rg in a l revenue
c u rv e  w il l  s h ift to the r ig h t as (|) in c re a s e s . T h a t is ,  i f  M C  is  held
co n stan t and <̂) is in c re a s e d , r is k  a v o id e rs  w i l l  tend to in c re a s e  th e ir
o p tim a l n u m b er o f c r im e s  and r is k  p r e fe r e r s  w i l l  reduce c r im e .  The
M R  c u rv e  does noc s h ift fo r  r is k  n e u tra l in d iv id u a ls .
T h e  fa c t th a t an in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f  a r r e s t  encou rages
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r is k  a v o id e rs  to c o m m it c r im e s  m ay s tr ik e  the re a d e r  as c o u n te r in tu it iv e . 
N o te , h o w e v e r, tha t when the in d iv id u a l is r is k  a v e rs e , the m a rg in a l 
u t i l i ty  o f C a t the u n fa v o rab le  outcom es (C 2  and C 3 ) is  g re a te r  than the 
m a rg in a l u t i l i ty  o f C a t the fa v o ra b le  outcom e (C -|). By in c re a s in g  P ,  
th e re  is a g re a te r  p ro b a b ility  o f an u n fa v o rab le  outcom e and th e re fo re  
a  g re a te r  p ro b a b ility  o f an outcom e w ith  g re a te r  m a rg in a l u t i l i ty  o f C .  
T h u s , it  is reaso n ab le  th a t an in c re a s e  in P  w ould in c re a s e  the 
m a rg in a l u t i l i ty  (re v e n u e ) fro m  c r im e  fo r  r is k  a v o id e rs  and d e c re a s e  
the m a rg in a l u t i l i ty  (re v e n u e ) f ro m  c r im e  fo r  r is k  p r e fe r e r s .
F ig u re  3 i l lu s tra te s  the s h ifts  in both M C  and M R  c u rv e s . I t  is  
a ss u m e d , h e re , th a t m ost o ffe n d e rs  c o m m it le s s  than 1 /(p  c r im e s  p e r  
y e a r  and th e re fo re  th a t M C  is in c re a se d  at the e q u ilib r iu m  n u m b e r o f 
o ffe n s e s , N * .
F o r  r is k  p r e fe r e r s  (panel A ) a r is e  in the exogenous p ro b a b ility  
o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffe n s e , 0 ,  w i l l  s h ift the M R  dow nw ard and w ill  
th e re fo re  reduce the e q u ilib r iu m  n u m b e r o f o ffe n s e s . F o r  r is k  
a v o id e rs , the M R  c u rv e  w i l l  s h ift  u p w a rd s . In panel , the s h ift in 
the M R  c u rv e  is  not as g re a t  as  the s h ift  in the M C  c u rv e , and the 
o p tim a l n u m b e r o f o ffenses  w i l l  d e c lin e . In panel B2 , the s h ift in the 
M R  c u rv e  has a g r e a te r  e ffe c t on the n u m b er o f o ffenses  than the s h ift  
in the M C  c u rv e , and m o re  o ffenses  w i l l  be c o m m itte d .
19
* *  N *
(A)
At
F ig . 3 T h e  effects  o f a change in cj> on M C  and M R  C u rv e s
(A ) In d iv id u a l is  a R is k  P r e f e r e r
(B ) In d iv id u a l is a R is k  A v o id e r  
1 . N * 1 <• N *
2 .  N * 1 >  N *
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T h e  o v e ra ll  e ffe c t on c r im e  o f a change in the exogenous com ponent 
o f the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is now shown to be am b ig u o u s . U sing  the 
p la u s ib le  p ro b a b ility  d is tr ib u tio n  c ited  in equation  (1 .2 3 ) ,  the e ffe c t o f 
an in c re a s e  in x  (Cp) on N w il l  p ro b a b ly  be n e g a tiv e , if  the in d iv id u a l is  
a r is k  p r e fe r e r  o r  r is k  n e u tra l.  The e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in x  on the 
n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  r is k  a v o id e rs  c o m m it w i l l  p o s s ib ly  be n eg ative  a ls o . 
T h u s , in the e m p ir ic a l  te s t ,  p re se n te d  la t e r  in th is  a n a ly s is , w e w ould  
exp e c t to find a n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  betw een c r im e  and the p ro b a b ility  o f 
a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffe n s e . H o w e v e r , no re la tio n s h ip  o r  even a  p o s itiv e  
re la t io n s h ip , w ould not be in co n s is ten t w ith  the th e o ry .
B . A  C H A N G E  IN  T H E  P R O B A B IL IT Y  O F  C O N V IC T IO N  A N D  P U N IS H M E N T
W hen the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  and p u n ish m en t g iven  a r r e s t  (Q ) 
in c re a s e s , the o ffe n d e r faces  a g re a te r  chance o f being co n v ic ted  and 
punished upon a r r e s t .  T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f consum ption  p ro s p e c t Cg  
is h ig h e r , the p ro b a b ility  o f consum ption  p ro s p e c t Cq is lo w e r ,  and the 
p ro b a b ility  o f consu m p tion  p ro s p e c t C 1 is  unchanged. T h u s , an in c re a s e  
in Q  w i l l  lo w e r  the exp ected  in c o m e , but w i l l  not a ffe c t the incom e in 
each  s ta te .
T h e  o v e ra ll  e ffe c t o f a  change in the p ro b a b ility  o f  co n v ic tio n  and 
p u n ish m en t on the n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d  can be exa m in ed  in a 
s im i la r  fash io n  to the e ffe c t on N o f a change in (j), o r  in any o f the 
exogenous v a r ia b le s .
A n exogenous change in Q. re s u lts  in the fo llo w in g :
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( 1 .3 4 )  dN_ = P NQ -  M R q
dQ -------------------------
M R n  -  P n n  1
(1 .3 5 )  and dN ^  O as P ,\ jq  ~ M R  q  its  O
dQ <-
S in ce  P does not v a ry  w ith  Q , P ^ jq  is z e r o ,  and a  change in Q  w il l  not 
a ffe c t the M C  c u rv e . T a k in g  the p a r t ia l  d e r iv it iv e  o f M R  w ith  re s p e c t  
to Q  and su b stitu tin g  into equation  ( 1  .3 5 )  w e find:
( 1  .3 6 )  dN }  O as M R q  = M R  ( u 3 - U 2 )  + ( d P U ^ - d P U ^ )  >  O
dQ <  -----------------------------------  ^
U -i-  (1 -Q )U o -Q U 3
The d e n o m in a to r in the M R q  fu n ctio n  m u st be p o s itiv e  s ince  U-|^ U 2 > U 3 - 
M R , d e fined  in equation  ( 1  .1 6 ) ,  is assum ed to be p o s it iv e . If  the 
in d iv id u a l is r is k  n e u tra l,  the M R  function  w i l l  fa ll  as Q is ra is e d .
T h is  re s u lt  is  obta ined  s in ce  U g ) Ug; and U "= 0 .
R is k  p r e fe r e r s  w i l l  a ls o  e x p e rie n c e  a  dow nw ard  s h ift  in the M R  
c u rv e  when Q  in c re a s e s . T h is  s h ift is i l lu s tra te d  in f ig u re  4 ,  panel A .  
T h u s , r is k  p r e fe r e r s  w i l l  reduce c r im e  when Q  in c re a s e s .
T h e  re s u lta n t n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d  w ith  a change in Q  is  
am biguous in  the case o f the r is k  a v e rs e  in d iv id u a l. T h e  f i r s t  te r m  in  
the n u m e ra to r  o f equation  (1 .3 6 )  can be thought o f as the r is k  -n e u tr a l  
e ffe c t , s in ce  the s ign  o f th is  te rm  does not depend on the r is k  p re fe re n c e  
of the in d iv id u a l. In the case o f the e ffe c t a change in Q  on the M R  c u rv e ,  
the r is k -n e u tr a l  e ffe c t is n e g a tiv e .
T h e  second te r m  in the n u m e ra to r  o f equation  ( I  .3 6 )  depends  
on the r is k  p re fe re n c e  o f the in d iv id u a l. In the case  o f the r is k  a v o id e r ,
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LJ*3 > U ancl the r is k -p r e fe r e n c e  e ffe c t is to ra is e  M R  when Q in c re a s e s .  
T h e  o v e ra ll  e f fe c t , th e n , is u n c e r ta in . I f  the r is k -n e u tr a l  e ffe c t is  
s tro n g e r  tnan the r is k -p re fe re n c e  e ffe c t , c r im e s  w i l l  be reduced  (F ig u re  4 ,  
panel B -|). If  the r is k -p r e fe r e n c e  e ffe c t is  s tro n g e r  than the r is k -n e u tr a l  
e ffe c t ,  r is k  a v o id e rs  w i l l  in c re a s e  th e ir  c r im in a l a c t iv ity  (F ig u re  4 ,  
panel E ^ ).
F ig .  4 T h e  e ffe c ts  o f a  change in Q  on M C  and M R  C u rv e s
(A ) In d iv id u a l is  a R is k  P r e f e r e r
(B ) In d iv id u a l is  a R is k  A v o id e r
1. R is k  N e u tra l e ffe c t >  R is k  P re fe re n c e  e ffe c t
2 . R is k  P re fe re n c e  e ffe c t >  R is k  N e u tra l e ffe c t




H * ' N *
( B , )
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F o r  purposes  o f th is  a n a ly s ts , It  Is assum ed th a t m ost r is k  a v o id e rs
w i l l  be d e te r re d  by an in c re a s e  in Q  and th a t, in the a g g re g a te , the
e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in Q  on c r im e  w il l  be n e g a tive .
C . A  C H A N G E  IN  T H E  C O S T S  O F  A P P R E H E N S IO N , O O N V IC T IO N  
A N D  P U N IS H M E N T
A n in c re a s e  in F a , the co st o f a p p re h e n s io n , w i l l  lo w e r  the 
consum ption  p ro s p e c ts  in both o f the u n fa v o rab le  s ta tes  o f the w o r ld .
A n in c re a s e  in F  , the co s t o f co n v ic tio n  and p u n ish m en t, net o f the 
a r r e s t  c o s t, w i l l  lo w e r  the consum ption  p ro s p ec t o n ly  i f  the p erso n  is 
a r re s te d  and c o n v ic te d . T h a t is ,  an in c re a s e  in F a w i l l  reduce  both  
C 0  and C g . An in c re a s e  in F b w i l l  on ly  lo w e r  C 3 .
T h e  e ffe c ts  o f F a  and F b on the n u m b er o f o ffenses  c o m m itte d  can  
be found by tak ing  the d if fe re n t ia l  o f equation  (1 .1 5 )  w ith  re s p e c t to 
N and F a ; and w ith  re s p e c t to N and F b , re s p e c tiv e ly :
(1 .3 7 )  dN_ = P M F b -  M R F a
d F a  M R n  ~ P NN
and
(1 .3 8 )  dN_ = P N F b  -  M R F b
d F K ---------------------------
M R n  -  P N N
S in ce  P does not v a ry  w ith  F a n o r w ith  F b , it  is  e a s ily  shown that:
(1 .3 9 )  _dN >  C as M R p  = M R (-(1  - Q ) U ' 2 - Q U ' 3 )+[;dP(1 - Q ) U " 2
F a <* 3  -d P Q U " 3 ] >
O .
U 1 - ( 1 - Q ) U 2 -Q U 3
and
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n . 4 G >  dN y  0 as  M R F  = M R  ( - Q U Tg )+ (S P Q U "3 ) ?  O .
d F b C  b ----------------------------------------
U 1 -  (1 -Q )U 2 -Q U 3
T h e  f i r s t  te rm  on the r ig h t-h a n d  side o f both eq u atio n s  (1 .3 9 )  and 
( 1  .4 0 )  re p re s e n ts  the r is k -n e u tr a l  e ffe c t. I f  U" w e re  O , then fo r  an 
in c re a s e  in e ith e r  F a o r F p ,  the M R  c u rve  w ould s h ift  dow nw ard  and 
c r im e  w ould  be re d u c e d . F a w i l l  have a g r e a te r  e ffe c t than Fp in reducing  
c r im e  c o m m itte d  by r is k  a v o id e rs .
T h e  r is k  p re fe re n c e  e ffe c t is re p re s e n te d  by the second te rm  in the  
n u m e ra to r  o f equations (1 .3 9 )  and (1 .4 0 )  F o r  r is k  p r e fe r e r s ,  the 
r is k  p re fe re n c e  e ffe c t is the sam e sign as the r is k -n e u tr a l  e ffe c t.
S in ce  U" is p o s it iv e , the r is k -p re fe re n c e  e ffe c t is  n e g a tiv e , and the 
r is k - p r e f e r e r s  w i l l  red u ce  th e ir  c r im in a l a c t iv ity  even m o re  than  
r is h -n e u tr a l  in d iv id u a ls . A g a in  a change in F a w i l l  have a g r e a te r  
im p a c t on c r im e  than F p .
F o r  the r is k  a v o id e r , the r is k  p re fe re n c e  e ffe c t is p o s itiv e  in the 
case o f an in c re a s e  in F a o r  F p . T h u s , r is k  a v o id e rs  w i l l  not reduce  
th e ir  c r im in a l  a c t iv ity  as  m uch as they w ould i f  th ey  w e re  in d iffe re n t  
to r is k .  In fa c t ,  it  is p o ss ib le  fo r  r is k  a v o id e rs  to in c re a s e  th e ir  
c r im in a l  a c t iv ity  w hen F a o r  Fp  in c re a s e s .
F ig u re  4 ,  w h ich  il lu s tra te s  the e ffe c ts  on M R , M C  and c r im e  o f an 
in c re a s e  in Q , can a ls o  be used to i l lu s tra te  the e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in F
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o r  F b . T h e  M R  c u rv e  sh ifts  dow nw ard  fo r  the r is k  p r e f e r e r ,  and m ay  
s h ift dow nw ard  o r  upw ard  fo r  the r is k  a v e rs e  in d iv id u a l. F o r  purpose  
o f th is  a n a ly s is , i t  is assum ed that fo r  m ost in d iv id u a ls , the M R  c u rv e  
w il l  s h ift dow nw ard  and th a t an in c re a s e  in F & o r  F ^  w il l  d e te r  c r im e .
D . A N  IN C R E A S E  IN  T H E  L E G A L  O R  IL L E G A L  W A G E
T h e  le g a l and il le g a l w ages a ffe c t the to ta l incom e and the m a rg in a l 
incom e in each s ta te  o f the w o r ld ,  fo r  in d iv id u a ls  who a re  engaged in 
both c r im e  and le g a l w e a lth -g e n e ra tin g  a c t iv i t ie s .  T h e  e ffe c t on c r im e  
of a  change in i l le g a l w ages is found by tak in g  the d if fe re n t ia l  o f  equation  
( 1  .1 5 ) ,  a llo w in g  N and W j to v a ry :
(1 .4 1 )  dN = P n W [ ~ M R  W .
d/vi ---------------------------
M R N " P N N
S in ce  P does not v a ry  w ith  W  , i t  is e a s ily  shown that:
[(1 - P U i  + P(1 - Q ) U ’2 + P Q U ’3 ] +
C1 - 4 2 ) ‘ [d C l-P )U " 1 N + d P (1 -Q )U ,,2 N + d P Q U " 3 N >
dN y .  O as MRyy = + [M R ((1 -Q )U ,p N -fQ U '3 N - U , 1 N )] 
dW j <  1 U 1 - ( 1 - Q ) U 2 -Q U 3  ' l O
T h e  f i r s t  te r m  o f the n u m e ra to r  in equation  (1 .4 2 )  re p re s e n ts  the 
r is k  n e u tra l e f fe c t . I f  U " w e re  z e r o ,  then the f i r s t  te r m  o f the n u m e ra to r  
o f equation  (1 .4 2 )  w ould  be p o s itiv e  and a ll  o th e r  te rm s  w ould  be z e r o .
T h u s , the r is k  n e u tra l e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in W j is  to in c re a s e  the  
n u m b er o f o ffenses  c o m m itte d .
T h e  r is k -p r e fe r e n c e  e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in W j on c r im e  c o m m itte d
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by r is k  p r e fe r e r s  is  am biguous s ince  the second te rm  in the n u m e ra to r  
o f equation  (1 .4 2 )  w i l l  be p o s it iv e , but the th ird  te r m  w ill  be n e g a tiv e .
And the o v e ra ll  e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in W j on the n u m b er o f c r im e s  the 
r is k  p r e fe r e r  w i l l  c o m m it is a lso  am b ig u o u s.
The e ffe c t o f W j on the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  by r is k  a v o id e rs  
is  a ls o  am b ig u o u s . F o r  r is k  a v e rs e  in d iv id u a ls , the second te r m  in the 
n u m e ra to r  o f equation  (1 .4 2 )  w i l l  be neg ative  but the th ird  te r m  w il l  be 
p o s itiv e . In the a g g re g a te , the e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in W j on c r im e  is  
assum ed fo r  th is  a n a ly s is , to be p o s it iv e .
The  e ffe c t , on c r im e ,  o f a change in le g a l w ages is  found by tak ing  
the d if fe re n t ia l o f equation  (1 .1 5 ) ,  a llo w in g  N and W L  to v a ry :
T h e  f i r s t  te r m  o f the n u m e ra to r  o f equation  ( 1  .4 4 )  re p re s e n ts  the  
r is k  n e u tra l e f fe c t . I f  U " w e re  z e r o ,  the f i r s t  te rm  o f the n u m e ra to r  o f  
equation  (1 .-44) w ould  be n eg ative  and a ll  o th e r  te rm s  w ould  be z e r o .  
T h u s , the r is k  n e u tra l e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in is  to d e c re a s e  the 
n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  c o m m itte d  .
(1 .4 3 ) —  ”  p n w l . “  m r w l
d W L
m r n  p n n
S in ce  P does not v a ry  w ith  W ^ ,  it  is e a s ily  shown that:
(1 .4 4 ) dN \  O as M R v v l  ='
HW, ^
[- (1  - P ) U ' t  -P (1  - Q ) U ' 2 - P Q U ’3 ]+
d i_
[ d ( 1 - P ) U " 1 t L + d P (1 -Q )U " 2 t L  +
d P Q U g + jJ
+ M R T (1 - Q ) U '2 t + Q U ,3 t L - U ' 1+ iJ
U 1 - ( 1 -Q )U 2 -Q U 3
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A g a m , the r is k -p r e fe r e n c e  e ffe c t fo r  r is k  a v o id e rs  and r is k  p r e fe r e r s
is am b ig u o u s. T h e  o v e ra ll  e ffe c t o f a change in W  on the c r im in a l
a c t iv it ie s  o f r is k  a v o id e rs  and r is k  p r e fe r e r s  is  not c le a r .  H o w e v e r,
we assum e chat the r is k  n e u tra l (n e g a tiv e ) e ffe c t is  s tro n g e r  than the
am biguous r is k  p re fe re n c e  e ffe c t fo r  m o s t in d iv id u a ls . T h a t is ,  we
assum e th a t an in c re a s e  in W L w il l  d e te r  m o st in d iv id u a ls .
E . S U M M A R Y  O F  E F F E C T S  O F  E X O G E N O U S  S H IF T S  IN  T H E  L A W  
E N F O R C E M E N T  V A R IA B L E S  A N D  IN  T H E  W A G E  V A R IA B L E S
An in c re a s e  in a ll  o f the law  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  c ited  in sec tio n s  
A  through C a re  expected  to reduce  c r im e ,  even though fo r  som e o ffe n d e rs  
an in c re a s e  in the law  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  m ig h t in c re a s e  c r im e .  
S im i la r ly ,  fo r  the w age v a r ia b le s ,  le g a l and il le g a l w a g e s , an exogenous  
in c re a s e  is  expected  to have a s p e c ific  e ffe c t (n eg a tive  fo r  le g a l w ages  
and p o s itiv e  fo r  ille g a l w ag es) a lthough fo r  som e o ffe n d e rs  it  is  p o ss ib le  
fo r  the e ffe c ts  to be re v e rs e d . T h u s , an in c re a s e  in the fo llo w in g  
v a r ia b le s  w ould o ro b a b ly  d e te r  c r im e : x ,  the exogenous com ponent o f the  
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  v a r ia b le ;  F a , the cost o f a r r e s t ;  F ^ , the co st o f  
co n v ic tio n  and p u n ish m en t net o f a r r e s t  cost; Q , the p ro b a b ility  o f 
co n v ic tio n  and p u n ish m en t g iven  a r r e s t ;  and W j_ , the w age fo r  le g a l 
w o rk . A n in c re a s e  in W ^, the w age fo r  c o m m ittin g  c r im e s ,  w i l l  u s u a lly  
have a p o s itiv e  e ffe c t on the n u m b e r o f c r i m e s  c o m m itte d .
T h e  hypotheses s ta ted  above a re  q u ite  a  b it  w e a k e r  than those c ited  
by E h r lic h  and those used by m o st subsequent au th o rs  in the f ie ld .  T h e  
d if fe re n t  hypotheses about the e ffe c t on c r im e  o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t and
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wage v a r ia b le s  r e f le c t  the changes m ade in the assu m p tio n s  o f the 
E h r lic h  m o d e l. E h r l ic h ,  in h is  two s ta te s -o f - th e -w o r ld  m o d e l, 
assu m es  F  to be a function  o f the n u m b er o f c r im e s  and P (h is  co m p o site  
p ro b a b ility  v a r ia b le )  to be independent o f the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d .  
He concludes than an in c re a s e  in P w il l  u n am b ig u o u sly  d e te r  c r im e .  A n  
in c re a s e  in the a v e ra g e  F  w i l l  unam biguously  d e te r  r is k  a v o id e rs  and 
m ig h t d e te r  r is k  p r e fe r e r s .  W hen he in c re a s e s  the n u m b e r o f s ta tes  
o f the w o r ld , E h r lic h  re ta in s  h is  bas ic  hypotheses.
W e fin d  th a t any supply o f c r im e  m odel w h ich  h yp o th es izes  th a t F  
w il l  v a ry  a cc o rd in g  to the n u m b e r o f o ffenses  c o m m itte d  and th a t P is  
exogenously  d e te rm in e d  w i l l  r e s u lt  in s tro n g e r  d e te rre n c e  o f r is k  a v o id e rs ,  
w h e th e r P o r  F  is  in c re a s e d . I f  one b e lie v e s  th a t m o s t in d iv id u a ls  in th is  
w o rld  a re  r is k  a v e rs e , then a m odel w h ich  h yp o th es izes  s tro n g  e ffe c ts  
on the a c t iv it ie s  o f r is k  a v e rs e  in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  hyp o th es ize  s trong  
e ffe c ts  o v e r  the e n tire  p o p u la tio n . And a m odel o f c r im in a l a c t iv ity  
w h ich  h yp o th es izes  F  to v a ry  acco rd in g  to the c r im in a l  in te n s ity  o f an 
in d iv id u a l and P  to be independent o f the c r im in a l  a c t iv it ie s  o f the 
in d iv id u a l is a  m odel w h ich  re s u lts  in s tro n g  d e te rre n c e  o f r is k  
a v o id e rs  in th e ir  c r im in a l a c t iv it ie s .
By choosing a  d if fe re n t  se t o f assu m p tio n s  in th is  a n a ly s is ,  
assu m p tio n s  w h ich  a re  b e lie v e d  to be re as o n a b le  o n es , the d e te rre n c e  
a rg u m e n t is h e re  found to be w e a k e r  than i t  has p re v io u s ly  been s ta te d .
T h e  n u m b e r o f s ta tes  o f the w o r ld  does not a ffe c t the s tre n g th  o f the
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h yp o th e s es .
F o u r  S ta te s  o f the W o rld  
T h e  m odel is  now extended to include fo u r s ta tes  o f the w o r ld .
T h e se  fo u r ou tcom es a re  d e s c rib e d  in T a b le  2 . T h e  d iffe re n c e  betw een  
the th re e -o u tc o m e  m o d e l, d e s c rib e d  ab o ve , and th is  m odel is tha t i t  is  
no/vpossible fo r  an in d iv id u a l to be co n vic ted  but to avo id  in c a rc e ra t io n .
T h e re  a re  now th re e  u n fa v o rab le  outcom es: the o ffe n d e r m ig h t be 
a r re s te d  but not convic ted ; the o ffe n d e r m ig h t be a r re s te d  and convic ted  
but not in c a rc e ra te d ; and the o ffe n d e r m ay  be a r re s te d  and convicted  
and in c a r c e r a te d . T h e re  a re  costs  asso c ia ted  w ith  a r r e s t ,  co n v ic tio n  
and in c a rc e ra t io n .
T h e  re s u lts  o f the th re e -o u tc o m e  m odel a re  e a s ily  extended to the  
fo u r  outcom e c a s e . I t  is  assum ed th a t R , l ik e  Q , is  not a function  o f the 
n u m b e r o ffen ses  c o m m itte d . A ls o , F  , the co s t o f in c a rc e ra tio n  net 
o f a r r e s t  and co n v ic tio n  c o s ts , is  r o t  a function  o f the n u m b e r o f o ffenses  
c o m m itte d . T h e  e ffe c t o f an exogenous change in R  is  expected  to be 
s im i la r  to the e ffe c t o f a change in Q . O n ly  fo r  r is k  p r e fe r e r s  w i l l  R  
u n am b ig u o u sly  d e te r  c r im e .  It  is  a ls o  expected  th a t an in c re a s e  in F c 
w ould  d e te r  c r im e  fo r  a ll  r is k  p r e fe r e r s  and fo r  som e r is k  a v o id e rs .
F o r  r is k  p r e fe r e r s ,  a r is e  in F c w i l l  have a s m a lle r  d e te r re n t  e ffe c t  
than a c o m p a ra b le  r is e  in F ^  o r  F a .
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TABLE 2
C onsum ption  P ro s p e c ts  and P ro b a b ilit ie s :  F o u r  S ta te s  o f the W o rld
S ta te  o f the W o rld
1 . No a r r e s t
2 .  A r r e s t  but no 
C o n v ic tio n
3 . A r r e s t ,  C o n v ic tio n , 
but no In c a rc e ra tio n
4 . A r re s c , C o n v ic tio n  
and In c a rc e ra tio n
P ro b a b il ity  C onsum ption  P ro s p e c t  
1 - P  C - ,= W '+ W LN + w L t L
P(1 -Q )  C 2 = W , + W iN + W L tL - F a
PQ(1 - R )  C 3 = W  + W .N + W i_ ti_ -F a - F 5
P Q R C =W '+ W LN + W L t L - F a - F b- F c
S u m m a r iz in g  the e ffe c t o f  exogenous changes in the la w  e n fo rc e m e n t 
v a r ia b le s  in the fo u r s ta te -o f - th e -w o r ld  c a s e , an in c re a s e  in any o f the 
fo llo w in g  v a r ia b le s  is expected  to d e te r  c r im e : x ,  the exogenous com ponent 
o f P ; Q , the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  g iven a r r e s t ;  R , the p ro b a b ility  o f 
in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven co n v ic tio n ; F a , the co st o f a r r e s t ;  F ^ ,  the co st o f  
co n v ic tio n  net o f a r r e s t  co sts ;F c , the co st o f in c a rc e ra tio n  net o f a r r e s t  
and co n v ic tio n  c o s ts . A ls o , an in c re a s e  in W - , the wage fo r  ille g a l  
a c t iv i t ie s ,  is  expected  to en co u rag e  c r im e  and an in c re a s e  in W |_ , the  
w age fo r  le g a l in c o m e -g e n e ra tin g  a c t iv i t ie s ,  is expected  to d e te r  c r im e .
I f  any o f these v a r ia b le s  w e re  not found to have th e ir  p re d ic te d  e ffe c t on 
c r im e ,  h o w e v e r, no in co n s is ten cy  w ith  the m odel could  be concluded .
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F O O T N O T E S
 ̂T h e  B e c k e r /E h r lL c h  an a lyses  use a com bined  p ro b a b ility  o f  
a r r e s t ,  co n v ic tio n  and im p ris o n m e n t. T h e y  assum e th a t, in a g iven  
tim e  p e r io d , th is  p ro b a b ility  is  independent o f the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  
c o m m itte d . The len g th  o f the tim e  p e rio d  is one y e a r  in the e m p ir ic a l  
a n a ly s is .
In the appendix  to h is  a r t ic le ,  E h r lic h  does c o n s id e r the case  
w h e re  P v a r ie s  w ith  the am ount o f t im e  spent in c r im e .  H o w e v e r , he 
o n ly  c o n s id e rs  the case w h e re  the m a rg in a l and a v e ra g e  p ro b a b ilit ie s  
change by the sam e p e rcen tag e  w ith  an in c re a s e  in the am ount o f  
t im e  spent c o m m ittin g  c r im e s .
p
I f  P and Pfsj r is e  by the sam e p e rcen tag e  when x in c re a s e s  then:
s p / p  s p n / p n
S u b s titu tin g  into equation (1 .2 0 ):
d N * = 1 raPPCU^ -(1  -Q )U  g -Q U g ) +
P P N ( U 1 - ( 1 - P ) U 2 -Q U 3 ) j .
0*
[d P (u ’ - ( 1  -Q )U 2 - Q U 3 )+ P N ( U 1 - ( 1  -Q )U 2 - Q U 3 )J
dN
- ^T  O as d P (U ^ -(1 -Q )U ^  -Q U g )  +
dx
p ^ -o -Q ^ -Q U g )  4, o
B u t, f ro m  equation  (1 .1 2 ) :
<JuJ = dP(U^ -(1  -Q )U 2 -P Q U ^ )+ P n (U 1 -(1  -Q )U 2 -Q U 3 )
°  d N *  ’ k
o o ^  O s ince  d U 1 ^  O
3 P = 1 _(1_(^))N
L e t  Z = (1 -(J ))N 
then In Z = N  In (1-<t)) 
but In ( 1 - $ ) #  -  (J)
and P = 1 -e - ^*^
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C H A P T E R  II
T H E  S U P P L Y  O F  O F F E N S E S  
T h e  B e h a v io ra l F u n ctio n
G iven the v a lid ity  o f the g e n e ra l approach  and o f the im p lic a tio n s  o f  
the m odel developed  in the p re ce d in g  c h a p te r , a b e h a v io ra l function  
can now be s p e c if ie d . T h is  function  re la te s  the n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  an 
in d iv id u a l w i l l  c o m m it in a  g iven tim e  p e rio d  to the v a r ia b le s  w h ich  
a re  assum ed  to a ffe c t h is  c r im in a l  a c t iv i ty .  T h e  g e n e ra l fo rm  o f th is  
b e h a v io ra l function  is:
(2 * 1 ) c ij = fjC p ij > ^ a ij t ^ ^ ij  > [j > ^ ij » ^ ij » ^ i j
V a r ia b le s  < |)y ,Q y  and R y  a r e ,  re s p e c t iv e ly , the p ro b a b ilit ie s  of: 
a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffe n s e , co n v ic tio n  g iven a r r e s t  and in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  
c o n v ic tio n . T h e  " i ” s u b s c rip t r e fe r s  to the ith  c r im e  type and the " j"  
s u b s c rip t r e fe r s  to the jth  in d iv id u a l. T h e  co s ts  o f a p p reh en s io n  a re  
re p re s e n te d  by F a ^ , the costs  o f c o n v ic tio n , n e t o f ap p reh en s io n  c o s ts , 
a re  re p re s e n te d  by F 13̂  and the costs  o f in c a rc e ra t io n , net o f a r r e s t  and 
c o n v ic tio n  c o s ts , a re  re p re s e n te d  by f=rCy • w age fo r  the j th  in d iv i­
dual fo r  the ith  c r im e  type is  s y m b o lize d  by W y  . And W j_j  re p re s e n ts  
the le g a l w age ra te  fo r  the j th  in d iv id u a l. T h e  n u m b e r o f c r im e s  o f the 
ith  type by the j th  in d iv id u a l is in d ica ted  by C y .
33
A n a d d itio n a l v a r ia b le ,  efj, is added to denote o th e r  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  
m ay a ffe c t the in d iv id u a l's  p ro p e n s ity  to c o m m it a c r im e  o f type i .  T h e re  
a re  a n u m b e r o f fa c to rs  w h ich  have not y e t  been included in the 
a n a ly s is , and w h ich  m ig h t a ffe c t the supp ly  o f c r im e .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  
e m ig h t include: incom e o th e r than w ages (the W ' v a r ia b le ) ;  fa c to rs  
such as  age o r  m a r ita l  s ta tu s  w h ich  m ig h t a ffe c t a ttitu d e s  to w ard  r is k ;  
p r io r  c r im in a l  r e c o r d , w h ich  m ig h t a ffe c t the c o s t o f a p p re h e n s io n , 
c o n v ic tio n  and pun ishm ent; o r  costs  and ga ins  fro m  a lte rn a t iv e  
c r im in a l  a c t iv i t ie s .
T h e  a n a ly s is  o f the b e h a v io ra l im p lic a tio n s  o f the m odel developed  
in the la s t c h a p te r  re v e a ls  the fo llo w in g  s e t o f hypotheses re g a rd in g
the e ffe c t o f the v a r ia b le s  e n te r in g  equation  (2 . 1 ) on to ta l o ffenses:
( 2 .2 )  $ c Lj 5  o  S o i j  $  O J c .. *  O
^ i j  J W y
$cij <_ S^ij ^  ^cij /
  -  O  L  -  O  1 _ -  O
*®ij ^ L j
Scij '  °  * Cij -  °
i R ij ^ Cu
A s  noted in the la s t  c h a p te r , a d e p a rtu re  fro m  any o f these hypotheses  
does not in d ica te  an in co n s is ten cy  w ith  the m o d e l.
I f  a ll  in d iv id u a ls  w e re  a l ik e ,  the b e h a v io ra l function  ( 2 .1 )  could  
a ls o  s e rv e  as an a g g reg a te  supply function  in a g iven p e rio d  o f t im e ,
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I f  equation  ( 2 .1 )  w e re  o f a l in e a r  fo r m , i t  could be re w r it te n  as:
(2 .2 )
If  the c o e ffic ie n ts  ( i . e . ,  the a 's  and the b 's ) w e re  the sam e fo r  a ll  in d iv i­
d u a ls , the in d iv id u a l equations could e a s ily  be sum m ed o v e r  a ll  in d iv id u a ls  
in a co u n ty . D iv id in g  the te rm s  in the su m m atio n  equation  by the popu la ­
tion  o f the co u n ty , the ag g reg a te  supply o f c r im e  equation fo r  the kth
n tK is  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  p e r  c a p ita  o f the ith type in the kth co u n ty . 
T h e  "k "  s u b s c rip t r e fe rs  to the kth co unty .
T h e re  a re  two c o n s id e ra tio n s  w h ich  m u st be exam in ed  m o re  fu lly  
b e fo re  te s tin g  the hypotheses ( 2 . 2 )  o f  the a g g reg a te  b e h a v io ra l function
( 2 .4 )  and in te rp re t in g  the r e s u lts .  F i r s t ,  th e re  is  the p ro b le m  o f re v e rs e  
c a u s a lity . T h a t is ,  the le v e l o f c r im e  in the c o m m u n ity  m ig h t a ffe c t  
d e c is io n s  about the le v e l o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t in the c o m m u n ity . T h e  
second c o n s id e ra tio n  is  the s ep a ra tio n  o f two fo rm s  o f d e te rre n c e :
county is:
( 2 .3 )
w h e re  n is  the s iz e  o f the popu lation  in the kth  co unty .
T h e  b e h a v io ra l function  can now be w r it te n  fo r  a ll  co u n ties  as:
( 2 . 4 )
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1 ) by d isco u ra g in g  in d iv id u a ls  fro m  c o m m ittin g  o ffenses  because o f low  
expected  ga ins  (d e te r re n c e )  and 2 )  by p re ve n tin g  o ffe n d e rs  fro m  
c o m m ittin g  a d d itio n a l o ffen ses  through in c a rc e ra tio n  (in c a p a c ita tio n ).
R e v e rs e  C a u s a lity  
T h e  le v e l o f  c r im e  in a  c o m m u n ity  m ig h t a ffe c t both the supply  and  
dem and fo r  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t. On the dem and s id e , i f  a c o m m u n ity  had 
a high c r im e  le v e l ,  and p e rc e iv e d  a " c r im e  p r o b le m ,"  the c it iz e n r y  
m ig h t dem and m o re  p ro te c tio n . C o n v e rs e ly , c o m m u n itie s  w ith  l i t t le  
c r im e  w ould p ro b a b ly  not a llo c a te  m any re s o u rc e s  fo r  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t.
By o n ly  c o n s id e rin g  the dem and fo r  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t, one would expect 
to o b s e rv e  a  p o s itiv e  re la tio n s h ip  betw een  c r im e  and la w  e n fo rc e m e n t.
C o n s id e rin g  o n ly  the e ffe c ts  on c r im e  o f the dem and fo r  la w  
e n fo rc e m e n t, an in c re a s e  in c r im e  w il l  ra is e  the dem and fo r  law  
e n fo rc e m e n t. A n d , c o n s id e rin g  o n ly  the s u p p ly -o f-o ffe n s e s  fu n c tio n , the  
re la tio n s h ip  betw een c r im e  and la w  e n fo rc e m e n t is  n e g a tiv e . Both o f 
these e ffe c ts  a re  o b s erv e d  to g e th e r when a n a ly z in g  the re la tio n s h ip  
betw een c r im e  and la w  e n fo rc e m e n t.
A  th ird  fa c to r  w h ich  a ffe c ts  the o b served  re la tio n s h ip  betw een  c r im e  
and la w  e n fo rc e m e n t is  the supply  o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t e ffe c t .  H o ld ing  
c r im in a l  ju s tic e  inputs  c o n s ta n t, an in c re a s e  in the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  
c o m m itte d  is  expected  to reduce  the le v e l o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t p ro v id e d . 
F o r  e x a m p le , in the case  o f a r r e s ts ,  hold ing  the s ize  and q u a lity  o f the  
p o lic e  fo rc e  c o n s tan t, an in c re a s e  in the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d
36
w ill  red u ce  the ra te  o f  a r r e s ts  p e r  c r im e  c o m m itte d .
T h e  s im u ltan eo u s  n a tu re  o f the re la tio n s h ip  betw een the supply o f 
la w  e n fo rc e m e n t, the dem and fo r  law  e n fo rc e m e n t and the supply o f 
offen ses  m u st be taken into account b e fo re  in te rp re t in g  the re s u lts  o f 
the te s ts  o f hypotheses in equation ( 2 . 2 ) .
T h e  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  in equation ( 2 .4 )  w h ich  could be 
re la te d  to the c r im e  ra te  in a s im u ltan eo u s  fash ion a re : 4 >, the a ve ra g e  
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one offense; Q , the a v e ra g e  p ro b a b ility  o f 
co n vic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t ;  R , the a v e ra g e  p ro b a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  
g iven  co n v ic tio n ; F a , the c o s t, to the o ffe n d e r , o f being a r re s te d ;  F 13, 
the co st to the o ffe n d e r o f being  in c a rc e ra te d , n e t o f a r r e s t  and c o n v ic ­
tion c o s ts .
B e lo w  is  a  b r ie f  d e s c rip tio n  o f supply and dem and c o n s id e ra tio n s  
fo r  the la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s .
T H E  P R O B A B IL IT Y  O F  A R R E S T
T h e  supply  o f o ffen ses  function  can be s im p ly  re p re s e n te d  by:
( 2 .5 )  ( C /N )  = f ( $ , x )
w h e re  4 ) is  the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffe n s e ;x re fe rs  to a ll  o th e r  
v a r ia b le s , and we hyp o th es ize  th a t <$(C/N)/§C$> <  O . T h e  dem and fo r  
p o lic e  inputs  can be s im p ly  re p re s e n te d  by:
(2 . 6 )  r  = h ( C /N ,y )
w h e re  r  is som e m e a s u re  o f p o lice  in p u ts , C /N  is  the c r im e  m e a s u re  
and y  is a co m p o site  o f a ll  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  a ffe c t the dem and fo r
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p o lice  in p u ts . T h e  h ig h e r the le v e l o f c r im e ,  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  held  
c o n stan t, the g re a te r  the dem and fo r  p o lice  inputs by the c o m m u n ity .  
T h a t is ,  w e hyp o th es ize  th a tS r /$  ( C /N ) > 0 .
T h e  supply o f law  e n fo rc e m e n t can be s im p ly  re p re s e n te d  by the 
fo llo w in g  a r r e s t  function:
( 2 .7 )  (|> = g ( C / N , r , z ) .
T h a t is ,  the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is  d e te rm in e d  by the le v e l o f c r im e  
(c r im e  r a te ) ,  the am ount o f  p o lice  re s o u rc e s , r ,  and o th e r  v a r ia b le s  
(re p re s e n te d  by z ) .  An in c re a s e  in c r im e ,  holding p o lice  re s o u rc e s  
co n stan t, is  expected  to lo w e r  the p ro b a b ility  o f a p p re h e n s io n . T h a t is ,  
we hyp o th es ize  thatJ(j)/(S ( C /N ) < 0 . And an in c re a s e  in p o lice  re s o u rc e s  
is  expected to in c re a s e  the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t .  T h a t is ,  § (j) / 6  r > 0 .
M a th ieso n  and P a s s e ll have exam in ed  the above re la t io n s h ip s ,
o
and th e ir  re s u lts  c o n firm  o u r  h y p o t h e s e s .T h e y  rind th a t hold ing o th e r  
v a r ia b le s  co n s tan t, h igh c r im e  precincts in N ew  Y o rk  C ity  a re  ass igned  
m o re  p o lice  p e rs o n n e l. And in a te s t on v a r ia b le s  a ffe c tin g  the p ro b a ­
b i l ity  o f a r r e s t ,  an in c re a s e  in p o lice  re s o u rc e s  w i l l  ra is e  the p ro b a ­
b i l ity  o f a r r e s t  and an in c re a s e  in c r im e ,  holding p o lice  re s o u rc e s  
co n s tan t, w i l l  lo w e r  the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t .
T h e  e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in c r im e  on (J) is  s t i l l  a m b ig u o u s , s ince  
$ <£/S C < 0 , S (£>/<§ r>  0 a n d $ r /S C > 0 .  H o w e v e r , it  seem s u n lik e ly  th a t the  
in c re a s e  in r  w ould be so g re a t as to cause m o re  law  e n fo rc e m e n t ( ( J ) )  
than b e fo re . T h u s , the e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in c r im e  on (J) is m ost
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l ik e ly  n e g a tiv e , and a s im p le  O L S  e s tim a te  o f (J) on c r im e  m ay  o v e r ­
e s tim a te  the a c tu a l e ffe c t o f (j) on c r im e  in the supply o f o ffen ses  fu n c tio n . 
O T H E R  L A W  E N F O R C E M E N T  V A R IA B L E S
T h e  o th e r la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  in equation  ( 2 .4 )  have not
3
been e x p lic it ly  exam in ed  by o th e r  a u th o rs  in a s im u ltan e o u s  fa s h io n . 
T h e r e fo r e ,  hypotheses about supp ly  and dem and re la tio n s h ip s  cannot be 
v e r if ie d  by exa m in in g  o th e r  s tu d ie s .
In th is  a n a ly s is , d e c is io n s  as to e x p e n d itu re s  to be m ade fo r  
la w  e n fo rc e m e n t a f te r  the a r r e s t  stage a re  m ade c e n t r a l ly .  T h e r e fo r e ,  
although one c o m m u n ity  w ith  a  high c r im e  ra te  m ig h t d e s ire  g r e a te r  
e x p e n d itu re s  fo r  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t, the a llo c a tio n  o f funds is  m ade a t  
the S ta te  le v e l .  T h e  re s t  i f  the S ta te  m ig h t not w ish  to ra is e  exp en d i­
tu re s . T h u s , dem and e ffe c ts  fo r  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t a r e  hyp o th es ized  
to be s m a l l .
On the supp ly  s id e , an in c re a s e  in the n u m b e r o f c r im e s ,  hold ing  
(f) co n s tan t, w i l l  in c re a s e  the n u m b e r o f in d iv id u a ls  e n te r in g  the c o u rt  
s ys te m  (o f the co u n ty ). T h e  n u m b e r o f co n v ic tio n s  and in c a rc e ra tio n  
sentences  could re m a in  the sam e w ith o u t the c o u rt s ys te m  in c u rr in g  
a d d itio n a l c o s ts . W h a t m ig h t happen is  th a t the " q u a lity "  o f each case  
m ig h t be lo w e r .  F o r  e x a m p le , one o b s e rv e s  the w id e ly  used p ra c t ic e  
o f p le a  b a rg a in in g  in high c r im e  a re a s .
W hen p lea  b a rg a in in g  o c c u rs , a defendant is  asked to p lead  g u ilty  
and th e re fo re  not dem and the c o u rt  re s o u rc e s  o f a t r i a l .  A s  a re w a rd
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fo r  not re q u ir in g  m any c o u rt re s o u rc e s , the defendant re c e iv e s  a 
lo w e r  co n v ic tio n  ch arg e  a n d /o r  a lo w e r  sen ten ce . T h u s , when c r im e  
in c re a s e s , Q  and R  can re m a in  constan t by lo w e rin g  F a , F 13, and F c .
It  is reaso n ab le  th a t the c o u r t 's  response to an in c re a se d  c a s e lo a d , 
hold ing the budget c o n s tan t, w i l l  re s u lt  in a g r e a te r  am ount o f p lea  
b a rg a in in g . W hen p le a  b a rg a in in g  o c c u rs , o ffe n d e rs  in c u r lo w e r  costs  
sin ce  the t im e  to case re s o lu tio n  w i l l  be s h o r te r  and a lso  th e re  w i l l  be 
a  re d u c tio n  in the a v e ra g e  sentence le n g th . F u r th e r ,  c o u rts  w ould  
m o re  l ik e ly  adopt a p o lic y  o f p le a  b a rg a in in g  than o f reducing  the 
p ro b a b ilit ie s  o f co n v ic tio n  and sentencing  (Q  and R  re s p e c t iv e ly ) .
T h u s , the re v e rs e  c a u s a lity  e ffe c t o f an in c re a s e  in c r im e  on Q
and R  w ould  be q u ite  s m a ll s in ce  both supply and dem and e ffe c ts  fo r
la w  e n fo rc e m e n t w i l l  be w e a k . F o r  F a , F 13, and F c the re v e rs e
c a u s a lity  e ffe c ts  w ould  be n e g a tiv e . T h is  is  because the e ffe c ts  o f an
in c re a s e  in c r im e  on the dem and fo r  these v a r ia b le s  is  h ypothes ized
to be s m a ll ,  and the supp ly  o f  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t e ffe c t is thought to
a. b ce x e r t  a n eg ative  in flu en ce  on the supply  o f F  , F  , and F  .
In c ap a c ita tio n
I f  c r im in a ls  w e re  not s e n s itiv e  to changes in the expected  p u n ish ­
m e n t, th e re  m ig h t s t i l l  be an o b served  n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  betw een  
c r im e  and law  e n fo rc e m e n t because an in c re a s e  in c r im e  w ould  red u ce  
the supp ly  o f law  e n fo rc e m e n t. I f  n e ith e r  d e te rre n c e  n o r supply e ffe c ts  
o c c u r re d , one m ig h t s t i l l  o b s erv e  a n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  betw een c r im e
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and la w  e n fo rc e m e n t s ince  th e re  m ig h t be in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c ts .
A ssu m in g  n e ith e r  d e te rre n c e  n o r supply  and dem and e ffe c ts , an 
in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f p ris o n  (P  x Q  x R ) w i l l  d e c re a s e  the  
n u m b e r o f c r im in a ls  who a re  fre e  to c o m m it c r im e s  ag a in s t the p ub lic  
a t la r g e .  T h a t is ,  the ad d itio n a l c r im in a ls  who a re  in c a rc e ra te d  a re  
p re ve n te d  fro m  c o m m ittin g  c r im e s .  The  phenom enon o f c r im in a l  
p re v e n tio n  through in c a rc e ra tio n  is c a lle d  the in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c t.
A
S om e a u th o rs  have in ves tig a ted  the e ffe c ts  o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t on
5
c r im e  th rough  in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c ts  o n ly . O th e rs , have stud ied  in ca ­
p a c ita tio n  and d e te rre n c e  e ffe c t to g e th e r, F o r  th is  s tu d y , w e use the 
m odel developed  oy E h r l ic h . 0  In h is  m o d e l, the c r im e  ra te  is  a function  
o f the p e rc e n t o f the popu lation  w h ich  is c r im in a l ,  the p e rc e n t o f the 
c r im in a l p opu la tion  a t la r g e ,  and the a ve ra g e  n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  
c o m m itte d  p e r  c r im in a l  p e r  y e a r .  A ssu m in g  no response by c r im in a ls  
to in c e n tiv e s  and assu m in g  a co n stan t s ize  o f the e n t ire  population  and 
o f the c r im in a l  p o p u la tio n , E h r lic h  finds the fo llo w in g  re la tio n s h ip :
( 2 .1 0 )  K  = N S
1 + P T
In h is  a n a ly s is  K is  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  d iv id ed  by the s iz e  o f the 
population^ N is  the a v e ra g e  n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  p e r  c r im in a l  
in a  g iven  tim e  p e rio d ; S  is the p e rc e n t o f the popu lation  w h ich  is  
c r im in a l;  P  is the p ro b a b ility  o f  in c a rc e ra tio n  and T  is  the a v e ra g e  
t im e  s e r v e d .
In th is  a n a ly s is  the p ro b a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  has th re e  c o m p o -
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nents: a r r e s t ,  c o n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t ,  and in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven c o n v ic ­
t io n . F o r  o u r a n a ly s is , equation  ( 2 .8 )  becom es:
(2 .1 1 )  K = NS_
1+ P Q R T
T h e  e la s t ic ity  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  an exogenous change in the law  
e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  is  co m p u ted , us ing  equation  ( 2 .9 ) .  T h e  p ro b a b i­
l i t y  o f  a r r e s t  is  assum ed  to fo llo w  the d is tr ib u tio n  shown in equation  (1 .2 3 ) ,  
w ith  (p as  the exogenous com ponent. T h e  e la s t ic ity  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  
re s p e c t to (p is :
( 2 .1 2 )  (JKCJ) = $K  . jj>_ = -foPC^QRT
K 14-PQRT
T h e  e la s t ic ity  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t to Q , R , and T  is:
(2 .1 3 )  ^ K Q ^ K R ^ K T  =
1 + P Q R T
S u b s titu tin g  fro m  equation  (1 .2 3 )  and (1 .2 5 ) ,  the e la s t ic it ie s  a re :
( 2 .1 4 )  G ■ = -(f) (N e  ^ Q R T
1 + ( l - e ' Q 1''1) Q R T
and
( 2 .1 5 )  V ^ K R ^ K T — ( ' - 9 ~ ^ , Q R T
1 + ( 1  - e  r N )Q R T
L a te r  in the a n a ly s is , d a ta  on the v a lu e s  o f the exogenous la w  e n fo rc e ­
m en t v a r ia b le s : (j), Q , R , and T  a re  p re s e n te d . 3 u t ,  in o r d e r  to 
e s tim a te  P ,  the a v e ra g e  n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  p e r  c r im in a l (N )  
m u st be e s t im a te d .
A n o th e r w ay  to il lu s tra te  the re la tio n s h ip  betw een c r im e  and
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in c a rc e ra tio n  is:
(2 .1 6 )  C r  = N (S -J )
The  n u m b e r o f c r im e s  in any p e r io d (C r ) is  equal to the a ve ra g e  n u m b er  
o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  by each o ffe n d e r (N ) tim e s  the to ta l n u m b e r o f 
o ffe n d e rs  who a re  not in c a rc e ra te d . (S  is  the to ta l n u m b e r o f o ffe n d e rs  
and J is  the n u m b e r o f o ffe n d e rs  who a re  in c a r c e r a te d .) D iv id in g  both
s id es  by the s iz e  o f the population  (Pop):
(2 .1 7 )  K = N (S  -_J_ )
Pop
and
(2 .1 8 )  N = K
s ’ -  J
Pop
T h re e  o f the v a r ia b le s  in equation  ( 2 .1 6 ) ,  k ,  J and Pop a re  e a s ily  
m e a s u re d . F o r  " F . B . I .  Index" fe lo n ie s 7 , the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  p e r
g
1 0 0 ,0 0 0  population  w as 3 ,7 7 9  in 1970 . T h e  a v e ra g e  n u m b e r o f o ffen d e rs
g
in c a rc e ra te d  in New Y o r k  S ta te  w as about 1 9 ,0 0 0  .
In o r d e r  to e s tim a te  S ,  the fo llo w in g  assu m p tio n s  a re  m ade: 1) a ll
c r im in a ls  a re  m a le s  and 2 ) a l l  c r im in a ls  fo llo w  a f i f te e n -y e a r  c r im in a l
c a r e e r ,  beg inning a t  age 15 and ending a t  age 2 9 . I f  a ll  m a le s  w e re
c r im in a ls ,  then a t any one po in t in t im e , about tw e lve  p e rc e n t o f the
10
to ta l popu lation  w ould be a c tiv e  c r im in a ls  . I f  betw een fiv e  and ten  
p e rc e n t o f m a le s  w e re  c r im in a ls ,  betw een . 6 % and 1 . 2 % o f the to ta l 
popu lation  w ould  be a c tiv e  c r im in a ls .  T h u s , 5  is  e s tim a te d  to be
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betw een . 6 % and 1 .2 % , and N is betw een th re e  and s ix . 1 1  T h a t Ls 
a c tiv e  c r im in a ls  c o m m it ,  on the a v e ra g e , betw een th re e  and s ix  
fe lo n ie s  p e r  y e a r .
E s tim a tin g  N to range fro m  th re e  to s ix  c r im e s  p e r  y e a r ,  the 
in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c t can now be sep a ra te d  fro m  the to ta l e ffe c t o f la w  
e n fo rc e m e n t on c r im e .  A f t e r  tak ing  supply and dem and o f la w  e n fo rc e ­
m en t e ffe c ts  into acco u n t, the ex ten t to w h ich  the m e as u re d  e la s t ic ity  o f 
on the c r im e  ra te  is g r e a te r  (in  abso lu te  v a lu e ) than the e s tim a te  
p ro v id ed  in equation (2 .1 4 )  in d ica te s  the e x ten t to w h ich  d e te rre n c e  o f c r im e  
e ffe c ts  e x is t  beyond the in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c ts  o f d ). T h e  sam e re la t io n ­
ship holds fo r  the m e as u re d  e la s t ic it ie s  o f Q , R , and T  on c r im e  and  
the e la s t ic ity  p re d ic te d  by equation  (2 .1 5 ) .  And i f  th e re  is  ev idence  th a t 
c r im in a l  d e te rre n c e  e ffe c ts  e x is t ,  o b served  e ffe c ts  r e f le c t  a com b in atio n  
of d e te rre n c e  and in c a p a c ita t io n . T h e  o b served  e ffe c t o v e re s tim a te s  the 
p u re  d e te rre n c e  e ffe c t and the p u re  in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c t.
A n o th e r in d ic a to r  th a t th e re  a re  not o n ly  in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c ts  but 
a ls o  d e te rre n c e  e ffe c ts  is  the re la tio n s h ip  betw een  the co st v a r ia b le s ,
L. 1 O
F a and F  , and the c r im e  r a te .  H o ld ing  constan t the supply and
u
dem and e ffe c ts  o f c r im e  on F  and F  , th e re  w i l l  be a n eg ative  r e la t io n -  
ship o b served  betw een F a o r  F  and c r im e ,  on ly  i f  d e te rre n c e  e ffe c ts  
do e x is t .
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F O O T N O T E S
^M ath ieson  and P a s s e ll ,  "H o m ic id e  and R o b b ery  in N ew  Y o r k  C ity "
2
In one e q u a tio n , p o lice  m an p o w er in a p re c in c t is p re d ic te d ,  
suing c r im e s  in the p re c in c t ,  popu lation  o f the p re c in c t and o th e r  v a r ia b le s .  
H old ing  population  s iz e  and o th e r  v a r ia b le s  co n s tan t, the log o f p o lice  
m a n p o w er v a r ie s  d ir e c t ly  w ith  the log o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d . The  
re s u lts  a re  s ig n if ic a n t.
In a second eq u a tio n , the a r r e s t  ra te  p e r  c r im e  c o m m itte d  is  
p re d ic te d  as fo llo w s:
In P = a+b jn ( Z / K ) t C  In S + e
w h e re  P is the a r r e s t  r a te ,  Z  in d ica te s  p o lice  m a n p o w e r, K m e a s u re s  
the n u m b e r o f c r im e s ,  and S  is an in d ic a to r o f neighborhood s ta b il i ty .
T h e  above equation  can be re w r it te n  as:
In P  = a +  b ( In Z )  -  b (In K ) +  c In S  -r e .
T h e  c o e ffic ie n t b is  found to be p o s itiv e  and s ig n if ic a n t. T h e re fo re  the  
a r r e s t  ra te  is  a p o s itiv e  function  o f the le v e l o f p o lic e  m a n p o w er and a 
n eg ative  function  o f the le v e l o f c r im e .
3
E h r lic h  does exa m in e  the o v e ra ll  ( r e v e rs e  c a u s a lity ) re la tio n s h ip  
betw een the p ro b a b ility  o f im p ris o n m e n t and the c r im e  r a te .  U sing a  
tw o -s ta g e  re g re s s io n , the log I l in e a r  e s tim a te  o f P ,  the p ro b a b ility  o f  
im p r is o n m e n t, is  a  function  o f p o lice  and c o u rt e x p e n d itu re s  p e r  c a p ita ,  
the c r im e  ra te  (p e r  p o p u la tio n ), popu lation  s iz e  and o th e r  s o c io -e c o n o m ic  
v a r ia b le s . H o ld ing  re s o u rc e s  (E x p e n d itu re s ), popu lation  and o th e r  
v a r ia b le s  c o n s tan t, an in c re a s e  in c r im e  w i l l  lo w e r  the p ro b a b ility  o f 
im p r is o n m e n t. T h e  e la s t ic ity  o f the p ro b a b ility  o f im p ris o n m e n t w ith  
re s p e c t to c r im e  is  found to be about -  .8 5  and s ig n if ic a n t. H o ld ing  the 
c r im e  ra te  c o n s ta n t, the e la s t ic ity  o f the p ro b a b ility  o f im p ris o n m e n t  
w ith  re s p e c t to p o lic e  and c o u rt e x p e n d itu re s  p e r  c a p ita  is found to be 
p o s itiv e  but no t s ig n if ic a n tly  g r e a te r  than z e r o .
^ S ee : S h lo m o  S h tn n a r and R eue l S h in n a r , "T h e  E ffe c ts  o f the  
C r im in a l  J u s tic e  S y s te m  on the C o n tro l o f  C r im e  : A  Q u a n tita tiv e  A p p ro a c h ,"  
L a w  and S o c ie ty  R e v ie w  9 (S u m m e r  1975'); and D av id  G re e n b e rg , "T h e  
In c a p a c ita tiv e  E ffe c t o f Im p ris o n m e n t: S om e E s t im a te s ,"  L aw  and 
S o c ie ty  R e v ie w  9 (S u m m e r  1 97 5 ).
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S ee : D a n ie l N agin  and A lfre d  B lu m s te in , "On the O p tim u m  use 
o f In c a rc e ra tio n  fo r  C r im e  C o n t r o l,"  O p e ra tio n s  R e s e a rc h  (fo rth c o m in g )  
and E h r l ic h ,  " P a r t ic ip a t io n  in Il le g it im a te  A c t iv i t ie s ."
® E h r lic h
7
T h ese  c r im e s  a re : m u rd e r ,  ra p e , a s s a u lt , ro b b e ry , b u rg la ry ,  
g ran d  la rc e n y  and auto th e ft.
g
S p e c ia l in fo rm a tio n  w as obta ined  fro m  the F . B . I .  th is  c r im e  
ra te  is  an a v e ra g e  o f the c r im e  ra te s  in the 62 co u n ties  in N ew  Y o r k  S ta te
g
T h e  1 9 ,0 0 0  is  the sum  o f p r is o n e rs  in S ta te  fa c il i t ie s  and lo c a l 
fa c i l i t ie s  fo r  D e c e m b e r 3 0 , 1970 . In d iv id u a ls  who w e re  not y e t convic ted  
w e re  not included in the co u n t. S o u rce  o f In fo rm a tio n : M ic h a e l H indelang  
and o th e rs , U . S .  S o u rceb o o k  o f C r im in a l J u s tic e  S ta t is t ic s  1973 ,
U . S .  L aw  E n fo rc e m e n t A s s is ta n c e  A d m in is tra t io n , N a tio n a l C r im in a l  
J u s tic e  In fo rm a tio n  and S ta t is t ic s  S e rv ic e  (W ashington: G o v ern m e n t 
P r in t in g  O ff ic e , 1973 ) p . 359
^ T h e  a g e /s e x  b reakd o w n s w e re  d e r iv e d  fro m : D e p a rtm e n t o f  
C o m m e rc e , U . S .  B u re a u  o f the C en su s , C ounty and C ity  D a ta  B o o k , 1972  
(W ash ing ton : G o v e rn m e n t P r in t in g  O ff ic e , 1973)
11 12% x 5% = .6%
1 2 % x 1 0 % = 1 . 2 %
T o ta l c r im e s
Pop x . 6 % = 6  M o n ie s  p e r  y e a r
T o ta l c r im e s
P op x~ .~2%-----  = 3  fe lo n ie s  p e r  y e a r
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C H A P T E R  HI
M E A S U R IN G  L A W  E N F O R C E M E N T  V A R IA B L E S  A N D  
T H E  C R IM E  R A T E  IN  N E W  Y O R K  S T A T E
The lin k  betw een p o lice  and c o u rt a c t iv it ie s  and c r im e  is  a  d if f ic u lt  
one to d e te rm in e . T h e re  a re  two reaso n s  fo r  th is . F i r s t ,  even i f  
m e a s u re s  o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t could be re a d ily  e s t im a te d , the re la t io n ­
ships betw een the la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  and c r im e  a re  c o m p le x .
T h e se  d if f ic u lt ie s  w e re  d iscussed  in the p re v io u s  c h a p te r . S eco n d , it is  
not easy to m e a s u re  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t o r  to m e a s u re  the c r im e  r a te .  T h is  
c h a p te r  a d d re s s e s  the m e a s u re m e n t is s u e . S p e c if ic a l ly ,  th is  c h a p te r  is  
an a tte m p t to p ro v id e  re as o n a b le  p ro c e d u re s  fo r  e s tim a tin g  R ,Q ,  F a ,F ^ ,  
F c , <$, and the c r im e  r a te .  T h e se  e s tim a te s  a re  based on d ata  a v a ila b le  
on c r im in a l  ju s t ic e  p ro c es s in g  and c r im e  re p o rtin g  in New Y o r k  S ta te .
F e lo n y  C ase  P ro c e s s in g  
T h is  is  an a n a ly s is  o f  the supp ly  o f fe lo n y  o ffen ses  in N ew  Y o r k  S ta te .  
A  c r im in a l  o ffense  can be d es ig n a ted  as  a  fe lo n y , m is d e m e a n o r o r  a 
v io la tio n  a cc o rd in g  to the N ew  Y o r k  S ta te  c r im in a l co d e. F e lo n ie s  a re  
the m ost s e r io u s  o ffenses  and v io la tio n s  a re  the le a s t s e r io u s . T a b le  3 
l is ts  m a jo r  fe lo n y  c r im e  c a te g o r ie s  in New Y o r k  S ta te , as  w e ll as  
m is d e m e a n o r and v io la tio n  o ffe n s e s . N o n -fe lo n y  c r im e  c a te g o r ie s  a re
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C r im e C r im e  Code # C r im e
m u rd e r  81
m a n s la u g h te r 91
n e g lig e n t h o m ic id e  1 2 1
ra p e  141
ro b b e ry  191
a s s a u lt 2 0 1
b u rg la ry  2 1  1
possession  o f 391
b u r g la r 's  too ls  
grand la rc e n y , not 1 1 2
auto
grand  la rc e n y , auto 132
theft
possession  o f s to len  152
p ro p e r ty
fra u d  182
fo rg e ry  232
a rs o n  252
p ro s titu tio n  262
o th e r sex o ffen ses  272
d ru g  o ffen ses  292
possession  o f dangei—  302
ous w eapons  
d r iv in g  w h ile  in to x i-  312
cated
abandonm ent o f 332
c h ild re n
g a m b lin g  342
m a lic io u s  m is c h ie f  352
o th e r fe lo n ie s  362
332
u n law fu l e n try
possession  o f b u rg la r 's  too ls  
jo s t l  ing
possession  o f s to len  p ro p e rty  
sex o ffenses  
d rug  o ffen ses  
possession  o f dangerous  
w eapons
a id in g  an escaped p r is o n e r  
p etty  la rc e n c y , not auto  
u n a u th o rize d  use o f auto  
frau d
p ro s titu tio n
a s s a u lt
o ffenses  a g a in s t c h ild re n  
v io la tin g  the l iq u o r  law s  
d r iv in g  w h ile  in to x ica ted  
o th e r m o to r o ffen ses  
in to x ica tio n
d is o rd e r ly  conduct
g am b lin g
m a lic io u s  m is c h ie f  
c r im in a l  tre s p a s s  
v io la tin g  lo c a l o rd in a n ce s  
o th e r  m is d e m e a n o rs  and  
v io la tio n s
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p e rtin e n t to the a n a ly s is , s ince  m any o ffe n d e rs  who a re  a r re s te d  on 
fe lony  ch arg e s  a re  p ro cessed  through som e c o u rt s tages on m is d e m e a n o r  
o r  v io la tio n  c h a rg e s . The  New Y o rk  S ta te  law s p ro v id e  d e ta ile d  
d e s c rip tio n s  o f each c r im e . 1
F ig u re  5 is a s im p lif ie d  sketch  o f case p ro c es s in g  fo r  p e rso n s  who 
have c o m m itte d  a fe lo n y  offense and have been a r re s te d  on a fe lo n y  c h a rg e . 
A f t e r  the c h arg e s  have been re co rd e d  (booked) a t the lo c a l p o lice  le v e l ,  
the case is b ro u g h t to the county b ran ch  o f the New Y o rk  S ta te  c o u rt  
s y s te m . P r e - c o u r t  p ro c es s in g  e n ta ils  the a r re s t in g  o f f ic e r  p re se n tin g  
the case to a d is t r ic t  a tto rn e y  ( D . A . ) .  A t th a t t im e , c o m p la in a n ts  a lso  
a p p e a r b e fo re  the D .A .  , who lis te n s  to the in fo rm a tio n  and re a s s e s s e s  
the c h a rg e s . It  is p o ssib le  fo r  the D .A .  to d is m is s  the case a t th is  
p o in t i f  it is  thought th a t th e re  is  in s u ffic ie n t evidence o r  if  c o m p la in an ts  
w ith d ra w  th e ir  c o m p la in ts . T h e  D .A .  m ay  a lso  change the c h a rg e s .
O nce the case is  assessed  by the d is t r ic t  a tto rn e y  the case advances  
to the lo w e r  c o u rt fo r  the next stage: a r ra ig n m e n t. A t  a r r a ig n m e n t , 
c h arg e s  a re  fo r m a lly  p re se n te d  to the d e fen d an t. T h e re  is a judge  
p re s id in g  o v e r  the c o u rt and a p ro secu tin g  a tto rn e y . A t  the a r ra ig n m e n t  
s ta g e , i t  is  p o ss ib le  fo r  p lea  b a rg a in in g  to o c c u r as  fo llo w s: the fe lony  
c h a rg e s  w i l l  be dropped  to the m is d e m e a n o r le v e l ,  the defendant w i l l  
p lead  g u ilty  and the case w i l l  be re s o lv e d . T h e  g u ilty  o ffe n d e r w i l l  be 
given e ith e r  a n o n -in c a rc e ra tio n  s en ten c e , o r  a lo c a l j a i l  sentence o f up 
to one y e a r .  S in ce  a r ra ig n m e n t n o rm a lly  o ccu rs  w ith in  tw e n ty -fo u r
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C R IM E  (F e lo n y )
4
P O L IC E
D IS T R IC T
A T T O R N E Y
A R R E S T
D IS M IS S
C A S E
'A R R A IG N M E N T  
(P re s s  C h a rg e s )
C R IM IN A L  
 ̂ C O U R T  .
D IS M IS S  
O R  A C Q U IT
f J A I L  
h 1 Y E A R
S U P R E M E  
^ C O U R T  ^
D IS M IS S  
DR A C Q U IT
J A IL  
1 Y E A R
P R IS O N  
1 Y E A R
P R O B A T IO N  
(N O  J A IL )
P R O B A T IO N  
(N O  J A IL )
C O N V IC T  O F  A  
F E L O N Y
C O N V IC T  O F  A  
M IS D E M E A N O R
C O N V IC T  T O  A  
M IS D E M E A N O R
R E C O M M E N D  T O  
S U P R E M E  C O U R T
O  = A g e n c ie s  
m  = O utcom es
F ig u re  5 -  C r im in a l  J u s tic e  P ro c e s s in g  in N ew  Y o r k  S ta te
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h ours  o f a r r e s t ,  when such p le a  b a rg a in in g  o c c u rs , v e ry  l i t t le  tim e  
is  n e c e s s a ry  fo r  the re s o lu tio n  o f the c a s e .
tf the case is not re so lv ed  a t a r ra ig n m e n t , th e re  a re  two p o ss ib le  
outcom es: e ith e r  the ch arg e s  w i l l  be reduced  to the m is d e m e a n o r le v e l  
and the case w i l l  be scheduled fo r  a t r ia l  in the lo w e r  c o u rt; o r  the ch arg e s  
w il l  re m a in  fe lo n y  c h arg e s  and the case w i l l  be advanced to the G rand  
J u ry . In e ith e r  c a s e , the judge w i l l  set a b a il am o u n t. T h e  accused m ust 
pay the b a il am ount o r  p u rch ase  a b a il bond o r  he w il l  be deta in ed  in a 
lo c a l ja i l  fa c il i ty  u n til fu r th e r  c r im in a l ju s tic e  p ro c e s s in g .
If  t r ie d  and co n vic ted  in the lo w e r  c o u r t , the defendant w i l l  re c e iv e  
a m a x im u m  sentence o f up to one y e a r  in a lo c a l j a i l  fa c il i ty  and h is  
co n v ic tio n  c h arg e  w i l l  be e ith e r  a m is d e m e a n o r o r  v io la tio n  o ffen s e . I f  
the case is advanced to the G rand  J u ry , the o ffe n d e r w i l l  m ost l ik e ly  
re c e iv e  an in d ic tm e n t. T h a t is ,  i f  the G ran d  J u ry  d ec id es  th a t the 
ch arg e s  a re  w e ll-fo u n d e d , a w r it te n  accu satio n  is  p re p a re d , c h arg in g  
the p erso n  w ith  having c o m m itte d  a fe lo n y . T h is  accusatio n  is  c a lle d  an 
in d ic tm e n t. T h e  in d ic tm e n t fo rm s  the b as is  fo r  p ro secu tio n  in the n ext 
c o u r t ,  the s u p e r io r  c o u r t . T h e  G ran d  J u ry  m ay  change the fe lo n y  c h a rg e s ,  
but th e re  is no p le a  b a rg a in in g  a t the G rand  J u ry  stage o f p ro c e s s in g .
A n  ind ic ted  defendant faces  t r ia l  in the s u p e r io r  c o u r t . O fte n , an 
o ffe n d e r p leads  to a m is d e m e a n o r ch arg e  o r  to a le s s e r  fe lo n y  ch arg e  
in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt and no ju r y  t r ia l  w i l l  o c c u r . W h e th e r o r  not p lea  
b a rg a in in g  o c c u rs , the o ffe n d e r , if  c o n v ic te d , can be convic ted  o f a
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fe lony o r  o f a m is d e m e a n o r o r  v io la tio n  o ffen se . I f  the o ffe n d e r is
co nvic ted  o f a m is d e m e a n o r o r  v io la tio n  o ffen se , ne w il l  re c e iv e  e ith e r  
a n o n -in c a rc e ra tio n  sentence o r  a ja i l  sen ten ce . I f  the o ffe n d e r is  
co nvic ted  o f a fe lo n y  o ffe n s e , he m ay a lso  re c e iv e  a sentence of one y e a r  
o r  m o re  in a S ta te  p ris o n  fa c il i ty .
A  case w h ich  is re s o lv e d  by t r ia l  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt re q u ire s  the
m o st tim e  in the c r im in a l  ju s tic e  s y s te m . It  m ig h t take  m o re  than one
2
y e a r  fo r  the case to re ac h  fin a l re s o lu tio n 7  not inc lud ing  a p p e a ls . A n d , 
a d efendan t m ay spend a p a r t  o r  a ll  o f his p r e t r ia l  tim e  in d e ten tio n . 
W h e th e r the defendan t is fre e  o r  deta ined  b e fo re  the case is reso lved  
depends on the am ount o f  b a il se t by the ju dges  and a lso  depends on the 
o ffe n d e r 's  a b ility  to pay the b a il am ount o r  to p urchase a b a il bond.
F ro m  the d e s c rip tio n  o f fe lo n y  case p ro c e s s in g , it  is  obvious th a t 
th e re  a re  s e v e ra l w ays  in w h ich  an o ffe n d e r can be acq u itted  (o r  have the 
case d is m is s e d ) and th e re  a re  s e v e ra l w ays that the o ffe n d e r can be 
c o n v ic te d . F o r  e x a m p le , a defendant m ay have the case d is m is s e d  in 
a m a tte r  o f h o u rs  a t the p r e -a r ra ig n m e n t  s ta g e . O r  it  m ig h t take o v e r  
a y e a r  to f in a lly  have a ju r y  re tu rn  a n o n -g u ilty  find ing  in the s u p e r io r  
c o u r t , t f  a defendant is  c o n v ic te d , he m ay p lead g u ilty  a t  the a rra ig n m e n t  
s ta g e , and be co n v ic ted  o f a m is d e m e a n o r o ffen s e . O r  he m ay be found 
g u ilty  by a ju r y  a f te r  a len g thy  c o u rtro o m  t r i a l .  I f  in c a rc e ra te d , his  
sentence could range  fro m  one day in a lo ca l ja i l  to l i fe  im p ris o n m e n t  
in a s ta te  p e n ite n t ia ry .
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M e a s u rin g  C o u r t -R e la te d  P ro b a b il it ie s  and C osts  
D a ta  on C o u rt  O u tco m es
T h e  d a ta  on c o u rt outcom es fo r  fe lony a r r e s ts  ir. Hew Y o r k  S ta te  is 
based on annual ta l l ie s  o f ou tcom es in the lo w e r  c o u r t ,  the G rand  J u ry  
and the s u p e r io r  c o u rt in each co u n ty . O utcom es a re  grouped by c r im e  
code (see T a b le  3 ) .  T h e  c r im e  code r e fe rs  to the c r im in a l  ch arg e  o f 
the in d iv id u a l as he e n te rs  each stacp o f c o u rt p ro c e s s in g .
It  would be qu ite  m is le a d in g  to m e a s u re  the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  
fo r  a  p e rso n  a r re s te d  on a ro b b e ry  c h a rg e , fo r  e x a m p le , by d iv id in g  the 
n u m b e r  o f  p erso n s  co n vic ted  on a ro b b e ry  ch arg e  (in  the s u p e r io r  c o u rt)  
by the to ta l n u m b e r o f p erso n s  a r re s te d  on ro b b e ry  c h a rg e s . One m is ­
lead in g  fa c to r  is th a t c o u rt p ro c es s es  a re  s lo w . It  m ig h t take w e ll o v e r  
one y e a r  betw een the t im e  o f a r r e s t  and the t im e  o f f in a l co n v ic tio n  in the 
s u p e r io r  c o u r t . T h u s , m any o f the p e rso n s  convic ted  th is  y e a r  w ould  
have been a r re s te d  la s t  y e a r .  A n d , m ost o f the p e rso n s  a r re s te d  fo r  
ro b b e ry  o ffen ses  th is  y e a r  w ould not y e t  have co m p le ted  th e ir  c o u rt  
p ro c e s s in g .
T o  red u ce  the p ro b le m s  o f m e a s u re m e n t due to t im e  la g s , w e base  
each in d iv id u a l p ro b a b ility  on the n u m b er o f cases  e n te r in g  a t tha t 
p a r t ic u la r  c o u rt s ta g e . F o r  e x a m p le , in o r d e r  to m e a s u re  the p ro b a b ility  
o f co n v ic tio n  in the lo w e r  c o u r t ,  we use the total n u m b e r o f fe lo n y  cases  
e n te r in g  the lo w e r  c o u rt as the base ra th e r  than the to ta l n u m b e r o f p erso n s  
a r re s te d  on that c h a rg e .
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A n o th e r m is le a d in g  fa c to r  in m e a s u rin g  the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  
fo r  one p a r t ic u la r  o ffense  (in  th is  e x a m p le , fo r  ro b b e ry ) is  th a t m any  
p erso n s  a r re s te d  on ro b b e ry  c h a rg e s  a re  co n vic ted  o f o th e r  o ffe n s e s .
D iv id in g  the n u m b e r o f p e rs o n s ' co n v ic ted  fo r  a ro b b e ry  by the n u m b e r o f  
perso n s  a r re s te d  on ro b b e ry  c h a rg e s  w ould  p ro b a b ly  lead  to a s e r io u s  
u n d e re s tim a tio n  o f the p ro b a b ility  o f  co n v ic tio n  fo r  a ro b b e r . M o s t o f the  
p erso n s  a r re s te d  on ro b b e ry  c h a rg e s  w ould be co n v ic ted  fo r  le s s e r  fe lo n y  
offen ses  o r  o f m is d e m e a n o rs .
S in ce  in d iv id u a l c r im e  c a te g o r ie s  a re  d if f ic u lt  to tra c e  th rough  the 
c o u rt s y s te m , we a g g reg a te  a s e le c ted  n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  into two c a te ­
g o rie s : v io le n t c r im e s  and p ro p e r ty - r e la te d  c r im e s .  T h e se  ag g reg a tio n s  
a re  m ade to reduce  the p ro b le m s  w h ich  a r is e  fro m  red u ctio n  o f c r im in a l  
ch a rg e s  as a case advances through the c r im in a l ju s t ic e  s y s te m . A ls o ,  
the c h arg e s  a re  se lec ted  to m atch  the c h a rg e s  in the d ata  on a r r e s ts  
and c o m p la in ts , d iscussed  la t e r .  V io le n t  fe lo n ie s  a re :  m u rd e r  (code 1 0 ), 
m a n s la u g h te r (code 2 0 ) ,  n e g lig e n t h o m ic id e  (code 3 0 ) ,  rap e  (code 4 0 ) ,  
and a s s a u lt (code 6 0 ) .  P r o p e r ty - r e la te d  fe lony  o ffen ses  a re : ro b b e ry  
(code 5 0 ) ,  b u rg la ry  (code 7 0 ) , possession  o f s to len  p ro p e r ty  (code 1 4 0 ), 
possession  o f b u rg la r 's  to o ls  (code 9 0 ) ,  g rand  la rc e n c y  (code 1 0 0 ) ,  and 
auto th e ft (code 1 30 ). W e a lso  ag g reg a te  a ll  fe lo n y  c h a rg e s  lis te d  in 
co lu m n  one o f T a b le  3 .  T h u s , to ta l fe lo n ie s  r e fe r s  to a ll  fe lo n ie s , v io le n t  
fe lo n ie s  r e fe r s  to the s e le c te d  n u m b e r o f v io le n t fe lo n y  o ffen ses  and p r o p e r ty -  
re la te d  fe lo n ie s  a re  a s e le c ted  group o f fe lo n io u s  p r o p e r ty - r e la te d  fe lo n y
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c r im e s .  T o ta l fe lo n ie s  encom passes m o re  o ffenses  than the sum  o f the 
o ffen ses  in the v io le n t and p ro p e r ty - re la te d  c a te g o r ie s .
D a ta  fo r  the lo w e r  c o u r t .  Tw o ta l l ie s ,  w h ich  a re  m ade by the lo w e r  
c o u rts  o f each co u n ty , a re  used in o u r  c a lc u la tio n s  o f the c o u rt o u tco m es . 
T h ese  ta l l ie s  a re  annual a g g reg a te s  o f m o nth ly  ta l l ie s .  T h e  f i r s t  o f the 
two ta l l ie s  is  c a l le d , "R e tu rn  B: P ro c e d u ra l O utcom e o f C r im in a l C ases
O
in P r e l im in a r y  C o u r ts ."  F o r  each c r im e  code lis te d  in T a b le  3 ,  (C odes
r e fe r  to the a r r e s t  c h arg e s  r a th e r  than d isp o sitio n  c h a rg e s ) the fo llo w in g
4
count is  m ade: to ta l n u m b e r o f d is p o s itio n s , to ta l n u m b e r o f co n v ic tio n s  
and s en ten c e s , to ta l n u m b e r o f a c q u itta ls  and d is m is s a ls  and to ta l n u m b e r  
t ra n s fe r re d  to the G ran d  J u r y . S in ce  we do not have d a ta  on p r e - t r ia l
5
p ro c e s s in g , w e assu m e th a t a ll  p e rso n s  a r re s te d  e n te r  the lo w e r  c o u rts . 
U sing the d ata  in R e tu rn  B , w e c a lc u la te  fo r  a ll  fe lo n y  o ffe n s e s , v io le n t  
fe lo n y  o ffen ses  and p ro p e r ty -r e la te d  fe lony o ffenses:
( 3 .1 )  P e rc e n t advanced to G ran d  J u ry  = to ta l n u m b e r t ra n s fe r r e d  to
(P e rc e n t not re c e iv in g  fin a l the G rand  J u ry _______________
d isp o s itio n  in the lo w e r  c o u rt)  to ta l n u m b e r o f d is p o s itio n s
( 3 .2 )  P e rc e n t re c e iv in g  fin a l d is p o s i-  = I -  P e rc e n t advanced to G rand
tion in the lo w e r  c o u rt J u ry
( 3 .3 )  P e rc e n t co n v ic ted  in lo w e r  = N u m b e r co n vic ted  and
c o u rt  sentenced_____________________
n u m b e r co n v ic ted  and sentenced  
+ n u m b er acq u itted  o r  d is m is s e d
T h e  o th e r  ta l ly  o f  ou tcom es fro m  the lo w e r  c o u rt is c a l le d , "R e tu rn  E:
R e p o rt o f sen tences  in c r im in a l c a s e s — lo w e r  c o u r ts ."  T h e  lo w e r  c o u rt
re tu rn  E  (th e re  is  a lso  a re tu rn  E  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt)  l is ts  sentences
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im posed on a ll  p e rso n s  convic ted  in the lo w e r  c o u r t . T h e  sentences  
a re  lis te d  fo r  each c r im e  co d e , w h e re  the code r e fe rs  to the co nvic tion  
c h a rg e . S in ce  a fe lo n y  co n v ic tio n  cannot o c c u r in the lo w e r  c o u r t , a ll  
c o n v ic tio n  ch arg e s  a re  fo r  m is d e m e a n o r o ffen s e s . T h e  lo w e r  c o u rt  
R e tu rn  E  l is ts :  to ta l n u m b e r o f defendants sen ten ced , to ta l n u m b e r sent 
to a  lo c a l j a i l ,  to ta l n u m b e r f in e d , to ta l n u m b e r g iven  a p ro b a tio n a ry  
s en ten c e , to ta l n u m b e r g iven  a co n d itio n a l d is ch a rg e  and to ta l n u m b e r  
given an unco n d itio n a l d is c h a rg e .
It  is im p o s s ib le  to s e p a ra te , in the lo w e r  c o u rt R e tu rn  E , w hich  
sentences w e re  fo r  in d iv id u a ls  a r re s te d  fo r  fe lo n y  o ffen ses  and convic ted  
o f m is d e m e a n o rs  and w h ich  sentences w e re  fo r  in d iv id u a ls  a r re s te d  fo r  
m is d e m e a n o r o ffe n s e s . W e assum e th a t sentences a re  based s o le ly  on 
co n v ic tio n  c h arg e  and w e com bine the fo llo w in g  co n v ic tio n  ch arg e s  fo r  
v io le n t o ffenses: jo s tlin g  (code 1 2 1 ) ,  sex o ffen ses  (code 1 9 1 ), a s s a u lt 
(code 2 3 2 ) and m a lic io u s  m is c h ie f  (code 3 4 2 ). T h e se  a re  com m on m is ­
d e m e a n o r co n v ic tio n  c h arg e s  fo r  p e rso n s  a r re s te d  fo r  m u r d e r ,  rap e  o r  
a s s a u lt. W e com bine the fo llo w in g  co n v ic tio n  c h arg e s  fo r  p r o p e r ty -  
re la te d  o ffenses: u n law fu l e n try  (code 3 1 ) ,  possession  o f b u r g la r 's  too ls  
(code 9 1 ) ,  possession  o f s to len  p ro p e r ty  (code 1 4 1 ), p e tty  la rc e n y  (code 1 1 2 ), 
u n a u th o rize d  use o f an a u to m o b ile  (code 132) and c r im in a l tre s s p a s s  
(code 3 5 2 ). T h ese  a re  com m on m is d e m e a n o r co n v ic tio n  c h a rg e s  fo r  
fe lo n y  c h arg e s  o f ro b b e ry , b u r g la r y ,  g rand  la rc e n y  and auto th e ft .
F o r  a ll  m is d e m e a n o r and v io la tio n  co n v ic tio n s  in the low er c o u r t ,  fo r
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s e le c ted  v io le n t c r i m e  c o n v ic tio n s  in the lo w e r  c o u rt and fo r  s e le c ted  
p ro p e r ty - re la te d  c r im in a l  co n v ic tio n s  in the lo w e r  c o u r t ,  w e com pute  
the fo llo w in g :
( 3 .4 )  P e rc e n t ja i le d  upon c o n v ic -  = to ta l n u m b e r sent to a lo c a l ja i l
tion  in the lo w e r  c o u rt to ta l n u m b e r sentenced
( 3 .5 )  P e rc e n t not ja i le d  upon c o n - = 1 -P e r c e n t  ja i le d  upon co n v ic tio n
v ic tio n  in the lo w e r  c o u rt in the lo w e r  c o u rt
D a ta  fo r  the G ran d  J u ry . T h e  ta l ly  o f o u tco m es in the G ran d  J u ry  is
c a lle d , "R e tu rn  C: D is t r ic t  A tto rn e y 's  R e p o rt on G rand  J u r y ."  F o r  each
county and fo r  each c r im e  code (code r e fe rs  to c h arg e s  when the case
e n te rs  the G ran d  J u ry )  the fo llo w in g  in fo rm a tio n  is  shown: to ta l n u m b e r
o f defendants  acted  o n , to ta l n u m b e r o f defendants  in d ic te d , to ta l n u m b e r
reco m m en d ed  fo r  yo u th fu l o ffe n d e r tre a tm e n t , to ta l n u m b e r re tu rn e d  to the
lo w e r  c o u rt and to ta l n u m b e r fo r  w h ich  no b i l l  w as re tu rn e d  ( i . e .  , the
c h a rg e s  w e re  d is m is s e d ) we c a lc u la te :
( 3 .6 )  P e rc e n t ind ic ted  fro m  the G ran d  = to ta l n u m b e r o f defendants  
J u ry  in d ic ted_____________________
to ta l n u m b e r o f defendants  
disposed
T h e  c r im e  c a te g o ry  ag g reg a tio n s  fo r  R e tu rn  C  a re  the sam e as the  
a g g reg a tio n s  fo r  R e tu rn  B .
D a ta  fo r  the s u p e r io r  c o u r t .  T h e re  a re  two sets  o f ta l l ie s  in the  
s u p e r io r  c o u r t . T h e  f i r s t  is ,  "R e tu rn  D: O u tco m e o f P ro c e d u re s  in 
S u p re m e  and C ounty C o u r t ."  F o r  each co u n ty , ta l l ie s  a re  m ade by the  
(fe lo n y ) c r im e  code d e te rm in e d  by the G ran d  J u r y .  T h e  fo llo w in g  in fo rm a ­
tio n  is  l is te d  on the R e tu rn  D: to ta l d is p o s itio n s , to ta l n u m b e r o f c o n v ic ­
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tions  by ( ju r y )  v e r d ic t ,  to ta l n u m b er o f co n v ic tio n s  by p le a , to ta l n u m b er  
acq u itted  by ju r y ,  to ta l acq u itted  o r  d is m is s e d  by the c o u rt and o th e rs . 
F o r  a ll  fe lo n y  o ffe n s e s , se lec ted  p r o p e r ty -re la te d  fe lo n ie s  and se lec ted  
v io le n t fe lo n ie s  we c a lc u la te :
( 3 .7 )  P e rc e n t o f co n v ic tio n s  
in s u p e r io r  c o u rt
to ta l n u m b e r o f c o n v ic tio n s  by  
v e rd ic t  +  to ta l n u m b e r o f
co n v ic tio n s  by p lea____________
to ta l n u m b er o f d is p o s itio n s
T h e re  is  a lso  a ta l ly  o f sentences fro m  the s u p e r io r  c o u rt: "R e tu rn  
E: R e p o rt o f S en ten ces  in C r im in a l C a s e s -H ig h e r  C o u r ts ."  H e r e ,  the 
c r im e  c a te g o r ie s  in d ica te  the ch arg e  a t  the tim e  o f c o n v ic tio n . C o n v ic tio n  
c h a rg e s  fo r  fe lo n y  in d ic tm en ts  m ay be fe lo n ie s  o r  m is d e m e a n o rs  o r  
v io la t io n s . T h e  fo llo w in g  in fo rm a tio n  is lis te d  the R e tu rn  E fro m  the 
h ig h e r c o u rt: to ta l n u m b e r sentenced to s ta te  p r is o n s , to ta l sen t to s ta te  
r e fo r m a to r ie s ,  to ta l sent to a  s ta te  re ce p tio n  c e n te r  (p re -p r is o n  p la c e ­
m e n t) , to ta l sent to lo c a l j a i l s ,  to ta l f in e d , to ta l p ro b a tio n a ry  sen ten ces , 
to ta l g iven  a  c o n d itio n a l d is c h a rg e  and to ta l g iven  an uncond itional 
d is c h a rg e . G iven  the in fo rm a tio n  on the h ig h e r c o u rt  re tu rn  E , we 
c a lc u la te :
( 3 .8 )  P e rc e n t o f p ro p e r ty -re la te d  
c r im e s  co n v ic tio n s  in the  
s u p e r io r  c o u rt w h ich  a re  
fe lo n ie s
( 3 .9 )  P e rc e n t o f p ro p e r ty -re la te d  
c r im e  co n v ic tio n s  in the 
s u p e r io r  c o u rt w h ich  a re  
m is d e m e a n o rs
to ta l sentenced fo r  c r im in a l  
codes: 5 0 , 7 0 , 9 0 , 100 , 130 and 140 
to ta l sentenced fo r  c r im in a l  
codes: 5 0 , 7 0 ,  9 0 , 100 , 130 , 140 
81 , 91 , 141 , 112 , 132 , and 353
1-P e r c e n t  o f p ro p e r ty -re la te d  
co n v ic tio n s  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt  
w hich  a re  fe lo n ies
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( 3 .1 0 )  P e rc e n t o f v io le n t c r im e
c o n vic tio n s  in the s u p e r io r  = 
c o u rt
to ta l sentenced fo r  c r im in a l  
codes: 10 , 2 0 , 3 0 , 4 0 , 60  
to ta l sentenced fo r  c r im in a l  
codes: 1 0 , 2 0 , 3 0 , 4 0 , 6 0 , 121 , 
191 , 2 3 2 , and 342
(3 .1 1 )  P e rc e n t o f v io le n t c r im e
co n vic tio n s  in the s u p e r io r  = 
c o u rt w h ich  a re  m is d e m e a n o rs
1 -P e r c e n t  o f v io le n t c r im e  
co n v ic tio n  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt  
w hich  a re  fe lo n ie s
( 3 .1 2 )  P e rc e n t o f a ll  c o n v ic tio n s  
in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt w hich  
a re  fe lo n ie s
to ta l sentenced fo r  a ll  fe lo n y
c r im e  codes_____________________
to ta l sentenced fo r  a ll  fe lo n y , 
m is d e m e a n o r and v io la tio n  c r im e  
codes
F u r th e r ,  w e c a lc u la te , fo r  a ll  p e rso n s  sentenced in the s u p e r io r  c o u r t ,  
fo r  p e rso n s  sentenced  fo r  se lec ted  p ro p e r ty - r e la te d  o ffen ses  (codes: 5 0 ,
7 0 ,9 0 ,1 0 0 ,  1 3 0 ,1 4 0 ,8 1  ,91 ,141  ,1 1 2 ,1 3 2  and 152) and fo r  p e rso n s  sentenced  
fo r  s e le c ted  v io le n t c r im e s  (codes: 1 0 ,2 0 ,3 0 ,4 0 ,6 0 ,1 2 1  ,191 , 2 3 2 ,and 342 ):
(3 .1 3 )  P e rc e n t o f co n v ic tio n s  in the 
s u p e r io r  c o u rt re s u ltin g  in = 
in c a rc e ra tio n  sentences
to ta l n u m b e r sent to s ta te  p ris o n  
+ to ta l n u m b e r sen t to re ce p tio n  
c e n te r  + to ta l n u m b e r sen t to
lo c a l j a i l ___________________________
to ta l sentenced
( 3 .1 4 )  P e rc e n t o f in c a rc e ra tio n  
sentences w h ich  a re  
p ris o n  sentences
to ta l n u m b e r sent to s ta te  p ris o n  
+ to ta l n u m b e r sen t to re ce p tio n
c e n te r_______________________________
to ta l n u m b e r sent to s ta te  p ris o n  
+ to ta l n u m b e r sent to re ce p tio n  
c e n te r  + to ta l n u m b e r sent to ja i l
C a lc u la tin g  the C o u r t -R e la te d  P ro b a b il it ie s
Q: T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t .  T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f
co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t ,  Q , is  equal to the p ro b a b ility  o f  co n v ic tio n  in 
che lo w e r  c o u rt g iven  a r r e s t  p lus  the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  in the
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s u p e r io r  c o u rt g iven  a r r e s t .  W e e s tim a te  the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  in 
the lo w e r  c o u rt g iven  a r r e s t  as  the p e rc e n t o f fe lo n y  cases  e n te r in g  the 
lo w e r  c o u rt w h ich  r e s u lt  in co n v ic tio n s  in the lo w e r  c o u r t . T h u s , the 
p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  in the lo w e r  c o u rt g iven  a r r e s t  is in d ica ted  by 
equation ( 3 .3 ) .
T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f  co n v ic tio n  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt  g iven  a r r e s t  is  
the p ro b a b ility  o f the case being advanced to the G ran d  J u ry  fro m  the  
lo w e r  c o u rt t im e s  the p ro b a b ility  o f  in d ic tm e n t fro m  the G ran d  J u ry  t im e s  
the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  in the s u p e r io r  c o u r t . E ach  o f these p ro b a ­
b i l i t ie s  is  e s tim a te d  as the p e rc e n t o f cases  a t each c o u rt stage w ith  that 
p a r t ic u la r  o u tco m e . T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt  
g iven  a r r e s t  is  e s tim a te d  by m u ltip ly in g  ( 3 .1 )  t im e s  ( 3 .6 )  t im e s  ( 3 .7 ) .
T h e  e s tim a te  o f Q is  s u m m a riz e d  by:
( 3 .1 5 )  Q  = P ro b a b il ity  o f C o n v ic tio n  g iven  A r r e s t  =
R: T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  c o n v ic tio n . T h e  p ro b a b i­
l i t y  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  co n v ic tio n  in the lo w e r  c o u rt is  e s tim a te d  by 
equation  ( 3 .4 ) .  And the p ro b a b ility  o f  in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  co n v ic tio n  in 
the s u p e r io r  c o u rt is  e s tim a te d  by equation  ( 3 .1 5 ) .  T h e  o v e r r a l l  p ro b a b i-
N u m b e r o f p e rso n s  
C o n v ic ted  S en tenced  
f ro m  lo w e r  c o u rt
/  to ta l #  tra n s fe r re d  to ta l ind ic ted  
to G rand  J u ry  fro m  fro m  G ran d  J u ry
t-
to ta l d is p o s itio n s  
i f ro m  lo w e r  c o u rt
#  co n vic ted  & sentenced  
+ #  a cq u itted  o r  d is m is s e d  
f ro m  lo w e r  c o u rt
to ta l co n v ic ted  in 
s u p e r io r  c o u rt
to ta l #  o f s u p e r io r  c o u r  
d is p o s itio n s
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ILty o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  co n v ic tio n  is e s tim a te d  by tak ing  a w eighted  
sum  o f ( 3 .4 )  and (3 . 1 3 ). The  w eig h ts  a re  the p e rc e n t o f  co n v ic tio n s  
o c c u rr in g  in the lo w e r  and s u p e r io r  c o u rts . T h a t  is:
c r im in a l ju s t ic e  sys te m  fro m  the m o m e n t o f a r r e s t  u n til f in a l d is p o s itio n  
o f the c a s e . M o s t o f the tim e  spent is  re la te d  to c o u rt ra th e r  than p o lice  
p ro c e d u re s . A lthoug h  th e re  a re  m any com ponents to the co st to the  
o ffe n d e r , one w hich  s eem s  p e r t in e n t is  the am ount o f  t im e  re q u ire d  to 
f in a lly  d ispose o f the c a s e , re g a rd le s s  o f w h e th e r o r  not c o n v ic tio n  o c c u rs .  
A n d , one o f o u r  m e a s u re s  w h ich  re la te s  to the am ount o f t im e  it  takes  to 
dispose  o f a case is  the c o u rt o f  fin a l d is p o s itio n . I f  a case is  d isposed in 
the lo w e r  c o u r t ,  the t im e  to d is p o s itio n  w il l  u s u a lly  be le s s  than the tim e  
to d ispose o f a case fro m  a r r e s t  to fin a l re s o lu tio n  in the h ig h e r c o u r t .
T h u s , w e e s t im a te  F a  by the p e rc e n t o f fe lony  cases  not re s o lv e d  in  
the lo w e r  c o u r t . T h a t  iS jF 3, is e s tim a te d  by the p e rc e n t o f  cases  fro m  the
(3 .1 6 ) R  = P ro b a b il ity  o f In c a rc e ra tio n  g iven C o n v ic tio n  =
' p e rc e n t ja i le d  upon 
co n v ic tio n  fro m  I 
f lo w e r  c o u rt /
/;to ta l #  convicted  f ro m  lo w e r  c o u rt  
to ta l #  convicted  
fro m  lo w e r  c o u rt
p e rc e n t in c a rc e ra te c  
upon co n v ic tio n  fro m  
s u p e r io r  c o u rt
+ to ta l #  convicted  
\  fro m  s u p e r io r  c o u rt
to ta l =*r co nvic ted  fro m  
s u p e r io r  c o u rt
to ta l #  co nvic ted  f r o m  lo w e r  
c o u rt +  to ta l #  co n v ic ted  fro m  
s u p e r io r  c o u rt
C a lc u la tin g  the C o u rt -R e la te d  C osts  to the O ffe n d e r
F a : the c o s t o f a r r e s t .  T h e  d e fen d an t's  case w i l l  re m a in  w ith in  the
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lo w e r  c o u rt whLch a re  advanced to the G ran d  J u ry :
(3 .1 7 )  F a = co st o f a r r e s t  to the o ffe n d e r =
to ta l n u m b e r o f fe lony  cases  in lo w e r  c o u rt w h ich
a re  t ra n s fe r re d  to the G rand  J u ry __________________
to ta l n u m b e r o f fe lo n y  a r r e s t  cases  c o n s id e red  by 
the lo w e r  c o u rt
F b : the co st o f  co n v ic tio n  net o f a r r e s t  c o s ts . F b is  the c o s t, to the  
o ffe n d e r , o f being c o n v ic te d , net o f a r r e s t  c o s ts , and re g a rd le s s  o f  
w h e th e r the o ffe n d e r is  in c a rc e ra te d . H e r e ,  we assum e that the co s t 
o f co n v ic tio n  w i l l  be a function  o f the h a rsh n ess  o f tre a tm e n t the o ffe n d e r  
w ill  r e c e iv e , no m a tte r  w h ich  sentence is  im p o sed . A n d , the h arsh n ess  
o f tre a tm e n t is  assum ed to be a function  o f the s e rio u s n e ss  o f the co n v ic tio n  
c h a rg e . T h a t is ,  i f  a p e rso n  is  g iven a p ro b a tio n a ry  sen ten ce , fo r  e x a m p le ,  
the len g th  o f p ro b a tio n  w i l l  be lo n g e r , the m o re  s e r io u s  the co n v ic tio n  
c h a rg e . O r ,  i f  the o ffe n d e r is g iven  a j a i l  s en ten ce , the len g th  o f  
sentence w i l l  be lo n g e r , the m o re  s e rio u s  the co n v ic tio n  c h a rg e , e tc .  
T h e r e fo r e ,  the c o s t to the o ffe n d e r o f co n v ic tio n  w il l  be a function  o f  
the s e rio u s n e s s  o f the co n v ic tio n  c h a rg e .
A s  sta ted  e a r l i e r ,  fe lo n y  o ffen ses  a re  co n s id e re d  to be m o re  s e r io u s  
than m is d e m e a n o r o ffe n s e s . T h e r e fo r e ,  fe lo n y  co n v ic tio n  c h arg e s  a re  
m o re  s e r io u s  than m is d e m e a n o r co n v ic tio n  c h a rg e s . In the a g g re g a te , 
the g r e a te r  the p e rc e n t o f  o ffe n d e rs  who a re  co nvic ted  o f fe lo n y  o ffe n s e s ,
u
the g r e a te r  the o v e ra ll  c o s t, to a ll o ffe n d e rs , o f c o n v ic tio n . F  is  thus  
e s tim a te d  as the p e rc e n t o f a ll  co n v ic tio n s  w h ich  a re  fo r  fe lo n y  c h a rg e s . 
S in ce  o n ly  h ig h e r c o u rt  co n v ic tio n s  can be fo r  fe lo n y  ch arg es :
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L*.
( 3 .1 8 )  F  = co st to the o ffe n d e r o f co n v ic tio n  net o f a r r e s t  co s t =
n u m b e r o f fe lo n y  co n v ic tio n s  in s u p e r io r  c o u rt  
to ta l n u m b e r o f co n v ic tio n s  in lo w e r  c o u rt o f persons  
a r r e s t  fo r  fe lo n y  o ffen ses  + to ta l n u m b e r o f co n v ic tio n s  
in s u p e r io r  c o u rt.
F c : T h e  co st o f in c a rc e ra t io n . F °  is  the c o s t, to the o ffe n d e r , o f 
in c a rc e ra tio n  n et o f a r r e s t  and co n v ic tio n  c o s ts . T h e  co st o f in c a rc e ra tio n  
is  d ire c t ly  re la te d  to the len g th  o f sen ten ce . The  lo n g e r  the sentence the  
g r e a te r  the c o s t. T h e  t im e  served  is  o n ly  p a r t ia l ly  d e te rm in e d  a t the 
t im e  o f the t r ia l  by the ju d g e  who sets  a m in im u m  and a  m a x im u m  sentence  
to be s e rv e d . Once the o ffe n d e r has se rv e d  the m in im u m  sen ten ce , the 
sta te  p a ro le  b o ard  d e te rm in e s  how m uch lo n g e r the o ffe n d e r w i l l  re m a in  
in p r is o n . W e w ould not exp ect a la rg e  v a r ia t io n  in a v e ra g e  tim e  s e rv e d  
becween c o u n tie s , hold ing co n v ic tio n  ch arg e  c o n s tan t, s in ce  m uch o f the  
d e c is io n -m a k in g  is  c e n tra liz e d .
It  is  d if f ic u lt  to d e te rm in e  the a v e ra g e  len g th  o f p ris o n  sentence  
a c tu a lly  se rv e d  by o ffe n d e rs  fo r  each county and fo r  each c r im e  ty p e . To  
e s tim a te  the a v e ra g e  in c a rc e ra tio n  p e r io d , p e r  o ffe n d e r , we use a s im p le  
in d ic a to r: the n u m b e r o f p e rso n s  who a re  sent to p ris o n  d iv id ed  by the  
n u m b e r o f p e rso n s  who a re  g iven  sentences o f in c a rc e ra tio n  ( ja i l  o r  p r is o n ).  
T h e  c o s t to the o ffe n d e r o f  in c a rc e ra tio n  is  m e as u re d  as :
(3 .1 9 )  F c = co s t o f in c a rc e ra tio n  to the o ffe n d e r =
n u m b e r o f p ris o n  sentences fro m  s u p e r io r  c o u rt  
n u m b e r o f in c a rc e ra tio n  sentences fro m  s u p e r io r  
c o u rt + n u m b e r o f j a i l  sentences fro m  lo w e r  c o u r t .
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M e a s u rin g  the C r im e  R ate
The  c r im e  ra te  is  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  d iv id ed  by the to ta l popu la­
tion in each co u n ty . T h e  d iff ic u lty  in m e a s u rin g  the c r im e  ra te  is th a t it  
is  d if f ic u lt  to m e a s u re  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  w h ich  w e re  a c tu a lly  c o m ­
m itte d . R a th e r , w h at is u s u a lly  m e as u re d  is som e p erce n ta g e  o f the 
n u m b e r o f c r im e s  w hich  have been d e tec ted  and re p o rte d  to c e n tra l  
p o lice  a u th o r it ie s .
T o  m e a s u re  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  in New Y o ^ k  S ta te
0
c o u n tie s , w e use d a ta  p ro v id ed  by the F . B . I .  on th e ir  " in d ex" c r im e s :  
m u r d e r ,  ra p e , ro b b e ry , a s s a u lt , b u rg la ry ,  la rc e n y  ( la rc e n y  o v e r  $50 
v a lu e ), and auto th e ft . W e group v io le n t o ffenses  to inc lude: ro b b e ry ,  
b u r g la r y ,  la rc e n y  and auto th e ft . A l l  o ffenses a re  the sum  o f v io le n t  
and p ro p e r ty - r e la te d  o ffen s e s .
C r im e s  a re  grouped into la rg e  c a te g o rie s  because o f the p ro b le m  
o f c r im in a l c h arg e  red u ctio n  in the c o u rt s y s te m , d iscu ssed  e a r l i e r .
I f  we did not group the c r im e s ,  o u r m e a s u re s  o f the p ro b a b ility  o f 
co n v ic tio n  and sen tencing  w ould be m is le a d in g .
G rouping  c r im e s  into la r g e r  c a te g o r ie s  c re a te s  a  p ro b le m  in the  
m e a s u re m e n t o f c r im e .  S tu d ie s 7  have shown th a t m any c r im e s  w h ich  
o c c u r and a re  d e tected  a re  n e v e r  re p o rte d  to p o lic e  a u th o r it ie s . F u r th e r ,  
the ra te  a t w h ich  c r im e s  a re  re p o rte d  to p o lice  v a r ie s  depending on the 
type o f c r im e .  In o r d e r  to ag g reg a te  the c r im e s ,  we m u s t in fla te  the  
n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  c r im e s  in each c r im e  c a te g o ry  to a r r iv e  a t e s tim a te s
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o f the ac tu a l n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  in each c r im e  c a te g o ry . W e  
in fla te  the n u m b er o f re p o rte d  c r im e s  by the re c ip ro c a l o f the ra te  o f 
re p o rtin g  o f each c r im e  ty p e . T a b le  4 shows the re p o rtin g  ra te  and the  
w eig h t by w h ich  we in fla te  the n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  c r im e s  fo r  each  
c r im e  ty p e .
T A B L E  4 
R e p o rtin g  R a te s  and C r im e  W e ig h ts
C r im e  Typ e R e p o rtin g  R ate C r im e  W e ig h t
M u rd e r 1 0 0 % 1
Rape 50% 2
R o b b e ry 60% 1 .6 7
A s s a u lt 50% 2
B u rg la ry 65% 1 .5
L a rc e n y 30% 3 . 3 3
A uto  th e ft 90% 1 . 1 1
T h e  c r im e  ra te s  a re  e s tim a te d  as  the to ta l n u m b e r o f c r im e s  d iv ided  
by the to ta l popu lation  o f the co u n ty . T h is  fra c tio n  is  m u lt ip lie d  by 
1 0 0 ,0 0 0  to y ie ld  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  p e r  1 0 0 ,0 0 0  p o p u la tio n . T h e  
e s tim a te s  a re  m ade as fo llo w s:
(3 .2 0 )  C R p  = p ro p e r ty - re la te d  c r im e s  p e r  1 0 0 ,0 0 0  population  =
(n u m b e r o f c o m p la in ts  of:(ro b b e ry  x 1 .6 7 }+ (b u rg la ry  x 1 . 5 ) +  | x  1 0 0 ,0 0 0  ( la rc e n y  x 3 .3 3 )+ (a u to  th e ft x 1 . 1 1 )
county popu lation
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( 3 . 2 1 ) C F ^  = v io le n t c r im e s  p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  popu lation  =
n u m b e r o f c o m p la in ts  o f :
( m u rd e r  x 1 )+ (ra p e  x 2 )+ (a s s a u lt x 2 ) 
county popu lation
x 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
(3 .22) CR^ = to ta l c r im e s  p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  popu lation  
-  C R V + CRp
M e a s u rin g  the P ro b a b ility  o f A r r e s t  
T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  p e r  o ffense  (|) can be m e as u re d  by d iv id in g
an e s tim a te  o f the to ta l n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  (A ) by an e s t im a te  o f the to ta l 
n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  (C ) .  In o u r a n a ly s is  o f the supply  o f 
o ffe n s e s , the dependent v a r ia b le  is the c r im e  ra te  p e r  p opu la tion  ( C /N ) .  
T h e  e x ten t to w h ich  th e re  a r e  m e a s u re m e n t e r r o r s  in the n u m b e r o f  
c r im e s  c o m m itte d , C ,  w i l l  cause a n eg ative  b ias  in the e s tim a te d  
c o e ffic ie n t o f A /C  on C / N ,  i f  the sam e e s tim a te  o f C is  used fo r  both  
v a r ia b le s .
B y using independent e s tim a te s  o f C to m e as u re  C /N  and A / C ,  we 
avo id  the p ro b le m  o f a p o s s ib le  n eg ative  b ias  on the c o e ff ic ie n t o f <£>.
W e use e s tim a te s  o f the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  and the n u m b e r o f  
a r r e s ts  by county based on ta l l ie s  p ro v id ed  by the N ew  Y o r k  S ta te  
D iv is io n  o f C r im in a l  J u s tic e  S e rv ic e s  (D C J S ).
T h e  New  Y o r k  S ta te  D C J S  p ro v id e s  ta l l ie s  o f re p o rte d  c r im e s  and 
a r r e s ts  fo r  m o st p o lic e  ag en c ies  in the s ta te . T h e se  ta l l ie s  a p p e a r on 
t h e ir ,  ’’R e tu rn  A : R e p o rt o f  o ffen ses  known to p o lice  a r r e s t s . ” T h e  R e tu rn  
A  c o n ta in s  the fo llo w in g  in fo rm a tio n : to ta l n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  o ffe n s e s ,
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n u m b e r o f re p o rts  found fa ls e  o r  g ro u n d le s s , n u m b e r o f re p o r ts  solved  
by a r r e s t ,  m a le  a d u lt a r r e s ts ,  fe m a le  a d u lt a r r e s ts ,  m a le  ju v e n ile  
a r r e s ts  and fe m a le  ju v e n ile  a r r e s ts .
W e e s tim a te  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  fo r  each c r im e  code by s u b tra c tin g  
the to ta l n u m b e r o f fa ls e  o r  g ro u n d less  re p o rte d  o ffen ses  fro m  the to ta l 
n u m b e r o f o ffenses  re p o r te d . U sing  the w e ig h ts  in d ica ted  in T a b le  4 ,  and 
adding the c a te g o ry  o f possession  o f s to len  p ro p e rty  to the l is t  o f 
p ro p e rty  c r im e s ,  w e com pute the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  c o m m itte d  fo r  each  
re p o rtin g  p o lice  agency:
(3 .2 3 )  n u m b e r o f p ro p e rty  c r im e s  c o m m itte d  =
(n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  ro o b e r ie s  (code 5 0 ) (n e t o f 
g ro u n d le ss  re p o r ts )  x 1 .6 7 )  +
(n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  b u rg la r ie s  (code 7 0 ) (n e t o f 
g ro u n d less  re p o r ts )  x 1 . 5 )  +
(n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  g rand  la rc e n ty  o ffen ses  (code 1 0 0 ) 
(n e t o f g ro u n d le ss  re p o r ts )  x 3 .3 3 )  +
(n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  auto th e fts  (code 130)
(n e t o f g ro u n d le ss  re p o r ts )  x  1 . 1 1 ) +
(n u m b e r o f re p o r ts  o f possession  o f s to len  p ro p e rty  
(code 140) (n e t o f g ro u n d less  re p o r ts )  x 1 )
( 3 .2 4 )  n u m b e r o f v io le n t c r im e s  c o m m itte d  =
(n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  h o m ic id e s  (code 1 0 , 2 0 ,  and 30 )
(n e t o f g ro u n d le ss  re p o r ts )  x 1 )  +
(n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  ra p es  (code 4 0 ) (n e t o f g round­
le s s  re p o r ts )  x  2 )  +
(n u m b e r o f re p o rte d  a s s a u lts  (code 6 0 ) (n e t o f 
g ro u n d less  re p o r ts )  x 2 )
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and
( 3 .2 5 )  to ta l n u m b e r o f c r im e s  =
n u m b e r o f p ro p e rty  c r im e s  + n u m o e r o f v io le n t c r im e s .  
T h e  n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  is com puted by adding the n u m b e r o f p e rso n s  
a r re s te d  inc ludes ju v e n ile s  and a d u lts , m a le s  and fe m a le s . T h e  e s t i­
m a te s  a re  com puted by the fo llo w in g  fo rm u la s :
( 3 .2 6 )  n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  fo r  v io le n t o ffen ses  =
(M a le  i- F e m a le )  a r r e s ts  fo r  ad u lts  + (M a le  + F e m a le )
a r r e s ts  fo r  ju v e n ile s  fo r  c r im e s : m u r d e r ,  m an ­
s la u g h te r , h o m ic id e , ra p e  and a s s a u lt.
(3 .2 7 )  n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  fo r  p ro p e rty  o ffen ses  =
(M a le  +  F e m a le )  a r r e s ts  fo r  ad u lts  + (M a le  + F e m a le )
a r r e s ts  fo r  ju v e n ile s  fo r  c r im e s : ro b b e ry , b u rg la ry ,  
g ran d  la rc e n y , auto th e ft and possession  o f s to len  
p r o p e r ty .
( 3 .2 8 )  n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  fo r  a ll  o ffen ses  =
n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  fo r  p ro p e rty  o ffen ses  + n u m b e r o f 
a r r e s ts  fo r  v io le n t o ffe n s e s .
In o r d e r  to a r r iv e  a t countyw ide  e s tim a te s  o f c r im e s  and a r r e s t s ,  it
is  n e c e s s a ry  to ag g reg a te  p o lice  re p o rtin g  a g e n c ie s . F o r  each co u n ty ,
w e ag g reg a te  the n u m b e r o f c r im e s  and a r r e s ts  in each c ity ,  town and
v il la g e .  T h e n , the ta l l ie s  fro m  re p o rts  o f  the county s h e r i f f  a re  added
to the to ta l .  S ta te  p o lice  a c t iv it ie s  a re  m o re  d if f ic u lt  to a llo c a te . F o r
each s ta te  p o lice  tro o p , we find  w hich  co unties  a re  c o ve re d  and a llo c a te
a r r e s ts  and c o m p la in ts  a cc o rd in g  to the re la t iv e  population  in each
county c o ve re d  oy chat s ta te  p o lic e  tro o p . A f te r  ag g reg atio n s  a re  m a d e ,
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the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is com puted as fo llo w s:
(3 .2 9 )  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  p e r  v io le n t o ffense =
T o ta l n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  fo r  v io le n t o ffen ses  
n u m b e r o f v io le n t c r im e s
( 3 .3 0 )
and
( 3 . 3 1 )
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  p e r  p ro p e rty  o ffense = 
to ta l n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  fo r  p ro p e rty  o ffen ses  
n u m b e r o f p ro p e rty  c r im e s
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  p e r  o ffense  =
to ta l n u m b e r o f a r r e s ts  fo r  p ro p e rty  ■+ v io le n t o ffen ses
n u m b e r o f p ro e r ty  + v io le n t c r im e s
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F O O T N O T E S
C r im e  c a te g o ry  lis t in g  p ro v id ed  by the N ew  Y o r k  S ta te  D iv is io n  
o f C r im in a l J u s tic e  S ta t is t ic s .
O
W e use the te rn  re s o lu tio n  to m ean that a case m u st reach  fin a l 
c o n v ic tio n , a c q u itta l o r  d is m is s a l.
^ A ll ta l l ie s  w e re  p ro v id ed  by the N ew  Y o r k  S ta te  D iv is io n  o f 
C r im in a l  J u s tic e  S ta t is t ic s .
4
D is p o s itio n  m eans th a t the case re ach es  its  f in a l outcom e in a 
p a r t ic u la r  c o u rt s ta g e . H e r e ,  d is p o s itio n  m eans th a t cases  w e re  
a c q u itte d , d is m is s e d , co n v ic ted  o r  tra n s fe r re d  to a n o th e r c o u r t . W hen  
w e say th a t a case re a c h e s  fin a l d isp o s itio n  a t a p a r t ic u la r  s ta g e , we  
m ean th a t the d efendan t w as  a cq u itted  o r  co n v ic ted  o r  the case w as  
d is m is s e d  a t the c o u rt s ta g e .
° T o  the e x te n t th a t cases  a re  d is m is s e d  b e fo re  a r ra ig n m e n t, we  
o v e re s tim a te  the p ro b a b ility  o f c o n v ic tio n .
&
S o u rce : s p e c ia l d a ta  p ro v id e d  by the F . B . I .  on Index C r im e s ,  
by co u n ty , in New Y o r k  S ta te  fo r  1970 .
7 F o r  e x a m p le , see: P h ilip  E n n is , " C r im in a l V ic t im iz a t io n  in the 
U nited  S ta te s . F ie ld  S u rv e y  I I .  A  R e p o rt o f a N a tio n a l S u r v e y ,"  
P re s id e n t 's  C o m m is s io n  on L a w  E n fo rc e m e n t and A d m in is tra t io n  o f 
J u s tic e  (W ashington: U . S .  G o v e rn m e n t P r in t in g  O f f ic e ,  1 96 7 ).
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C H A P T E R  IV
E C O N O M E T R IC  S P E C IF IC A T IO N  O F  T H E  M O D E L  
A N D  R E G R E S S IO N  R E S U L T S
E c o n o m e tr ic  S p e c ific a tio n
T h e  equations fo r  e s tim a tin g  the supply o f o ffen ses  functions  fo r
New Y o r k  S ta te  in 1970 a re  p resen ted  b e lo w . W e assum e a l in e a r  fo rm
in the fo llo w in g  equations:
( 4 .1 )  C . R . T = a + b 1 (Y A G E )k + b2 (F E M )k  +  b3 (N O N W )k +
b4 (U R B A N )k +  b5 (L O S C H L )k + b g (P O V )k  +
b7 (M E D Y )k +  b 8 (P A T )k +  bg (P C T )k + b 1 0 ( P T T ) k +
b-j •) (T H IG H E R )k +  b 1 2 (T F E L O N Y )k + b i 3 (T P R IS O N )k +
utk
( 4 .2 )  C . R . p =  c + d ^ Y A G E ^  + d2 ( F E M ) k + d3 (N O N W )k +
d4 (U R B A N )k +  d5 (L O S C H L )k +  d g p O V )k + 
dy (P H IG H E R )k +  d 8 (P A P )k + d9 (P C P )k + d 1 0 (P T P )k  +  
d 1 1 (P H IG H E R )k + d 1 2 (P F E L O N Y )k +  d 1 3 (P P R IS O N )k +
upk
( 4 .3 )  C . R . v = e + f-, (Y A G E )k + f2 ( F E M ) k +  f3 (N O N W )k +
f 4 (U R B A N )k +  r'5 (L O S C H L )k + fg C P O V ^  +  
fy (M E D Y )k + fg (P A V )k + fg (P C V )k + f 1 0 ( P T V ) k +
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f-l 1 (V H IG H E R )k + f 1 2 (V F E L O N Y )k +  f  1 3 (V P R IS O N )k + 
uvk
T h e  " k "  s u b s c r it  r e fe r s  to the kth  co unty . T h e re  a re  62 co unties  
in N ew  Y o rk  S ta te . T h e  " T "  s u b s c rip t r e fe rs  to a ll  c r im e s ,  the " P "  
s u b s c rip t r e fe r s  to p ro p e r ty  c r im e s  and the " V "  s u b s c rip t r e fe r s  to  
v io le n t c r im e s .  T h e  u v a r ia b le s  a re  the e r r o r  te rm s  in each o f the 
e q u a tio n s .
T h e  V a r ia b le s
T a b le  5 l is ts  a ll  sym b o ls  fo r  the v a r ia b le s  used in the equations
( 4 .1 )  through  ( 4 .3 )  and p ro v id e s  a s h o rt d e s c rip tio n  o f each o f the 
v a r ia b le s , as w e ll as  m eans and s tan d ard  d e v ia tio n s .
T A B L E  5
V A R IA B L E S  IN  T H E  R E G R E S S IO N  E Q U A T IO N
S ym b o l D e s c r ip tio n  M ean  S ta n d a rd
_________ D e v ia tio n
C . R . y  c r im e  ra te  fo r  a ll  fe lo n y  3 6 3 2 .5  3438
o ffen ses  p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  popu lation
C . R . p  c r im e  ra te  fo r  p r o p e r ty - r e la te d  3 4 4 4 .2  3235
fe lo n y  o ffen ses  p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
popu lation
C . R . y  c r im e  ra te  fo r  v io le n t o ffen ses  1 8 8 .3  231
p e r  1 0 0 , 0 0 0  popu lation
Y A G E  p e rc e n t o f the population  9 .3 %  1 . 6 %
betw een  the ages o f 15 and 19
F E M  p e rc e n t o f popu lation  w h ich  5 1 .3 %  1 .1%
is fe m a le
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S ym b o l
N O N W
U R B A N
L O S C H L
P O V








T A B L E  5 (conc'd)
D e s c rip tio n  M ean S ta n d ard
D e v ia tio n
p e rc e n t o f popu lation  w hich  4 .2 %  5 .9 %
is nonw hite
p e rc e n t o f popu lation  5 0 .8 %  2 7 .6 %
liv in g  in u rb an  a re a s
p e rc e n t o f a d u lt popu lation  3 .3 %  1 .8%
w ith  5 o r  fe w e r  y e a rs  o f school
p e rc e n t o f  fa m ilie s  below  the 3 .1 %  2 .8 %
n a tio n a l p o v e rty  le v e l
m ed ian  incom e $9775  $1501
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t — a ll 17 .6%  7 .1 %
fe lo n y  o ffen ses
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t —  1 5 .7 %  7 .6 %
p ro p e rty  o ffenses
p ro b a b ility  o f  a r r e s t —  24.7%  7 .2 %
v io le n t fe lo n ie s
p ro b a b ility  o f c o n v ic tio n  5 1 .2 %  1 7 .3 %
g iven  a r r e s t  fo r  a  fe lo n y —  
a ll  o ffen ses
p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  g iven 5 0 .1 %  2 0 .2 %
a r r e s t  fo r  fe lo n y — p ro p e rty
o ffen ses
p ro b a b ility  o f  co n v ic tio n  3 9 .6 %  2 0 .4 %
given  a r r e s t  fo r  a  fe lo n y —  
v io le n t o ffen ses
p o rb a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  59.1 % 2 6 .6 %
g iven  a r r e s t  fo r  a fe lo n y  and 
c o n v ic tio n — a ll  o ffen ses
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T A B L E  5 (c o n t’d)
S ym b o l D e s c r ip tio n  M ean
P T P  p ro b a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  a r r e s t  4 3 .4 %
fo r  a fe lo n y  and c o n v ic tio n — p ro p e rty  
offen ses
P T V  p ro b a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  a r r e s t  3 8 .7 %
fo r  a fe lo n y  and c o n v ic tio n — v io le n t o ffenses
T H IG H E R  p e rc e n t o f in d iv id u a ls  a r re s te d  on fe lo n y  7 2 .9 %  
c h a rg e s  w hose cases  re a c h  f in a l d isp o ­
s itio n  in the s u p e r io r  c o u r t— a ll  o ffen ses
P H IG H E R  p e rc e n t o f in d iv id u a ls  a r re s te d  on fe lony  7 3 .4 %  
c h a rg e s  w hose cases  re ac h  fin a l d isp o ­
s itio n  in the s u p e r io r  c o u r t— p ro p e r ty  
o ffenses
V H IG H E R  p e rc e n t o f in d iv id u a ls  a r re s te d  on fe lony  6 3 .9 %  
c h a rg e s  w hose cases  re a c h  f in a l d isp o ­
s itio n  in the s u p e r io r  c o u r t— v io le n t  
o ffenses
T F E L O N V  fo r  those in d iv id u a ls  who a re  a r re s te d  3 6 .8 %  
on fe lo n y  c h arg e s  and c o n v ic te d , the 
p e rc e n t who a re  convicted  o f a fe lo n y —  
a ll  o ffen ses
P F E L O N V  fo r  those in d iv id u a ls  who a re  a r re s te d  5 4 .1 %
on fe lo n y  c h a rg e s  and c o n v ic te d , 
the p e rc e n t who a re  co n v ic ted  o f  a fe lo n y —  
p ro p e rty  o ffenses
V F E L O N Y  fo r  those in d iv id u a ls  who a re  a r re s te d  4 8 .8 %
on fe lo n y  c h a rg e s  and c o n v ic te d , the  
p e rc e n t who a r e  co nvic ted  o f a fe lo n y —  
v io le n t o ffen ses
P P T  p e rc e n t o f o ffe n d e rs  a r re s te d  on 41 .9%
fe lo n y  c h a rg e s , convicted  and 
given an in c a rc e ra tio n  sentence  
w ho a re  sent to p r is o n — a ll o ffen ses
S ta n d ard
D e v ia tio n
2 7 .0 %
3 2 .3 %  
21 .3%
2 2 .5 %  
2 7 .7  
2 2 . 0 % 
2 6 .5 %  
3 2 .6 %  
2 7 .2 %
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TABLE 5 (cont’d)
S ym bol D e s c rip tio n M ean S ta n d a rd
D e v ia tio n
P P P p e rc e n t o f o ffe n d e rs  a r re s te d  
on fe lo n y  c h a rg e s , co nvic ted  
and g iven  an in c a rc e ra tio n  
sentence who a re  sent to 
p r is o n — p ro p e rty  o ffen ses
42 . 7% 3 2 .3 %
P P V p e rc e n t o f o ffe n d e rs  a r re s te d 5 1 .8 %  3 6 .4 %
on fe lo n y  c h a rg e s , convic ted  
and g iven  an in c a rc e ra tio n  
sentence who a re  sent to  
p r is o n — v io le n t o ffenses
B e lo w  is  a s h o rt exp lan a tio n  fo r  each o f the r ig h t-h a n d  v a r ia b le s  
e n te rin g  into equations ( 4 .1 )  through ( 4 .3 )  and hypotheses re g a rd in g  
th e ir  s ig n s .
1 . P e rc e n t te e n a g e rs  (aged 15 through 19) in the p o pu la tion  (Y A G E )  
(s o u rc e : 1970 C ensus o f P o p u la tio n ).
T h e  p e rc e n t o f the population  w h ich  is  teenaged is  expected  to have  
a p o s itiv e  e ffe c t on c r im e  fo r  two reaso n s : F i r s t ,  te e n a g e rs  a re  
thought to have a  g r e a te r  d if fe re n t ia l w age (W j -  W |_ ). T h e ir  le g a l w age  
is lo w e r ,  s in ce  they  have le s s  w o rk  e x p e rie n c e ; and th e ir  i l le g a l wage  
m ay  be h ig h e r because o f g r e a te r  speed and d e x te r ity  in c o m m ittin g  
o ffe n s e s . S eco n d , te e n a g e rs  a re  l ik e ly  to re c e iv e  a  l ig h te r  sentence than  
a d u lts , and th e re fo re  the co st o f co n v ic tio n  and sentencing w ould  be lo w e r  
fo r  th is  g ro u p .
2 .  P e rc e n t o f  the popu lation  w h ich  is fe m a le  (F E M )  (S o u rc e : 1970 C ensus  
o f P o p u la tio n ).
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T h e  re la tio n s h ip  betw een the p e rc e n t fe m a le  and the c r im e  r a te ,  
holding o th e r  v a r ia b le s  c o n stan t, is expected  to be a n eg ative  one.
T h is  is  because w om en a re  b e lie v e d  to be m o re  r is k -a v e r s e  than men  
and th e re fo re  a re  le s s  l ik e ly  to e n te r  into the r is k y  s itu a tio n .
3 .  P e rc e n t o f the population  w h ich  is  nonw hite (N O N W ) (S o u rc e :
1970 C ensus o f P o p u la tio n ).
N o n w h ites  have a lo w e r  le g a l w a g e , W j_ , and th e re fo re  a h ig h e r  
d if fe re n t ia l wage fro m  c o m m ittin g  c r im e .  T h e re fo re  the sign on th is  
v a r ia b le  is h ypothes ized  to be p o s itiv e .
4 .  P e rc e n t o f  the population  liv in g  in u rban  a re a s  (U R B A N ) (S o u rc e : 
1970 C ensus  o f P o p u la tio n .
W j is  thought to be h ig h e r in u rban  a r e a s , s in ce  it  is e a s ie r  fo r  
c r im in a ls  to pass through the co m m u n ity  undetected  by o th e r m e m b e rs  o f  
the c o m m u n ity . T h e r e fo r e ,  a re a s  w hich  a re  m o re  u rb a n ize d  a re  
hyp o th es ized  to have a h ig h e r c r im e  r a te .
5 .  P e rc e n t o f  ad u lts  w ith  low  le v e ls  o f schooling (L O S C H L )  (S o u rc e :  
1970 C ensus  o f P o p u la tio n ).
L a c k  o f education  is b e lie v e d  to have a g r e a te r  dow nw ard  im p a c t on 
the w age in the le g a l s e c to r  than on the ille g a l w a g e . T h e r e fo r e ,  the  
d if fe re n t ia l  wage is  g r e a te r  fo r  p erso n s  w ith  lo w e r  schoo ling  and th e ir  
p ro p e n s ity  to c o m m it c r im e s  is  h ig h e r .
6 . P e rc e n t o f fa m ilie s  w h ich  a re  p o o r (P O V ) (S o u rc e : 1970 C ensus o f  
P o p u la tio n ).
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H old ing  co n stan t the m edian  incom e o f the c o m m u n ity , the p e rc e n t  
o f fa m ilie s  who a re  p o o r is one in d ic a to r  o f the p e rc e n t o f w o rk e rs  
w ith  re la t iv e ly  low  o p p o rtu n itie s  in the leg a l s e c to r . T h is  g ro u p , i f  a 
la c k  o f s k il l  is the reason  fo r  the low  le g a l w ag e , m ay a lso  la c k  sK ill 
in the il le g a l s e c to r , and W j m ay  a ls o  be lo w . T h e  d if fe re n t ia l  w age  
fo r  p o o r people m ay  be the sam e o r  lo w e r  o r  h ig h e r than fo r  o th e r  p e o p le .
7 . M ed ian  Incom e (M F D Y )  (S o u rc e : 1970 Census o f P o p u la tio n ).
H old ing  co n stan t the p e rc e n t o f  fa m ilie s  who a re  p o o r , the m ed ian  
incom e is an in d ic a to r  o f p o ss ib le  w e a lth  fo r  c r im in a ls  to s te a l. F o r  
th is  re a s o n , we w ould  exp ect a p o s itiv e  re la tio n s h ip  betw een m edian  
incom e and c r im e  in the case o f p ro p e r ty  o ffen ses  and no re la tio n s h ip  
in the case o f v io le n t o ffe n s e s .
B u t, m ed ian  incom e is a lso  a p o ss ib le  in d ic a to r  o f the o ffe n d e r 's  
leg a l w a g e , W ^ ,  the g r e a te r  the c o s t, to the o ffe n d e r , o f a r r e s t ,  
co n vic tio n  and in c a rc e ra t io n . T h a t is ,  the o ffe n d e r w ith  h ig h e r leg a l 
e arn in g s  w i l l  in c u r a  g r e a te r  m o n e ta ry  c o s t when he is  p reven ted  
fro m  w o rk in g . F o r  th is  re a s o n , w e w ould  exp ect a n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  
betw een m ed ian  incom e and c r im e .
C o n s id e rin g  both o f the above fa c to rs ,  m edian  incom e is  hypothes ized  
to have a n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  w ith  the n u m b e r o f v io le n t c r im e s  c o m m itte d  
and a w e a k e r  n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  o r  even a p o s itiv e  re la tio n s h ip  to the 
n u m b e r o f p ro p e r ty  c r im e s  c o m m itte d .
3 . P ro b a b il ity  o f a r r e s t  ( P A T ,P A P ,P A V )  (S o u rc e : see C h a p te r  3 ) .
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T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is  h ypothes ized  to have a n eg ative  e ffe c t  
on c r im e .
9 . P ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t  ( P C T ,  P C P ,P C V )  (S o u rc e :  
see C h a p te r  3 ) .
T h is  v a r ia b le  is  expected  to have a n eg ative  e ffe c t on c r im e .
1 0 . P ro b a b il ity  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  co n v ic tio n  ( P T T , P T P , P T V ) (  S o u rce  
see C h a p te r  3 ) .
T h is  v a r ia b le  is h ypothes ized  to have a n eg ative  e ffe c t on c r im e .
11 . P e rc e n t o f cases  re so lv ed  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt (T H IG H E R , P H IG H E R ,  
V H IG H E R ) (S o u rc e : see C h a p te r  3 ) .
T h is  v a r ia b le  re p re s e n ts  F a and is  hypothes ized  to have a n eg ative  
e ffe c t on c r im e .
12. P e rc e n t o f  co n v ic tio n s  w h ich  a re  fe lo n ie s  (T F E L O N Y ,  P F E L O N Y ,  
V F E L O N Y )  (S o u rc e : see C h a p te r  3 ) .
T h is  v a r ia b le  re p re s e n ts  F ^  and is  hypothesized  to have a n eg ative  
e ffe c t on c r im e .
13 . P e rc e n t o f  in c a rc e ra tio n  sen tences  w h ich  a re  p r is o n  sentences  
( P P T ,  P P P ,  P P V )  (S o u rc e : see C h a p te r  3 ) .
T h is  v a r ia b le  re p re s e n ts  F c and is  h ypothes ized  to have a n eg ative  
e ffe c t on c r im e .
R e g re ss io n  R e s u lts  
The re s u lts  fo r  the s ta t is t ic a l e s tim a tio n  o f equations ( 4 .1 )  through
( 4 .3 )  a re  p re se n te d  in T a b le  6 . T h e  c o e ffic ie n ts  a re  p re s e n te d , as w e ll
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as the c o r re la t io n  c o e ffic ie n t fo r  the e n tire  eq u a tio n , and the F -v a lu e s  
fo r  the e n t ire  eq u atio n s .
In te rm s  o f the s o c io -e c o n o m ic  v a r ia b le s , th e re  is  only one w ith  
the expected  e ffe c t on c r im e — o e rc e n t o f popu lation  w h ich  is  n o nw hite .
T h e  c o e ffic ie n t on the p e rc e n t o f the population  w h ich  is nonw hite is 
h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t (a t the 1 % le v e l)  and p o s itiv e  in a ll th re e  eq u atio n s .
In the equations  w h ich  e s tim a te  v io le n t o ffenses  and a ll  o ffe n s e s , the 
p e rc e n t o f the po p u la tio n  betw een the ages o f 15 and 19 is found to have  
a n eg ative  e ffe c t on the c r im e  r a te .  T h is  unexpected  re s u lt  m ay be 
ra t io n a liz e d  by the fa c t th a t a la rg e  teenage popu lation  m ay in d ica te  a  
la rg e  p e rce n ta g e  o f  fa m ilie s  in the co unty . A n d , the g r e a te r  the fa m ily  
t ie s ,  the le s s  p rone  the head o f the household w i l l  be to e n te r  into r is k y  
s itu a tio n s .
Th e  p e rc e n t o f a d u lts  w ith  low  schooling  has a  n eg ative  e ffe c t on 
p ro p e r ty  c r im e s  and on a ll  c r im e s .  T h is  re s u lt  c o n tra d ic ts  o u r hypo­
th e s is . B u t, the p e rc e n t o f  ad u lts  w ith  low  schoo ling  is  p o s it iv e ly  re la te d  
to the p e rc e n t n o n w h ite ,  ̂ and th e re fo re  som e o f the e ffe c ts  o f lo w  
schoo ling  m ay  be included  in the c o e ffic ie n t on the nonw hite v a r ia b le .
T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  has a  n eg ative  and h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t (a t  the 
5% le v e l)  e ffe c t on a l l  c r im e s  and on p ro p e r ty  c r im e s .  T h e  v a r ia b le  F a , 
m e as u re d  by the p e rc e n t o f cases  re so lv ed  in the s u p e r io r  c o u rt is 
n e g a tiv e ly  re la te d  to p ro p e r ty  o ffen ses  a t the 19% le v e l o f s ig n ific a n c e  
and is  n e g a tiv e ly  re la te d  to a ll o ffen ses  a t the 2 0 % le v e l o f s ig n if ic a n c e .
TABLE 6
R E G R E S S IO N  R E S U L T S
E quation  1: A l l  o ffenses
C o n stan t Y A G E  P E R N W  P Q V  P E R F E M  U R B A N  L O S C H L  M E D Y  
c o e ffic ie n t 12527 -2 5 5 8 7 *  5 1 8 1 1 * *  2 0 .4  - 4 7 .5  8 . 6  - 5 1 3 . 8 * *  - . 1 9
s ta n d a rd  e r r o r  17128 7714 206  265 1 6 .2  187 .3 6
P A T P O T P T T T H IG H E R T F E L O N Y P P T
c o e ffic ie n t -8 3 3 9 *  *











@F  = 1 5 .9
R  S q u a re  = .8 1 3 8 2  
A d ju s ted  R  S q u a re  ~ .7 6 3 4 0
* *  s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t the 5% le v e l ( t - t e s t )
* s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t the 1 0 % le v e l ( t - t e s t )
# s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t the 2 0 % le v e l ( t - t e s t )
d> s ig n if ic a n t a t the 1 % le v e l
TABLE 6 (cont'd)
REGRESSION RESULTS
E quation  2: P ro p e r ty  o ffen ses  
C o n stan t Y A G E  
c o e ffic ie n t 12394 —20100
P E R N W  P O V
46358r - o * * 1 7 .4
P E R F E M  U R B A N  L O S C H L  M E D Y
- 5 2 .9 15.1 - 5 4 5 * *  - . 1 9
s tan d ard  e r r o r 15976 7243 192 252 1 5 .6 178 .3 4
c o e ffic ie n t
P A P
- 7 5 1 9 * *
P C P P T P
639  -281
P  H IG H E R
- 2  170
P F E L O N Y
-1 7 2 3 *
P P P
5 .1
s ta n d ard  e r r o r  3725 1353 933 1406 1065 827
F  = 1 5 .5  @
R  S q u a re  = .8 0 7 6 2  
A d ju s ted  R  S q u a re  = .75551
* *  s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t the 5% le v e l ( t - t e s t )
* s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t the 1 0 % le v e l ( t - t e s t )
#  s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t  the 2 0 % le v e l ( t - t e s t )
@ s ig n if ic a n t a t the 1 % le v e l
TABLE 6 (cont'd)
REGRESSION RESULTS
E quation  3: V io le n t  O ffe n s es  
C o n stan t Y A G E  
c o e ffic ie n t 1 8 2 .9  -1 4 6 7 *
s tan d ard  e r r o r 993
P E R N W  P O V
3869
475
P E R F E M  U R B A N  L O S C H L  M E D Y








- . 0 2 6
.02
P A V  P C V
coeffic ien t: - 1 4 .3  .9 5
s tan d ard  e r r o r  218  90
F  = 2 1 . 0 ®
R  S q u a re  = .8 5 5 1 6  
A d ju s ted  R  S q u a re  = .8 1 5 9 3
* *  s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t the 5% le v e l ( t - t e s t )  
* s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  fro m  z e ro  a t  the 1 0 % le v e l ( t - t e s t )
@ s ig n if ic a n t a t the 1 % le v e l
P T V  V H 1G H E R  V F E L O N Y  P P V
3 8 .9  2 1 .9  - 4 7 .9  7 0 .4
4 4 .7  6 8 .5  6 5 .0  5 3 .5
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T h e  v a r ia b le  re p re s e n tin g  the co s t o f co n v ic tio n  (F ^ ) ,  p e rc e n t o f c o n v ic ­
tions  w h ich  a re  fe lo n ie s , is a lso  s ig n if ic a n t a t the 1 0 % le v e l in the case  
o f p ro p e r ty  c r im e s  and is s ig n if ic a n t a t the 2 0 % le v e l in the case of 
a ll  o ffen s e s .
None o f the la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  have a s ig n if ic a n t e ffe c t on 
c r im e  in the case o f the v io le n t o ffen s e s . T h is  re s u lt  is  co n s is ten t 
w ith  an approach  w h ich  c la im s  th a t in d iv id u a ls  who c o m m it c r im e s  of 
pass ion  ( i . e .  , v io le n t o ffen s e s ) a re  u s u a lly  not ra tio n a l when they c o m m it  
such o ffen ses  and th e re fo re  a re  not resp o n s ive  to econo m ic  in c e n tiv e s .
An a lte rn a t iv e  reaso n  fo r  a la c k  o f s ig n if ic a n t re la tio n s h ip  found betw een  
v io le n t c r im e s  and the le v e l o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t fo r  v io le n t o ffen ses  is  
because o f the d a ta . In m any o f the c o u n tie s , th e re  w e re  v e ry  few  
v io le n t o ffen ses  w h ich  o c c u rre d  in 1970 . T h e  d iffe re n c e  o f one o r  two 
c r im e s  could m a ke  a v e ry  la rg e  d iffe re n c e  in the c r im e  ra te s  o f the 
c o u n tie s . A ls o , in a county w ith  on ly  a  few  t r ia ls  fo r  v io le n t o ffenses  
p e r  y e a r ,  the ou tcom e o f one case could have a la rg e  e ffe c t on the 
m e a s u re d  le v e ls  o f  la w  e n fo rc e m e n t. A  la r g e r  a g g reg a tio n  o f  o b s erv a tio n s  
w ould  have to be m ade b e fo re  accep tin g  the n u ll hypothesis  th a t v io le n t  
c r im e  cannot be d e te r re d  through la w  e n fo rc e m e n t.
T h e  m agnitude o f the e ffe c ts  o f  each o f the la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s
can be c o m p are d  by exa m in in g  the e la s t ic ity  o f  the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t
2
to each o f these independent v a r ia b le s . E la s t ic it ie s  a re  com puted a t the 
m ean va lu e  fo r  each o f the independent v a r ia b le s  and a re  p resen ted  in
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T a b le  7 . In m o s t c a s e s , the e la s t ic it ie s  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t  
to la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  a re  q u ite  s m a ll ( le s s  than .5  in 
abso lu te  v a lu e ).
In s u m m a ry , the re la tio n s h ip  betw een c r im e  and la w  e n fo rc e m e n t in 
the case o f v io le n t o ffen ses  is  in c o n c lu s iv e . And the re la tio n s h ip  
betw een c r im e  and law  e n fo rc e m e n t in the case o f a ll  o ffen ses  and p ro p e rty  
c r im e s  is as fo llo w s: T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is  found to be h ig h ly  
s ig n if ic a n tly  re la te d  to c r im e  in a n eg ative  d ire c t io n . T h e  c o s t, to the 
o ffe n s e r , o f a r r e s t  and the c o s t , to the o ffe n d e r o f co n v ic tio n  g iven  
a r r e s t ,  a re  a ls o  re la te d  to c r im e  in a n eg ative  and s ig n if ic a n t m a n n e r .
In the cases  w h e re  the law  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s  a re  s ig n if ic a n tly  
re la te d  to the c r im e  r a te ,  th e ir  e la s t ic it ie s  a r e  be low  .5  in abso lu te  
v a lu e .
T A B L E  7
E L A S T IC IT IE S  O F  T H E  IN D E P E N D E N T  V A R IA B L E S  
W IT H  R E S P E C T  T O  T H E  C R IM E  R A T E
A ll  C r im e s  P ro p e r ty  C r im e s  V io le n t C r im e s
P A - . 4 4 - . 3 7 - . 0 3
P C - . 0 1 . 1 0 . 0 0
P T . 0 1 - . 0 4 .0 8
H IG H E R
COI - . 4 9 .0 7
F E L O N Y - . 1 9 - . 2 9 - .  1 2
P P . 0 2 . 0 0 .1 9
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W e can co m p are  these re s u lts  w ith  the O L S  re s u lts  obta ined  by  
E h r l ic h .  H is  e la s t ic ity  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t to the p ro b a b ility  
o f im p r is o n m e n t w as  found to be about -  .5  fo r  a ll  o ffe n s e s , p ro p e r ty  
o ffen ses  and v io le n t o ffe n s e s . E h r lic h  tes ted  h is  hypotheses using  
s ta te w id e  d a ta  fo r  1 96 0 . T h e  e la s t ic it ie s  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t  
to a v e ra g e  len g th  o f sentence w e re  found to be about -  .3 5  fo r  v io le n t  
o ffen ses  and -  .6 0  fo r  p ro p e r ty  o ffen ses  and a ll  o ffe n s e s . 4  E h r lic h  found 
a p o s itiv e  and s ig n if ic a n t re la tio n s h ip  betw een m ed ian  incom e and c r im e  
and a ls o  found a p o s itiv e  and s ig n if ic a n t re la tio n s h ip  betw een p e rc e n t  
p o o r and c r im e  and betw een p e rc e n t nonw hite and c r im e .
E h r l ic h 's  p ro b a b ility  m e a s u re  does not d ir e c t ly  c o m p a re  to the 
ones used in th is  a n a ly s is . One a n a ly s is , p e r fo rm e d  by S jo q u is t , 
s e p a ra te s  the o v e ra ll  p ro b a b ility  into the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  and the 
p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t .  S jo q u is t p e r fo rm e d  a O L S  te s t  
o f the c r im e  supply  fu n c tio n , using  1968 d ata  on p ro p e r ty  c r im e s  fo r  53  
m u n ic ip a lit ie s . He found a s ig n if ic a n t e la s t ic ity  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  
re s p e c t to the a r r e s t  ra te  o f about -  .4 0  and an in s ig n ific a n t re la tio n s h ip  
betw een  the co n v ic tio n  ra te  (g iven  a r r e s t )  and c r im e .  W hen he com bined  
the p ro b a b ility  o f  a r r e s t  and the p ro b a b ility  o f co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t  
into one v a r ia b le ,  he a ls o  obta ined  a  c o e ffic ie n t (e la s t ic i ty )  equal to 
about - . 3 5  and s ig n if ic a n t. S jo q u is t a lso  found a s ig n if ic a n t e la s t ic ity  o f 
the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t to ave ra g e  sentence len g th  o f about -  .3 0  
(H e  used the a v e ra g e  len g th  o f sentence in the s ta te  as  the m e a s u re ).
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T h e  s o c io -e c o n o m ic  v a r ia b le s  used by S jo q u is t a re  d if f ic u lt  to 
c o m p a re  w ith  E h r lic h s ' o r  w ith  the v a r ia b le s  used in th is  a n a ly s is ,  
since they a re  qu ite  d if fe re n t .  O v e ra ll  the c o e ffic ie n ts  obta ined  by  
S jo q u is t about the p ro b a b ilit ie s  a re  lo w e r  than the ones obta ined  by 
E h r lic h  and s im i la r  to the re s u lts  found in o u r a n a ly s is .
M a th ie so n  and P a s s e ll use the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  in th e ir  
s u p p ly -o f-o ffe n s e s  function  fo r  N ew  Y o r k  C ity  p o lice  p re c in c ts . In 
th e ir  O L S  e s t im a te s , they  find  the e la s t ic ity  o f  the c r im e  race w ith  
re s p e c t to the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  to be about - 1  .
B u t, th e ir  re s u lts  a re  not q u ite  c o m p a ra b le  to the o th e r  s tu d ie s , 
sin ce  these a u th o rs  use such s m a ll u n its  o f o b s e rv a tio n . B y o b s erv in g  
c r im e  w ith in  one c it y ,  it  is  q u ite  p o s s ib le  fo r  c r im in a ls  to tra v e l fro m  
one p re c in c t  to a n o th e r to c o m m it c r im e s .  T h e  p o te n tia l c r im in a l has 
two d e c is io n s  to m ake : w h e th e r o r  not to c o m m it c r im e s  and w h e re  to 
c o m m it c r im e s .  In  the p re s e n t study w h ich  uses a g g re g a te s  o f e n t ire  
co u n ties  as u n its  o f o b s e rv a tio n , i t  is im p lic i t ly  assum ed th a t the t ra v e l  
(m ig ra t io n )  asp ec t to the c r im in a l  d e c is io n -m a k in g  p ro c e s s  is  s m a ll .  
S jo q u is t e x p lic ity  s ta te s  th a t in s e le c tin g  h is  o b s e rv a tio n s , he t r ie s  to 
red u ce  the " s p illo v e r  e f fe c ts ."  T h u s , the r e la t iv e ly  la rg e  e la s t ic ity  o f  
the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t to the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  in the M a th ieso n  
and P a s s e ll study is ,  in p a r t ,  a ttr ib u ta b le  to th e ir  cho ice  o f u n it o f 
o b s e rv a tio n . T h e ir  re s u lts  r e f le c t  not o n ly  th a t c r im in a ls  a re  m o re  p rone  
to c o m m it c r im e s  w hen th e re  is a low  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t ,  but a lso  th a t
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given a  c h o ic e , a c r im in a l  w i l l  c o m m it h is  c r im e s  in an a re a  w ith  a  
lo w  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t .
R e v e rs e  C a u s a lity
T o  w h a t e x te n t m ig h t o u r re s u lts  be a ffe c ted  by the re v e rs e  c a u s a lity  
o f the c r im e  ra te  on the la w  e n fo rc e m e n t v a r ia b le s ?
1) P ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffen se : I t  w as concluded in C h a p te r  2 
th a t because o f re v e rs e  c a u s a lity , the c o e ffic ie n t on the p ro b a b ility  o f 
a r r e s t  w ould  l ik e ly  be an o v e re s tim a te  o f the tru e  e ffe c t o f  a r r e s t  on 
c r im e .  T h e  n e g ative  re la tio n s h ip  betw een the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  and 
the c r im e  ra te  is l ik e ly  to be w e a k e r  i f  a l l  o f the s im u ltan e o u s  e ffe c ts  
w e re  taken into acco u n t.
2 ) P ro b a b il ity  o f c o n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t  (Q ) and p ro b a b ility  o f  
in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  c o n v ic tio n  (R ): T h e  re v e rs e  c a u s a lity  e ffe c ts  o f 
both o f these v a r ia b le s  a re  h yp o th es ized  to be s m a ll ( f ro m  C h a p te r  2 ) .  
T h e r e fo r e ,  the la c k  o f  re la tio n s h ip  betw een Q and R  and the c r im e  ra te  
canno t be a ttr ib u te d  to the b ia s  fro m  not tak ing  the s im u lta n e o u s  n a tu re  
o f the s ys te m  into account w hen p e r fo rm in g  the s ta t is t ic a l a n a ly s is .
3 )  C o st o f  a r r e s t  (F a ) and co s t o f co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t  ( F b): W e  
concluded in C h a p te r  2 th a t th e re  m ig h t be a n e g ative  re la tio n s h ip  betw een  
F a and F b and c r im e  due to the supply  o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t e ffe c t . Such an  
e ffe c t m ig h t be causing  an o b served  n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  betw een  F a  and 
F^  and the c r im e  r a te .  O u r  e s tim a te s  on these v a r ia b le s  m ay  be b ia s e d , 
and w e cannot d is m is s  the p o s s ib ility  th a t F a and F a do not have a
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s ig n if ic a n t e ffe c t on c r im e  in the supply o f o ffenses  fu n c tio n . A  s im u lta ­
neous e s tim a tio n  p ro c e d u re  w ould have to te  p e rfo rm e d  in o rd e r  to 
e lim in a te  p o ss ib le  s im u ltan eo u s  equation D ias .
4 ) C o s t o f in c a rc e ra tio n  net o f a r r e s t  and co n v ic tio n  costs  ( F c ): A lthough  
no s ig n if ic a n t re la tio n s h ip  w as  found betw een th is  v a r ia b le  and the c r im e  
r a te ,  th e re  m ay  e x is t  a s im u ltan eo u s  re la tio n s h ip  betw een the co s t o f  
in c a rc e ra tio n  and the c r im e  ra te  because o f supply  o f la w  e n fo rc e m e n t  
e ffe c ts .
It  w ould be n e c e s s a ry  to p e r fo rm  a d e ta ile d  s im u ltan eo u s  equation  
te s t to c o n firm  the above h yp o th eses . H o w e v e r , w e can b r ie f ly  d iscuss  
the re s u lts  obta ined  by E h r lic h  and M a th ieso n  and P a s s e ll in th e ir  
s im u ltan e o u s  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s e s . In both s tu d ie s , th e re  w e re  two  
p u rp o ses  w h ich  the s im u ltan e o u s  te s t s e rv e d . F i r s t ,  th e re  w as  the  
p ro b le m  o f a p o ss ib le  n e g ative  c o r re la t io n  betw een the c r im e  ra te  and 
the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  (M a th ie s o n  and P a s s e ll 's  s tu d y ) o r  the 
p ro b a b ility  o f im p ris o n m e n t (E h r l ic h 's  s tu d y) due to m e a s u re m e n t e r r o r s  
in the n u m b e r o f c r im e s .  (In  the p re s e n t s tu d y , th is  p o ss ib le  n eg ative  
b ias  is  e lim in a te d  by using two d if fe re n t  e s tim a te s  o f the n u m b e r o f  
c r im e s ) .
T h e  second purpose o f p e r fo rm in g  a s im u ltan e o u s  equation  te s t w as  
to in v es tig a te  the issue o f re v e rs e  c a u s a lity . In both a n a ly s e s , the 
c o e ffic ie n t on the p ro b a b ility  v a r ia b le  w as  n eg ative  and g r e a te r  in abso lu te  
value  than in the O L S  te s t. T h is  s u rp r is in g  re s u lt  is  not e a s ily  e x p la in e d .
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One p o ss ib le  exp lan a tio n  has been o ffe re d  by Nag in , who found th a t 
c o e ffic ie n ts  a re  q u ite  s e n s itiv e  to the e xa c t s p e c ific a tio n  o f the 
s im u ltan eo u s  eq u atio n s . O th e r , e q u a lly  p la u s ib le , s p e c ific a tio n s  have  
lead  to s m a lle r  and ins ignLficant c o e f f ic ie n ts .
T h u s , a lthough o th e r  a u th o rs  have exam in ed  the re v e rs e  c a u s a lity  
is s u e , th e re  is not y e t  c o n cre te  evidence th a t the re v e rs e  c a u s a lity  
accounts fo r  the n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  found betw een  c r im in a l ju s tic e  
actio n s  and the le v e l o f c r im e .
In cap ac ita tio n
T o  w h a t e x te n t m ig h t the s ig n if ic a n t n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  betw een  
the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  and c r im e  be a function  o f in c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c ts ?  
U sing equation  (2 .1 2 )  w e can su b stitu te  the m ean v a lu es  o f the v a r ia b le s  
needed to e s tim a te  the in c ap a c ita tio n  e la s t ic ity  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  
re s p e c t to the p ro b a b ility  o f  a r r e s t  fo r  one o f f e n s e .  W e use the m ean  
v a lu e s  shown in T a b le  4 .  T h e  n u m b e r o f c r im e s  p e r  c r im in a l  ran g es  
fro m  th re e  to s ix  ( f ro m  C h a p te r  2 ) .  T h e  a v e ra g e  in c a rc e ra tio n  p e r io d ,
T ,  is e a s ily  e s tim a te d  as  fo llo w s:
( 4 . 4 ) T  = (p e rc e n t o f in c a rc e ra tio n s  w h ich  a re  in ) x (a v e ra g e  j a i l  s ta y )  
lo c a l ja i ls
+ (p e rc e n t o f in c a rc e ra tio n s  w hich  a re  in ) x (a v e ra g e  p ris o n  s tay )  
p ris o n s
T h e  p e rc e n t o f in c a rc e ra tio n s  in p ris o n  is show n, fro m  T a b le  4 ,  to 
be about 42% fo r  a ll  o ffen ses  and 43% fo r  p ro p e r ty  o ffe n s e s . T h e  p e rc e n t  
o f in c a rc e ra tio n s  in ja i ls  is  th e re fo re  about 58% fo r  a ll o ffen ses  and 57%
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fo r  p ro p e r ty  o ffe n s e s . T h e  a ve ra g e  ja i l  s tay  is  about fo u r m onths and
g
the a ve ra g e  p r is o n  stay  is about two y e a r s .  T h u s , T ,  the a ve ra g e  
in c a rc e ra tio n  p e rio d  is 1 .0 3  y e a rs  fo r  a ll  o ffen ses  and is 1 .0 5  y e a rs  
fo r  p ro p e r ty  o ffe n s e s .
S u b s titu tin g  . 1 7 6 ,Q -|-= . 5 1 2 , R -p = .5 9 9 , T-p=1 .0 3  and N=3 into
equation  (2 . 1 2 ) ,  w e find  the in c a rc e ra tio n  e la s t ic ity  o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  
re s p e c t to the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffense  is  - . 0 8 7 .  I f  N eq u a ls  
s ix , the in c ap a c ita tio n  e la s t ic ity  is - . 0 9 6 .  Both o f these e la s t ic it ie s  a re  
w e ll below  the a v e ra g e  e s tim a te d  e la s t ic ity  (f ro m  T a b le  6 ) o f - . 4 4 .  T h e  
o b served  re la tio n s h ip  betw een the c r im e  ra te  and the p ro b a b ility  c f  a r r e s t  
fo r  one o ffense (a ll  fe lo n ie s ) is  not s o le ly  a ttr ib u ta b le  to in c ap a c ita tio n  
e ffe c ts .
S u b s titu tin g  < )̂p = . 1 5 7 ,Q p  = .501 ,R p = .4 3 4 ,  and T p = 1  .0 5  into  
equation  (2 .1 2 )  when N eq u a ls  th r e e ,  w e find  the in c ap a c ita tio n  e la s t ic ity  
o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t to the p ro b a b ility  o f  a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffense  
is .0 6 2 . I f  the a v e ra g e  n u m b e r o f o ffen ses  p e r  c r im in a l p e r  y e a r  is  s ix ,  
then the in c ap a c ita tio n  e la s t ic ity  o f the p ro p e r ty  c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t  
to the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  fo r  one o ffense  is  .0 7 3 .  Both o f these e la s ­
t ic i t ie s  a re  w e ll be low  the a v e ra g e  e s tim a te d  e la s t ic ity  ( f ro m  T a b le  6 ) 
o f the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  w ith  re s p e c t to the c r im e  ra te  equal to - . 3 7 .  
In c ap a c ita tio n  e ffe c ts  a lone cannot account fo r  the n eg ative  re la tio n s h ip  
found betw een the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  and the c r im e  r a te .
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F O O T N O T E S
^P earson  r  = + . 7 7  
2
T h is  is  equal to:
m ean va lu e  o f independent v a r ia b le  
c o e ffic ie n t x m ean v a lu e  o f the c r im e  ra te
3
E h r lic h  a lso  tes ted  h is  hypotheses on d a ta  fo r  1940 and 1950.
T h e se  re s u lts  a re  s im i la r  to the 1960 r e s u lts .
4
S jo q u is t , " P ro p e r ty  C r im e  and E co n o m ic  B e h a v io r ."
^ D a n ie l N a g in , "A n In v es tig a tio n  into the A s s o c ia tio n  B etw een  C r im e  
and S a n c tio n s ."  P h .D .  d is s e r ta t io n , (P itts b u rg h : C a rn e g ie  M e llo n  
U n iv e rs ity , fo rth c o m in g )
fa
S o u rc e s  o f in fo rm a tio n : New Y o r k  S ta te  D e p a rtm e n t o f 
C o rre c t io n s  and N ew  Y o r k  S ta te  D iv is io n  o f C r im in a l  J u s tic e  S e r v ic e s .
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C H A P T E R  5 
C O N C L U S IO N S
One o f the p u rp o ses  o f th is  study w as to p ro v id e  a th e o re tic a l and  
e m p ir ic a l fra m e w o rk  fo r  te s tin g  the d if fe re n t ia l im p a c t o f v a r io u s  
c r im in a l ju s tic e  s tra te g ie s  on c r im e .  M o s t o f the eco n o m is ts  who have  
in ves tig a ted  the c r im e  issue have found th a t the th re a t  o f p u n ish m en t does  
d e te r  c r im in a l a c t iv ity .  W e w anted  to in v es tig a te  w h ich  asp ects  o f 
p o ten tia l p u n ish m en t d e te r  the m o st c r im e .  3 y  p o s tu la tin g  a  m odel in 
w h ich  th e re  a re  fo u r  s ta tes  o f the w o r ld ,  it is  p o ss ib le  to iso la te  the  
in d iv id u a l d e te r re n t  e ffe c ts  o f a r r e s t ,  co n vic tio n  and in c e ra tio n .
G iven  the assu m p tio n s  o f the p re s e n t m o d e l, the b e h a v io ra l im p lic a ­
tions do not in d ica te  th a t one c r im in a l  ju s tic e  p o lic y  w il l  n e c e s s a r ily  d e te r  
m o re  c r im e  than a n o th e r. T h a t  is ,  an in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f  
a r r e s t  a ffe c ts  the expected  u t i l i ty  function  in a d if fe re n t  m a n n e r than an 
in c re a s e  in the p ro b a b ility  o f c o n v ic tio n . F ro m  the m o d e l, w e cannot 
conclude w h ich  p ro b a b ility  has the s tro n g e s t e ffe c t on the expected  
u t i l i ty  fu n c tio n . E ven  i f  w e knew  the r is k  p re fe re n c e  o f the in d iv id u a ls  
we s t i l l  could  not p re d ic t  w h ich  c r im in a l ju s tic e  p o lic y  w il l  have the 
g re a te s t d e te r re n t  im p a c t on the c r im e  r a te .
G iven  o u r  m o d e l, the d if fe re n t ia l  im p ac t o f ap p reh e n s io n , co n v ic tio n  
and in c a rc e ra tio n  on c r im e  is an e m p ir ic a l m a tte r .  In the e m p ir ic a l
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a n a ly s is , we p re d ic t  th a t the le v e l o f c r im e  is a function  of: the 
p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t ,  the co st to the o ffe n d e r o f a r r e s t ,  the p ro b a b ility  
o f co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t ,  the co st to the o ffe n d e r o f co n v ic tio n  net 
o f a r r e s t  c o s t, the p ro b a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven co n v ic tio n  and 
the co st to the o ffe n d e r o f in c a rc e ra tio n  ne t o f co n v ic tio n  c o s ts . A ls o ,  
the c r im e  ra te  is  h ypothes ized  to be a function  o f the v a r ia b le s  w h ich  
a ffe c t le g a l and il le g a l wage ra te s . T h e  m odel is tes ted  using d ata  
on the 62 co u n ties  in N ew  Y o rk  S ta te  fo r  1970.
T h e  re s u lts  in d ica te  th a t the th re a t o f p u n ish m en t does d e te r  
in d iv id u a ls  in New Y o r k  S ta te  fro m  c o m m ittin g  c r im e s .  T h u s , the 
g e n e ra l d e te rre n c e  m o d e l's  im p lic a tio n s  a re  c o n firm e d  in th is  te s t .
T h e  p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is  found to have a h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t  
n eg ative  e ffe c t on a ll  o ffen ses  and on p ro p e r ty - r e la te d  o ffe n s e s , hold ing  
o th e r  v a r ia b le s  c o n stan t. A ls o , the c o s t to che o ffe n d e r o f a r r e s t  and 
the co s t o f co n v ic tio n  n et o f the co s t o f a r r e s t  a re  found to d e te r  o ffe n d e rs  
f ro m  c o m m ittin g  p ro p e r ty - r e la te d  c r im e s  and a ll  o ffe n s e s . T h e  e la s t ic ity  
o f the c r im e  ra te  w ith  re s p e c t to these th re e  v a r ia b le s  is found to range  
betw een about - . 2 0  and - . 4 5 .  B ecause o f  the s iz e  o f the s ta n d ard  e r r o r s  
re la t iv e  to the c o e ff ic ie n ts , a r e lia b le  ra n k in g  o f the re la t iv e  d e te r re n t  
e ffe c ts  o f the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t ,  the c o s t to the o ffe n d e r o f a r r e s t  
and o f the co s t to the o ffe n d e r  o f  co n v ic tio n  ne t o f a r r e s t  c o s ts .c a n n o t be m ade
G iven  these in it ia l  r e s u lts — th a t the p ro b a b ility  o f a r r e s t  is found to 
have a s ig n if ic a n t d e te r re n t  e ffe c t on c r im e  and the p ro b a b ilit ie s  o f
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co n v ic tio n  g iven  a r r e s t  and o f  in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven co n vic tio n  do not 
have a s ig n if ic a n t d e te r re n t  e ffe c t on c r im e — it  is q u ite  p o s s ib le  that 
som e c r im in a l ju s tic e  p o lic ie s  do have a g r e a te r  e ffe c t on c r im e  than  
o th e rs . F o r  e x a m p le , a c u r re n t ly  p o p u la r approach  to c r im in a l ju s tic e  
is  to advocate  m a n d a to ry  sentencing  fo r  c e r ta in  types o f o ffen ses  o r  fo r  
c e r ta in  types o f o ffe n d e rs . I f  the re s u lt  o f a m a n d a to ry  sentencing  p o licy  
w ould  be to in c re a s e  the p ro b a b ility  o f in c a rc e ra tio n  g iven  c o n v ic tio n , 
and i f  a l l  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  could be held c o n s ta n t, a d m in is tra to rs  m ig h t 
be d isappo in ted  a t the s m a lt e ffe c t such a p o lic y  m ig h t have on c r im e .
O u r re s u lts  p re s e n t o n ly  one p iece  o f e v id e n c e , and d e fin it iv e  
co n clu s io n s  about the d if fe re n t ia l  im p a c t o f v a r io u s  c r im in a l ju s tic e  
p o lic ie s  cannot be re a c h e d . H o w e v e r , the ev id en ce  does suggest the  
s ig n ific a n t d iffe re n c e s  in the d e te r re n t  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f d if fe re n t  p o lic ie s  
m a y  e x is t .  F u r th e r  re s e a rc h  w il l  su p p o rt o r  r e f u t e  o u r  fin d in g .
T h e  g e n e ra l issue re m a in s — w h at c a n , and shou ld , the p u b lic  s e c to r  
do about c r im e ?  I f  a d m in is tra to rs  w an t to devote p u b lic  funds fo r  the  
purpose o f d e te r r in g  c r im in a l  a c t iv i ty ,  they should have som e u nderstand ing  
of: 1) T h e  re la tio n s h ip  betw een e x p e n d itu re s  and the le v e l o f c r im in a l  
ju s t ic e  san ctio n  and 2 ) T h e  re la tio n s h ip  betw een the sanction  le v e l and 
c r im in a l  a c t iv ity .  In  th is  a n a ly s is , w e have co n cen tra ted  on the second  
is s u e . F u r th e r  ev idence  on both issu es  w il l  help p u b lic  a d m in is tra to rs  
b e tte r  d e te rm in e  how to b est a llo c a te  p u b lic  funds fo r  c r im in a l  d e te rre n c e  
p u rp o s e s .
94
B IB L IO G R A P H Y
B ecker-, G a ry  S . " C r im e  and P u n ish m en t: An E co n o m ic  A p p ro a c h ."
In E ssays  in the E co n o m ics  o f C r im e  and P u n is h m e n t. E d ited  by  
G a ry  S .  B e c k e r  and W il l ia m  L a n d e s . N ew  Y o rk :  C o lu m b ia  U n iv e rs ity  
P r e s s ,  1974 .
C a n — H i l l ,  R . A .  and S te r n ,  N . H .  "A n  E c o n o m e tr ic  M o d e l o f the S upply  
and C o n tro l o f R eco rd ed  O ffen ses  in England and W a le s ."  J o u rn a l 
o f P u b lic  E co n o m ics  2 (N o v e m b e r 1973}.
D e p a rtm e n t o f  C o m m e rc e , U . S .  B u reau  o f the C e n s u s . C ounty and C ity  
D a ta  Book 1972 . W ash ington: G o v ern m e n t P r in t in g  O ff ic e , 1973 .
E h r l ic h ,  Is a a c , " P a r t ic ip a t io n  in I l le g it im a te  A c t iv it ie s :  An E co n o m ic  
A n a ly s is , " In E ss a ys  in the E co n o m ics  o f C r im e  and P u n is h m e n t. 
E d ited  by G a ry  S .  B e c k e r  and W il l ia m  L a n d e s . N ew  Y o rk :  C o lu m b ia  
U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1974 .
____________ . "T h e  D e te r re n t  E ffe c t o f C a p ita l P u n ish m en t: A  Q u estio n  o f
L ife  and D e a th . " A m e r ic a n  E co n o m ic  R e v ie w  65 (June 1 97 5 ).
E h r l ic h ,  Isaac  and B e c k e r , G a ry  S .  " M a r k e t  In s u ra n c e , S e lf - In s u ra n c e  
and S e lf -P r o te c t io n .  " J o u rn a l o f P o lit ic a l  Econom y 8 0 , J u ly  1 97 2 .
E n n is , P h i l ip .  C r im in a l  V ic t im iz a t io n  in the U n ited  S ta te s . F ie ld
S u rv e y s  I I .  A  R e p o rt o f a N a t io n a l.S u r v e y . P re s id e n t 's  C o m m is s io n  
on L aw  E n fo rc e m e n t and A d m in is tra t io n  o f J u s t ic e . W ashington:
U . S .  G o v e rn m e n t P r in t in g  O f f ic e , 1967 .
G re e n b e rg , D a v id . "T h e  In c a p a c ita tiv e  E ffe c t o f Im p riso n m e n t:S o m e  
E s t im a te s ."  L a w  and S o c ie ty  R e v ie w  9 (S u m m e r  1975 ).
H in d e la n g , M ic h a e l;  D unn , C h r is to p h e r; S a lto n , L .  P au l; and A u m ic k
A lis o n . S o u rceb o o k  o f  C r im in a l  J u s tic e  S ta t is t ic s  1973. U . S .  L aw  
E n fo rc e m e n t A s s is ta n c e  A d m in is tra t io n , N a tio n a l C r im in a l J u s tic e  
In fo rm a tio n  and S ta t is t ic s  S e r v ic e .  W ash ington: G o v ern m e n t P r in t in g  
O ff ic e , 1973 .
Jo h n sto n , J .  E c o n o m e tr ic  M ethods . 2nd e d . N ew  Y o rk :  M c G r a w -H il l ,  1972.
K o b r in , S . ;  H an sen , E . W . ;  L u b e c k , S .  G .;  and Y e a m e n , R . T h e  D e te r re n t  
E ffe c tive n e ss  o f C r im in a l  J u s tic e  S an ctio n  S tra te g ie s : S u m m a ry  R e p o r t . 
W ashing ton : L a w  E n fo rc e m e n t A s s is ta n c e  A d m in is tra t io n , N a tio n a l 
In s titu te  o f L a w  E n fo rc e m e n t and C r im in a l J u s t ic e , 1973.
95
M athLeson, D onald and P a s s e ll ,  P e t e r .  "H o m ic id e  and R o b b ery  in New  
Y o r k  C ity : An E co n o m ic  M o d e l. " J o u rn a l o f  L e g a l S tu d ie s  5 
(J a n u a ry  1976 ),
N a g in , D a n ie l. "A n  In ves tig a tio n  into the A s s o c ia tio n  B etw een  C r im e  and 
S a n c tio n s . P h . d .  d is s e r ta t io n . P itts b u rg h : C a rn e g ie -M e llo n  
U n iv e rs ity ,  fo rth c o m in g .
N a g in , D a n ie l and B lu m s te in , A l f r e d ,  "O n the O p tim u m  U se o f In c a rc e ra tio n  
fo r  C r im e  C o n tr o l. "  O p e ra tio n s  R e s e a rc h  (fo r th c o m in g ).
P h i l l ip s ,  L la d  and V o te y , H a ro ld , J r .  "A n  E co n o m ic  A n a ly s is  o f the  
D e te r re n t  E ffe c t- o f  L e w  E n fo rc em e rtc n  C r im in a l  A c t iv i t ie s ."
J o u rn a l o f  C r im in a l  L a w , C rim o n o lo g y  and P o lic y  S c ie n c e  63  
(S e p te m b e r  1 97 2 ).
S h in n a r , S h lo m o  and S h in n a r , R e u e l. "T h e  E ffe c ts  o f the C r im in a l
J u s tic e  S y s te m  on the C o n tro l o f C r im e : A  Q u a n tit ia t iv e  A p p ro a c h ."  
L aw  and S o c ie ty  R e v ie w  9 (S u m m e r  1 97 5 ).
S jo q u is t, D av id  L .  " P ro p e r ty  C r im e  and E co n o m ic  B e h a v io r: S om e  
E m p ir ic a l  R e s u lts ."  A m e r ic a n  E co n o m ic  R e v ie w  83 (June 1 97 3 ).
S t ig le r ,  G eo rg e  J .  "C n  the O p tim u m  E n fo rc e m e n t o f L a w s . "  In E ss a ys  in 
the E co n o m ics  o f C r im e  and P u n is h m e n t. E d ited  by G a ry  S .  B e c k e r  
and W il l ia m  L a n d e s . N ew  Y o rk : C o lu m b ia  U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1974 .
S w im m e r ,  E ugene. " M e a s u re m e n t o f  the E ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f U rb an  L a w
E n fo rc e m e n t-A  S im u ltan e o u s  A p p ro a c h . " S o u th ern  E co n o m ic  J o u rn a l 
40  (A p r i l  1 9 7 4 ).
T h e i l ,  H e n r i .  P r in c ip le s  o f  E c o n o m e tr ic s . N ew  Y o rk : John W ile y  and 
S o n s , In c . 1971 .
U . S .  D e p a rtm e n t o f J u s t ic e , F e d e ra l B u reau  o f In ves  tig a tio n  . U n ifo rm  
C r im e  R e p o rts  fo r  the U . S .  (U C R ). P r in te d  a n n u a lly  1933 to d a te . 
W ashington: U . S .  G o v ern m e n t P r in tin g  O ff ic e .
